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 This dissertation revolves around two questions: what kind of a politics can 
one imagine taking hold in the Filipino diaspora, and what place can literature 
occupy therein?  These questions come from a primary set of concerns: firstly, the 
predominantly nationalistic and hierarchical tendencies of theories of the Filipino 
diaspora’s potential politics; and secondly, the capacity for literature to engender 
political concepts, and what, then, the role of the reader plays as the receptor and 
creator of these concepts.  
 Accordingly, this dissertation is divided into two parts: a theoretical 
determination of the political categories that allow one to think the idea of a non-
hierarchical diasporic politics, and a literary critical elaboration of these categories.  
In the first part, I engage a variety of texts, from theoretical works that deal with the 
concept of a revolutionary subjectivity, to historical and theoretical texts that 
address the issue of Filipino politics.  The thesis I begin with is that the hierarchies 
that Filipino and Filipino American scholars and activists end up reproducing are 
directly related to the problems posed by the American return to the Philippines at 
the end of World War 2.  The main problem is how democracy, as represented by 
the U.S. vis-à-vis fascism, is conceived.  In the end, I conclude that democracy is, 
historically speaking, inextricable from American imperialism.  This is why 
nationalism ends up creating hierarchies: because democracy is, in its alignment 
with Empire, also inextricable from the State, the implicit ally of nationalisms of all 
kinds.  
 I propose an alternative model: the constellational diaspora, in which the 
Philippines is included in the diaspora as a site for action, thus removing its 
centrality within any diasporic nationalism.  One can encounter this 
constellationality, as I call it, in literature, which can operate a series of ideas 
through which the reader is able to imagine from a particular perspective the 
concept of a non-hierarchical politics.  The figure that culminates this dissertation’s 
political trajectory is a specific one, disavowing all Empires, nations, and States 
alike: the traitor as a general political category.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
           “. . . there is no criterion for establishing a correspondence between aesthetic virtue and political 
                    virtue.  There are only choices.” 
                  –––Jacques Rancière, “The Janus-Face of Politicized Art” 
 
 
 
 
 The problem of nationalism besieges any thought on the politics of diaspora.  
In the case of the Philippines and the Filipino diaspora, this problem becomes 
especially pronounced: the language of the “homeland,” even among second 
generation diasporic Filipinos, dominates the idea of the Philippines and its place in 
the transnational and planetary topology of Filipino identities.  The political economy 
of contemporary capitalism helps keep this relationship stable: in 2005, remittances to 
the Philippines helped boost personal consumption, which was the largest contributor 
to GDP growth that year.1  These remittances are mostly provided by overseas 
contract workers.  Needless to say, they are the most easily exploitable form of labor: 
not only are they in constant supply (IMF and World Bank policies displacing 
workers from Philippines cities and its provinces all the time), they are also, not being 
legal citizens, not protected by the labor rights of their host countries.  And yet, they 
make more money than Filipinos “at home” do.  Again, the IMF and World Bank 
ensures this: the national currency, the peso, is devalued, tariff ratios are imbalanced, 
national industries are deregulated and privatized, land is enclosed, etc.  The 
continual exploitation and surplus value extraction, the key components to Marx’s 
formula for capitalist accumulation, keep the political economy of the Philippines, 
under capitalism, stable––that is, stable and poor.  The flow of money is only the 
                                                
1 Asia Development Bank.  “Asian Development Outlook 2006: II. Economic Trends and Prospects in 
Developing Asia: Southeast Asia: Philippines.”  
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2006/phi.asp (2007).   
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concrete manifestation of the nation’s central role in the diasporic topology, one 
contoured by capitalism. 
   This dissertation formulates a series of answers to the following question: 
does this political economic foundation of the Filipino diaspora mean that any 
thought on the diaspora’s political possibilities would have to adopt––to accept––the 
limitations imposed upon it by capital?  If indeed the brief overview given above of 
the bases of the diaspora’s constitution is correct, and that any kind of diasporic 
nationalism has its roots in contemporary capitalism’s political economic effects on 
the Philippines, does this mean that any nationalism––which is to say, any diasporic 
politics that grounds itself in the Philippines first as the originary site for the 
constitution of its political ontology––is doomed from the start because it merely 
accepts the terms that have been set for it by what this nationalism aims to 
counteract: the destructive effects of capitalism?  It is a question about the 
possibilities of thinking against and beyond the horizons of capitalism, a question that 
also seeks just what these horizons are in the first place.   
 My answer is definitive: the horizon of any diasporic nationalism, a diasporic 
politics that, because it has to maintain a single nation as its primary source for and 
object of its political energies (in this case, the Philippines), is essentially 
hierarchical, is the State, and concurrently, capitalism and imperialism.  And yes, I 
will show that it is possible to think beyond these horizons, and specifically from the 
perspective that a particular medium can afford the subject: literature.  In literature, 
the reader can encounter the means by which these horizons can be surpassed; 
literature allows the reader to think these possibilities into existence, and in so doing 
enables the reader’s thought on his or her own subjectivity through the new political 
dimensions the narrative has disclosed.   
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I.  METHODOLOGY: POLITICAL ONTOLOGIES 
 What do I mean when I say that the horizon for any diasporic nationalism, of 
which the Filipino diaspora is a particularly acute instance, will always be the State, 
capitalism, and imperialism?  That the hierarchies that compel a diasporic Filipino to 
identify first with the Philippines as “home,” regardless of how far removed he or she 
may be (first or second generation, overseas contract worker, etc.), is a way of 
identifying as a Filipino without submitting the identity of the Filipino, delimited by 
the nation, to the kind of critique it deserves.  As a consequence, the stakes in 
aligning an identity, a political identity no less, with the nation remain beyond the 
scope of rigorous examination.  This is important because the formation of the 
Philippine nation is inseperable from its formation as a State––as a political economic 
unit that, as scholars have repeatedly emphasized, has been from its inception plagued 
by corruption and exploitation, a State that, moreover, is unthinkable without taking 
into consideration its allegiance to American imperialism and the ever-widening and 
penetrating grasp of late twentieth century capitalism.   
 The Filipino, as an ethno-political signifier, was born from the ilustrado 
appropriation of the Spanish designator of a “naturalized” Spanish-born individual 
living in the Philippines.  At the turn of the twentieth-century, with the rebellion 
against the Spanish gaining strength, the ilustrado class (those educated elite of 
which national hero Jose Rizal was a “member”) took the name for themselves, 
seeking to ignite a sense of radical anti-colonial nationalism among those “native” to 
the Philippines, those who identified against the Spanish conquistadores.  The 
unification of the Philippines as a nation, however, did not take place until the 
Americans arrived: it was only until they set up what was nonetheless a very 
differentiated form of rule (military in the provinces, political economic in the 
metropolitan centers) that the idea of the Philippine nation took hold.  The very name 
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“Filipino,” then, will always be marked by the problem of separating the idea of a 
unified ethno-political ontology from what is nonetheless its historical progenitor: 
American imperialism.  I will show more elaborately, in Chapter 1, how this political 
ontology operates in the diaspora.   
 But is it possible to completely and successfully struggle against this 
historical trap?  If I am claiming that indeed it is, however, I do so only by basing my 
claims upon the histories that are already there.  I argue against this history; what I do 
not do is argue a way to think outside of it altogether.   
 In this way, Alain Badiou’s theories of a subtractive ontology are particularly 
helpful.  For him, a political ontology––a militant ontology, a properly political 
subject capable of separating itself from the status quo and thus challenging it––can 
only be constituted by a subtraction from any given socio-political situation.  This 
subtraction involves an event, the rupture of the status quo and consensual fabric of 
the social, from which the subject can then arise.  It bears keeping in mind that a 
militant ontology does not produce what Badiou calls the evental site; it is what 
emerges from it by following the consequences that ensue from that rupture.  It is 
from Badiou that I derive two key notions for thinking the potential militancy of the 
Filipino diaspora: 
 1.  The idea that the subject arises from an evental site, which itself arises 
from the status quo.  The subject can negate the status quo only because it is able to 
think beyond it––but from within the terms that it imposes upon thought.  This, 
ultimately, is the constitutive tension of a militant ontology: that it introduces new 
ways of thinking into the status quo––that is, it does not completely negate the terms 
set forth by it, but negates their significance and destroys their efficacy by including 
them in an entirely new sequence.  This sequence can involve a new way of 
combining lines and figures (as was the case in cubism), or colors (as in Malevich’s 
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revolutionary painting White on White), two of Badiou’s favorite examples of an 
artistic event; or it can involve a political sequence, like that initiated by the October 
Revolution, in which a new proletarian subject came into view.  In all cases, the 
militant subject arises as a potential figure whose concrete manifestation happens as a 
process, not as a result.  What matters is not just that the State ended up swallowing 
the communism that resulted from the October revolution; what also matters is that 
the event took place, that it initiated the possibility of actualizing what was before 
then considered impossible: the creation, on a massive scale, of the idea of a 
proletarian society.  Newness does not arise from nothing; newness arises by 
introducing what is unrecognizable or impossible into what is already there, 
reinscribing the terms of the status quo into a new socio-political logic. 
 2.  That the method of determining the contours of an event is, despite the 
impossibility of creating that event, possible.  Thinking the possibility of the event is 
to participate in the event’s potentiality.  The event, by being theorized, is 
potentiated.  The method that declares the existence of events, that introduces into 
thought the idea that the status quo can be challenged and thenceforth arise a new 
militant subject, is the intellectual threshold of an event.  It is a form of thought that 
is thus political and militant to the core.   
 I will address each of these topics in their turns. 
 That the subject can negate the status quo only from within its horizons is a 
crucial factor in constituting a militant Filipino ontology for the following reason: the 
name Filipino itself designates, simultaneously, both the horizons of nationalism, and 
thus the State, and resistance to it.  If an anti-imperial and anti-capitalist politics is 
possible in the diaspora, it is only because the name Filipino, as the marker of an 
ontology, as the ethno-political designator of a given subject who identifies as 
Filipino, can serve to unify a political community against capital and empire by 
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introducing the negativity that this politics declares into the concept of the Filipino 
itself.  The Filipino as militant ontology induces a separation in the idea of Filipino-
ness, which can only ever name the historically-conditioned problem mentioned 
earlier: that of the Filipino’s rootedness in a State politics inseparable from 
American imperialism.  This is the tension constitutive of a subtractive politics.   
 But we encounter a problem, one that readers of Badiou have already likely 
identified: that of particularism.  Badiou vilifies particularisms of all sorts, and 
instead opts for a universalism based upon the Truth, as he calls it, whose advent the 
event is: the Truth of a militant political upheaval of the status quo.  This kind of 
universalism, formally speaking, is something I do not have a problem with.  Talking 
about the Filipino, however, as a specific diasporic community, seems to run aground 
when we consider this aspect of the militant sequence, one that is so fundamental to 
Badiou’s philosophy that failing to acknowledge this apparent problem is enough to 
make my claims irrelevant.   
  Inasmuch as my thought on the politics of the name draws direct inspiration 
from his political ontology, however, the diasporic politics I advocate herein points 
the way towards the dissolution of the particularism that, in a way, necessarily 
hampers it.  This project, this dissertation, is nothing if not an attempt to think the 
extreme case of a situation within imperialism that, as a limit-case, must be traversed 
in order to realize the end of empire and capital.  The particularity of a Filipino 
diasporic politics is only a preliminary step in the path towards destroying the 
particularity of the movement itself so as to bring about a general insurrection.  This 
is the militant thrust of the ontology I will advance as well as the polemic of which its 
presentation consists.   
 Therein also lies the most important component of the tension constitutive of 
this subtractive ontology: that the Filipino, historically speaking, as an identity 
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constituted by a State and an empire, negates its own foundations, affirming and 
outright denying them at the same time.  It is an ontology in constant erosion, a 
particularity that recognizes the situation thusly: as an instance of what is nonetheless 
a much more general function of capitalism––its extraction of surplus value from the 
poorest of the world.    
 It is in this way that thinking the possibility of a new political ontology means 
participating in its creation.  Producing a method that thinks how a subject can think 
its emergence against the horizons of the State and empire, thinking one’s subtraction 
from their limitations, are already intellectual efforts of the greatest difficulty.  What 
Badiou’s method does, what my own, which is only a humble reinterpretation and 
extension of his, seeks to do, is this: to think militantly, to theorize what a properly 
militant thought does.  This is a theory, moreover, that strives to attain militant 
thought in the situation proper to it.  To put it bluntly, and rather clumsily, it is a 
theory that theorizes what a militant theory consists of, what it does and what it 
allows the theorist to think.  In my case, the intellectual situation is specific: to 
theorize what it would mean to think militantly from within the relative confines of 
literary study and scholarship.  My objective is to demonstrate the possibility of 
thinking a non-hierarchical political ontology of the Filipino diaspora–– through 
literature.  This dissertation, then, is an instance of militant Filipino diasporic literary 
criticism.   
 
II.  LITERATURE AND NATIONALISM 
 
 I therefore have a particular subject in mind, whose potential militancy I will 
elaborate: that of the reader.  My concern with literature has to do with what is today 
perhaps an under-theorized component: the reading process.  The question that 
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animates this dissertation is the following: what concepts can literature produce for 
the reader, and what happens––what can happen––when the reader reads?  What can 
literature do for thought?  To be more specific: what kind of a thought is literature? 
 Accordingly, my theoretical investigations revolve around the extension of 
what is now, in academia, a largely ignored field of inquiry: reader response theory.  
Developed from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the importance I accord to 
this literary theoretical “school” has everything to do with the rather simple but, for 
reasons that surely have to do with the apparently outmoded philosophical tradition 
that gives it its pulse (phenomenology), ignored relationship between two things: the 
subjectivity of the reader and the materiality of the text.  Inasmuch as I am focused on 
looking at how a militant diasporic subject can potentially be constituted, I do not see 
how I could avoid tackling reader response theory and its attendant problems, 
creating, in the process, a new consideration of the theory so that, apropos of the non-
hierarchical ontology of which I gave an indication earlier, the reader-text relation is 
not beset by what I see as the subordination of the relation to a pre-given idea of 
“reality.”  This reality, I will show, is tantamount to the social and political status 
quo.  The stakes in my rereading of reader response theory are high: it means nothing 
less than figuring out a way of how literature can create a thought of the illegitimacy 
of the status quo.  Consequently, this also means that literature can potentially present 
the idea of its undermining, a potentiality that I will demonstrate through my reading 
of Jacques Rancière’s own reading of literature’s capacity to express relations of 
social equality. 
 What does this have to do with diasporic politics?  Essentially, I am 
concerned with looking at how representing the nation could invoke the idea of a 
politics that nonetheless refuses the nation as the legitimator of a political ontology.  
In Filipino and Filipino American criticism, this refusal is absent; indeed, even the 
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most radical of critiques maintains the nation as a central (if not indeed problematic) 
component of a Filipino politics.   
 One such critique is Caroline Hau’s aptly entitled Necessary Fictions.  In this 
book, she discusses the “affinity between literature and nationalism,” an argument 
she makes “on the basis of a common fund of ideas and concerns dealing with the 
possibility and necessity of social change.”  This common fund of ideas between 
literature and nationalism is premised upon their “intimate connection” “through the 
notion of ‘excess,’ a term that [she uses] to refer to the heterogeneous elements––‘the 
people,’ ‘the indigenous,’ ‘the Chinese,’ ‘the political,’ ‘and ‘error’––that inform, but 
also exceed, nationalist attempts to grasp, intellectually and politically, the complex 
realities at work in Philippine society.”2  These excesses, Hau explains, serve to 
designate those elements that cannot be completely subsumed under the national 
project without some violence (both conceptual and physical), a series of 
irreconcilable differences that point to the persistence of the historical limitations that 
prevent a homogeneous national project.  These excesses are thus both failures of the 
national project and indications of the imbrication of the Filipinos’ political capacities 
with the historical circumstances in and through which they act.  This is what Hau 
calls the Filipinos’ “implication in a world . . . both of [their] making and not of 
[their] making.”3  It is to Hau’s credit that she makes the central argument of her 
book by looking at how such contingencies make it impossible to see the various 
nationalisms in the Philippines’ past as thoroughly viable projects.  Indeed, her 
critique of the Communist Party of the Philippines’ basically Statist and limited 
politics remains an indelible instance of truly radical critique.  I do, however, feel 
compelled to offer up my own caveat: if indeed the limitations that confront a 
                                                
2 Caroline S. Hau, Necessary Fictions: Philippine Literature and the Nation, 1946 – 1980 (Quezon 
City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), 6.   
3 ibid, 7.  
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Filipino politics forces the critique to acknowledge include the concept of failure into 
her theorization of its possibilities, why cannot the nation itself be submitted to 
critique, that it cannot be conceived as an historically-determined limitation in itself? 
 It is at this point where I will begin my own investigations.  The premise of 
my dissertation is that the relationship between literature and politics lies in the 
former’s ability to give rise to a thought on the latter as a power that exceeds the 
limitation that is the nation, and that the constitutive tension of a diasporic politics is 
that it acknowledges the imperative to supercede the nation, which nonetheless 
continues to exercise its aggressive hold on the political imagination.  Literature lets 
the reader think this constitutive tension of politics, thus giving rise to a kind of 
political imagination of the Filipino diaspora.  
 I will call the emergence of this constitutive tension, as concept, the 
emergence of the possibility of thinking the absolute negativity that a Filipino 
diasporic politics operates: absolute because it is the total limit of such a politics, 
whose modus operandi is to destroy the nation as an organizer of political ontology, 
and negative because this destruction is the constitutive void of a diasporic politics.  
If the Filipino names, within the horizons of the nation, the collusion of State politics 
and imperial conquest, then the impossible task of this dissertation is to determine 
how it is nevertheless possible to think, through literature, of the Filipino’s 
irreducibility to the Philippines and thus to nationalism.   
 
III.  A NOTE ON ORGANIZATION 
 
 It should be quite obvious by now that I am making some rather polemical 
claims.  The diasporic politics I advance herein is the limit-case of a Filipino 
subjectivity, in that what the latter entails is an intensification of the historical 
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tensions that many scholars of the Philippines (both literary critical and otherwise) 
largely ignore.  This tension has everything to do with the name “Filipino,” which, in 
what follows, I will stretch to its breaking point, close to those regions beyond which 
it would cease to exist, only to pull it back and argue for its necessity, against its total 
abolition.  This is the only way to catch glimpses of that negativity that is so radical 
so as to found a properly militant ontology.  
 The organization of this dissertation, then, proceeds according to a series of 
hypotheses, followed by a series of logical derivations that elaborate on the 
implications of these hypotheses as they develop into new ones altogether.  This is 
what Badiou, in Being and Event, describes as the capacity of the subject, who “uses 
names to make hypotheses about the truth” (and by truth he means, as I have already 
said, that new sequence of elements and coordinates that issues from an event, the 
fidelity to which is a procedure accomplished by militants).4  The subject can only 
hazard a guess at what the event has initiated; he or she makes hypotheses about the 
proper way of advancing the event by designating its subsequent elements, by naming 
them as in so doing introducing them into the field of the political and the concrete. 
Herein lies the paradox of Badiou’s ontology: that these names must bear the burden 
of the status quo, inasmuch as they can be made to mean anything at all, and yet do so 
only in the service of what the event does, of its overturning of the status quo.  It is 
this political and ontological tension that, for me, the name “Filipino” actualizes: the 
easily recognizable identity that erodes the foundations of that identity, the name of a 
national subject-hood that can also name the erosion of that subject-hood’s primacy.  
This is all, in my estimation, a diasporic politics can do at the moment.  But it is 
already quite a departure from everything we have thought possible thus far. 
                                                
4 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (Tr. Oliver Feltham, New York: Continuum, 2005), 399.  
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 Chapter 1 will thus begin with an exposition of these historical and theoretical 
tensions, moving towards a topology of the name Filipino and its consequences for 
thinking a non-hierarchical diasporic politics. 
 Chapter 2 will proceed from these propositions by looking at the topology 
from the perspective of time: if indeed a non-hierarchical diasporic politics is the 
beginning of a Filipino ontology, then this means we have to start with the 
paradoxical position of presupposing a non-existent situation, i.e. the dissolution of 
the State and empire as the legitimators of a Filipino national identity.  What does it 
mean to posit this dissolution, which is the goal of such an ontology, as its 
foundation?  It means, as I will show, abandoning a linear model of time in favor of a 
much more complex and variegated relationship between past, present, and future. 
 Chapter 3 will accordingly concretize this temporal re-evaluation.  My 
concern in this dissertation is with how the current problem of diasporic politics has 
been conditioned by the problem of World War II.  How are we to think the 
Americans’ return to the Philippines?  As saviors?  As dominators?  How do we think 
both without also in some ways de-legitimizing its defeat of Japanese fascism?  The 
problem is that the binary between democracy, as an ultimate Good, and fascism, as 
an incontestable Evil, can be seen today in the way that democracy, as a concept and 
practice, has been subsumed under the operations of empire and capital through a 
single name: neoliberalism.  It is because of this subsumption that, I will argue, we 
need a new concept of democracy that, in many ways, demand that, if a truly non-
hierarchical diasporic politics is to be thought, is also non-democratic. 
 Chapter 4 will act as the transition chapter between the theoretical and 
political arguments and the literary theoretical analyses.  It can therefore be read as 
the putative divider between both parts of this dissertation, the threshold between two 
separate but interrelated fields of inquiry.  It is in the chapter where I will develop a 
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new reading of reader response theory and the constitution of the political subjectivity 
of the reader. 
 Chapters 5, 6, and 7 will each be devoted to a reading of a specific novel.  
Respectively, they are F. Sionil Jose’s Viajero, Carlos Bulosan’s All the 
Conspirators, and Wilfrido Nolledo’s But for the Lovers.  I will show how each of 
them either inhibits the concept of a non-hierarchical diasporic politics (Viajero), 
critiques nationalism through the coordinates of novelistic irony (All the 
Conspirators), and proposes a genuinely militant figure that disavows the nation as 
the horizon of being: the traitor (But for the Lovers).  These chapters proceed as a 
gradual elaboration of how literature can potentially induce the kind of thought that I 
develop in the first three chapters.  Literature, in this sense, is not an illustration of 
the theoretical and political concepts proposed therein; rather, they are a concrete 
instance of their actualization in thought, what I term a variable operator of the 
thought on a non-hierarchical diasporic politics. 
 Finally, the Conclusion will take into account the stakes of the dissertation as 
a whole, and end with a rumination on its relevance to the current geopolitical 
situation we all face, this war-ridden twenty-first century.   
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CHAPTER 1 
A MILITANT TOPOLOGY OF THE NAME: THE “FILIPINO” 
 
 
      “. . . politics stakes its existence on its capacity to establish a relation to . . . the void.” 
                                   –––Alain Badiou, Being and Event 
 
 
 
 Let us advance, at the outset, this rather extreme thesis: that the name 
“Filipino” will always designate a political ontology aligned with imperialism.  And 
let us advance, in conjunction with this thesis, another: that this political ontology is 
also thusly aligned with the State.  No amount of radicalism heaped upon any 
Filipino or Filipino diasporic politics, by virtue of its name alone, can escape this 
trap.  That this ineluctable imperialism and Statism bores its way relentlessly into 
this political ontology rests upon a single thing: the similarly ineluctable problem of 
how to conceive of the place that the Philippine nation occupies in any thought on a 
Filipino political ontology, especially a diasporic political ontology.   
 There is a decidedly popular notion among Filipino and Filipino American 
radicals and leftists that some form of revolutionary nationalism, in the service of 
an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist politics, is required of any genuinely militant 
Filipino ontology.  Indeed, Philippine history has been witness to a number of 
nationalist movements, from the ilustrado appropriation of the name Filipino to 
designate a new political subjectivity wrested from its Spanish roots; to the 
communist HUKBALAHAP campaigns during the second world war and in the 
years immediately following; to the People’s Power Revolution against the corrupt 
regime of Ferdinand Marcos; and to the recent mass demonstrations against both 
current president Gloria Macapagcal-Arroyo and the nearly uncountable human 
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rights violations committed by military and paramilitary troops against activists, 
militants, and community leaders accused of suspicious anti-State activity.   
 The question, however, is whether nationalism is still (or has ever been) a 
viable conceptual framework for any thought or action definable as militant or 
radical.  It is a question that plagues political theorization itself, and revolves 
around the logical and very real separation that the State represents as the political 
formalization of the collectivity designated by the term “nation.”  When submitted 
to the conceptual parameters that contour this dissertation, this problem acquires an 
entirely new valence, for the problem of the diaspora is the problem not of the 
originary State or nation, but, by virtue of the diaspora’s obviously international 
scope, of States and of nations in general as well.  The global representation of the 
nation vis-à-vis the State becomes a problem of imperial representation, of the 
representation of the State under the conditions of Empire.   
 To what extent, then, is the nation logically separable from the State and its 
coercive and repressive machines?  It seems that any diasporic politics that resorts 
to a form of nationalism must necessarily hierarchize the relation between one 
subjectivating site and another: that of the nation or locality in which the diasporic 
individual resides and works to the Philippines.  Even if we posit a very real 
separation between the State and the nation (a move compelled by a desire for the 
conditions of true equality, to be sure), a diasporic nationalism still introduces a 
relation of inequality.  Is the nation, conceived through this diasporic politics, a 
mere product of the logic that the imperial space imposes upon a diasporic 
subjectivity that in its turn thinks this nationalism as a viable solution?   
 Take, for example, the following proposal for a Filipino American radical 
politics.  Let it stand as exemplary of the kind of nationalism I have been thus far 
describing:  
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 We Filipinos [in the U.S.] don’t have any real identification of ourselves  
 as belonging to a nation because that nation of all the classes and sectors  
 in the Philippines is non-existent; that organic embodiment of the national-
 popular will has not yet come into being, and has in fact been aborted and  
 suppressed by U.S. military power when it was being born during the  
 revolution of 1896 – 1898, a culmination of three centuries of revolts  
 against Spanish rule.  We don’t have a popular-democratic nation to serve  
 as the matrix and locus of authentic sharing and belonging––that nation is  
 still emerging, a manifold complex of antagonisms and struggles still in  
 the agony of unfolding.1 
This proposal is advanced by E. San Juan, Jr., probably the most caustic and astute 
Filipino critic of empire working today in the U.S.  Although his synthesis of 
Marxist theory and cultural studies in his analyses of capitalism and Filipino and 
American politics have innovated theorizations of a diasporic anti-capitalism, San 
Juan is himself unable to shake nationalism as even a provisional step towards 
political action amongst Filipinos in the U.S.  This inability to think past and 
beyond nationalism, however radical it is defined, transforms political identification 
into the process of creating a sense of nation-hood that will serve as the groundwork 
for a political subjectivity capable of resisting, in collective fashion, imperialism 
and capitalism from inside the country (the U.S.) that violently enforces and polices 
the global political economic status quo.   
 The sense of loss in this passage is palpable; accompanying this need for a 
national political ground is the idea that a revolution capable of actualizing this 
ground has been crushed.   
                                                
1 Epifanio San Juan, Jr., “The Predicament of Filipinos in the United States: ‘Where Are You From? 
When Are You Going Back?’,” The State of Asian America: Activism and Resistance in the 1990s 
(Ed. Karin Aguilar-San Juan, Boston: South End, 1994), 215.  
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 Implicit in this kind of a politics is the aforementioned split between the 
Philippine State and the nation, the former the product, result, and eventual 
accomplice of U.S. imperialism and the latter the embodiment of a revolutionary 
popular “will” against both imperial exploitation and violence and domestic 
governmental corruption.  The obvious, however, is worth mentioning: that a 
diasporic politics founded upon such a national popular will requires positing a 
“return” to the Philippines.  It necessitates an international hierarchy within which 
the Philippines, as the site of national popular will, conveys political meaning and 
legitimacy to any radical, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist politics.  The 
hierarchies that this popular nationalism aims to attack on a local level––that is, on 
the level of the Philippines as the State that arose on the corpse of an aborted 
revolution––reemerge on an international level, the level proper to a diasporic 
politics.   
 In conjunction with the two theses I proposed at the beginning of this 
discussion, I should at this point advance yet another: that this international 
reckoning of hierarchies predisposes a national popular diasporic politics to a 
politics whose form is indistinguishable from the State and, as a consequence, from 
Empire as well.   
 This chapter will demonstrate not only this sad and inexorable fate of much 
of today’s Filipino diasporic politics; it will also demonstrate the possibility of 
thinking another diasporic politics altogether, one which is explicitly non-
hierarchical and which assumes, as the basis for its ontology, the problem that 
“being Filipino” designates: the problem of its indistinguishability from the political 
ontology that the State and empire allow.   
 These can be elaborated by a series of conceptual propositions: 
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 1.  A diasporic nationalism will always reproduce the logic of the State and 
      Empire, a logic that produces what I will term the axiomatic identity of    
      the politicized Filipino.   
 2.  For a genuinely militant diasporic ontology to emerge, it is necessary to 
      think through this axiomatic, an inescapable fact of this militancy’s  
      operation.  Rather than abandoning the axiomatic as a mere fiction of  
      power, it is actually and paradoxically thinkable as an indispensable and 
      constitutive element of an ontology that is, nonetheless, non-hierarchical. 
 3.  The name “Filipino” harbors this inescapability, but inasmuch as it does 
      so it also enables a militant ontology that, as the subjectivity constitutive 
      of a non-hierarchical politics, produces what I will call the absolute  
      negativity of the logics of the State and Empire, of the axiomatic identity 
      that they always force the subject to adopt. 
I will address and clarify these propositions in their turns. 
 
 
1.1  AGAINST THE STATE, AGAINST THE NATION 
 
A.  DICTATORSHIP AND CENTRALISM 
 Diasporic nationalism must confront the problem of hegemony that it 
implicitly adopts as its essence.  Hegemony, as we will see, is the obverse of the 
non-hierarchical militancy whose concept I will be advancing in the closing 
sections of this chapter.  Our analysis of the contours of hegemony will not only 
reveal the failings of diasporic nationalism; it will also reveal the ways in which 
what I have termed the absolute negativity of a militant ontology are rendered 
passive and unintelligible. 
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 In the case of the Philippines, the most explicit definition of revolutionary 
nationalism can be found in the Communist Party of the Philippines-Maoist’s (CPP-
Maoist’s) “Programme for a People’s Democratic Revolution in the Philippines.”  
Written in 1968, it remains, to this day, the party program, unrevised and 
unappended.  Section II.2, entitled “Establish a People’s Democratic State and a 
Coalition or United Front Government,” states that “[t]he people’s democratic state 
is under the leadership of the working class and it includes participation of all 
democratic classes, i.e., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and the national 
bourgeoisie.”  Section II.4, entitled “Follow the Principle of Democratic 
Centralism,” states that “[t]he national government shall have central authority over 
the local government at various levels.  The national government, however, shall 
base its decisions on the needs and aspirations of the broad masses of the people 
and the lowers levels of government.  This is centralized leadership based on 
democracy and democracy guided by centralized leadership.  At every level of the 
government (barrio, municipality, city or district, provincial, regional), there shall 
be elected representative bodies where decisions are taken democratically for every 
corresponding area.  A lower representative body shall be subordinate to a higher 
representative body.  Any part of the government shall be subordinate to the 
People’s Revolutionary Congress which represents nationally the sovereign Filipino 
people.”2  Is this idea of the nation, defined as democratic and, inasmuch as the 
State in its current manifestation is definable as an appendage to Empire, anti-
Statist, commensurable to the nation imagined diasporically as the source of a 
national popular will?   
                                                
2 CPP-Maoist, “Programme for a People’s Democratic Revolution in the Philippines,” Communism 
in the Philippines: An Introduction (Ed. Alfredo B. Saulo. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila 
University Press, 1990), 201.  
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 San Juan, as we can see from the passage I quoted above, does not elaborate 
on what this will might look like, but we can surmise that it bears some 
resemblance to that of the CPP-Maoist version of a revolutionary democracy.  By 
no means, however, am I making a simple and blatantly gratuitous conflation; the 
logic that supports the conjunction of the national and the popular is in every way 
dominated by the idea that maintains the CPP-Maoist construction of a united front 
government: hegemony.  Let us venture, then, the qualitative aspects of the national 
popular by way of the Communist Party’s elaboration of a revolutionary 
organization––which in the end amounts to the organization of consensus.   
 At first glance, the CPP-Maoist’s principle of “democratic centralism” 
sounds a lot like what is arguably the most powerful formulation thus far provided 
of what revolutionary democracy means: Lenin’s notion of the revolutionary State, 
which embodies the dissolution of all power under the name of proletarian 
dictatorship.  For Lenin, the paradox of a proletarian dictatorship is a virtual 
impossibility; the oxymoronic naming of this form of government designates the 
State’s necessary dissolution at the point of its inception.  But this dissolution, as 
the founding moment of the State, can take place only insofar as this State is a 
specific, and again, paradoxical kind: a non-democratic State.  Of course, there is 
no space to discuss, in full, the implications of Lenin’s conceptualization of the 
State’s infamous “withering away.”  It will simply suffice, for the present, to recall 
his description of democracy as the “best possible political shell for capitalism.”3  
Recall that Lenin also says that “democracy is not identical with the subordination 
of the minority to the majority.  Democracy is a state which recognizes the 
subordination of the minority to the majority, i.e., an organisation for the systematic 
                                                
3 V.I. Lenin, The State and Revolution, Selected Works Vol. II (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), 
247. 
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use of force by one class against another.”4  Lenin thus posits the existence, albeit 
negatively, of a form of democracy that can be thought separately from domination 
and repression; he pits this apparently egalitarian social topology against the 
topology of the democratic state, which recognizes and organizes non-egalitarian 
relations, but always (and this is the State democracy that Lenin is describing) 
under the form of equality.  Lenin says as much when he describes democracy as 
“formal equality,” as opposed to the “actual” equality of a truly communist and 
non-Statist communism.5 
 What, then, is the difference between this notion of democracy vis-à-vis the 
State and the CPP-Maoist’s call for “democratic centralism”?  Whereas Lenin 
advocated a proletarian dictatorship, and pushed the contradictions of this formal 
unity to the point of rupture, the CPP-Maoist advocates something else altogether: a 
hegemonic alliance between “all democratic classes.”  The difference is profound.  
Lenin’s positing of a rupture qua democracy’s implementation meant that its social 
and political form had to be challenged and ultimately destroyed if capitalism were 
to be truly abolished.  The CPP-Maoist, however, keeps this form intact and uses it 
as the foundation for establishing, by way of democratic centralism, “a sovereign 
Filipino people.”  The contradictions that besiege Lenin’s concept of democracy are 
not present in that of the CPP-Maoist: for them, democratic centralism is a 
deliberative organization that maintains the form of capitalist democracies as a 
necessarily transitional phase in the passage to a non-capitalist Philippine society.  
We will see in the next chapter to what degree this notion of transition, as opposed 
to rupture, inhibits any thought on a militant diasporic topology.  For now, 
however, we will concern ourselves with the formal qualities of this version of 
                                                
4 ibid, 297.  
5 ibid, 310 – 11.  
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democracy. despite its claim to radicalism and its gestures towards revolution, it is 
actually based upon the redistribution of the terms that comprise the status quo.  
This formal problem is nothing if not the limit that comprises the concept of 
antagonism that lies at the heart of hegemony.  And it is in this hegemonic relation, 
moreover, where we will begin to catch glimpses of the power of the absolute 
negativity of a militant politics.   
 
B.  HEGEMONY, RADICAL DEMOCRACY, AND THE STATUS QUO 
 The most radical re-conceptualization of hegemony in recent years has been 
that of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy.  Their primary target in this book is mainstream Marxism and its primary 
theoreticians, whom they see as having closed off the radical democratic principles 
that Marxism, as an essentially socio-political philosophy with an illustrious 
ancestry dating back to the French Revolution, inherits.  Their thesis is that 
Marxism’s over-emphasis on “class” has reduced these radical principles to the 
logic of identitarianism, thus hierarchization the radical democratic potential of its 
theoretical and philosophical foundations.  Their response to these reductions, 
however, actually ends up resuscitating an identitarianism of another kind: the 
identity of the form that a radical politics must, in their estimation, take.  Here, in 
this identitarianism, we will begin to see the problems that hegemony imposes upon 
theorization of the Filipino diaspora’s political ontology.  
 Laclau and Mouffe make the claim that society is resolutely contingent, with 
no positivity of its own.  Contingency precludes fixing a particular identity (race, 
gender, class, sexuality, etc.) as the defining political subject––but only inasmuch 
as the absolute non-fixity of identities is precluded as well (since it would itself, as 
a topology, arise as the definitive form).  Laclau and Mouffe reject every shred of 
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stability, even the stability of instability, so to speak; every individual, group 
formation, and social relation becomes “partially fixed.”  This collection of 
impossible closures allows society––radical society––to deconstruct itself.  For 
Laclau and Mouffe, a hegemonic relation, qualified as a radical democratic society, 
consists of the emergence of a series of identities through which a political 
procedure defines itself and under which it unites (e.g., a politics defined primarily 
by anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-capitalist, etc. struggle).  But this politics is 
democratic only insofar as it is characterized by the differential subjectivities not 
properly included in that unifying identity and which, as such, subvert its authority.  
They call these subversive subjectivities “elements” of a hegemonic project.  They 
are the subjectivities that are constantly being excluded for the purposes of forming 
a provisional and contingent identity––the “naming” of the project under the terms 
of the unifying subjectivity––and which are in their turns constantly erupting, 
asserting their own claims and their own objectives, regrounding the terms of the 
project.6  These elements reshape the latter based upon the discord they induce.7  
The topology of a hegemonic relation, conceived as the basis for a radical 
democracy, thus consists of structuring discord according to the unifying identity’s 
ever-provisional ability to regulate action.   
 The key to this relation is therefore the excluded element’s persistent 
intrusion into the project, its ability to change the internal composition of the 
hegemonic relation.  This exteriority, in addition to the excess it represents, is also 
protean: its metamorphoses conform to the internal composition, which 
incorporates certain elements (“articulates” them, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
terminology) and turns them into “moments,” terms that are defined by and 
                                                
6 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics  (2nd ed. New York: Verso, 2001), 105.  
7 ibid, 111 – 13.  
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definable within the hegemonic composition’s discursive field.8  It is a politics of 
uninterrupted antagonism; as Laclau and Mouffe say, the transformation of 
elements into moments, the incorporation and assimilation of every excluded 
subjectivity and claim, is always unsuccessful and “incomplete.”9  The hegemonic 
topology is contoured by the constant shuttling of elements and moments in and out 
of the relation.  This passage, in which every element’s self-identicalness, as it 
were, is constantly being punctured by the excesses that the relation cannot contain, 
is the realization of democratic politics.  Every element is capable of being 
accommodated by the tensile strength of the internal weave of hegemony.  Their 
disruptions, as they lie on the outskirts of the hegemonic relation’s boundaries, are 
excesses that hegemony, as a political and social form, will always be able to define 
once it comes time for them to redefine the substance of the struggle.   
 But this is exactly the problem.  The elements are capable of reshuffling the 
hegemonic discourse, but they cannot transform its overall composition; though the 
substantive dimensions of the relation may change, the logic that governs the ways 
in which political subjectivities are defined as being combinable and recombinable 
persists.  This is why the French Revolution is such an important event for Laclau 
and Mouffe; it represents the egalitarian potential that a century of Marxism has 
buried under the banner of the proletariat: namely, the Revolution’s “decisive 
mutation in the political imaginary of Western societies” as it toppled the ancien 
régime and subordinated society to the “logic of equivalence.”10  A radical 
democratic politics pluralizes and democratizes this immanent social mutation, one 
based upon what they call the “struggle for a maximum autonomization of spheres,” 
                                                
8 ibid, 105.   
9 ibid, 107.  
10 ibid, 155.  
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a “pluralism” based upon the “autoconstitutivity” of each element.11  The excluded 
element, under the force of this pluralism, precipitates its autonomy as an excluded 
thing; it initiates a radical politics that does not negate the general form of society 
but expands its de-positivized sites, planting into the field a series of autonomous 
regions around which any and all transcendental principles fall apart.   
 In what way, then, is Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of excess and exclusion 
thinkable as negativities?  Equivalence subverts identity and reveals difference to 
be a constitutive principle, yet inasmuch as equivalence places a ban on every 
positivity, including difference (“the differential positivity of all terms” in the 
relation), it also reveals the latter as a “precarious” political category.  This dual 
“subversion” gives “a real existence to negativity as such.”  Laclau and Mouffe 
describe this as the “formula of antagonism.”12  The element, the excluded thing, 
arises as an indirect negativity whose realness consists of its effects, of the 
impossibility it introduces into the hegemonic topology: that of every positivity, 
whether it be that of identity or difference. 
 We can see that negativity is the theoretico-political linchpin for Laclau and 
Mouffe’s topology.  Drawing this negativity forth and making it the central 
principle not only keeps society from “suturing” itself (in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
terms); it also keeps it from devolving into a state of absolute chaos.  The excluded 
element thus takes on an added complexity.  Not only is it capable of gaining entry 
into the hegemonization and initiating a recomposition of its terms; it also arises as 
an indirect presence, refracted by the moment that it becomes upon entry.  The 
excluded is incapable of making its claims known unless it becomes a partial 
moment, unless it accepts the discursive “rules” of the topology into which it seeks 
                                                
11 ibid, 167.  
12 ibid, 128 – 9.  
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and gains access.  What is excluded and delegitimated, as such, is that which is 
unknowable within the hegemonic relation.  
 At this point, we should pause and reflect upon this, for this relation 
between what is excluded and what is included, between the unknowable and its 
transformation into an intelligible component of a political relation, is key to the 
concerns of this dissertation.  The perpetually excluded thing––which is thus 
perennially unknowable within the discursive terrain of a given political form––is 
what I have referred to (and which I will henceforth be summoning as this 
dissertation’s guiding concept) as absolute negativity––negative because it is the 
excess that politics cannot––and must not––admit, and absolute because as such it 
remains unknowable except as a refraction of itself, absolute because in itself it is 
entirely inadmissible.   
 Rather than exploiting the radically excessive domain of absolute negativity, 
however, Laclau and Mouffe turn it into a regulator of hegemony; it becomes the 
organizing principle by which the discursive field of society, functioning as the 
formally antagonistic relation that grounds radical democracy, is able to persist. 
Inasmuch as negativity anchors the antagonisms constitutive of a latent democratic 
imaginary, it belongs to the social: it is made significant because it is said to inform 
the logic of contingency.  Negativity, vis-à-vis this discursivity, mutates into a self-
evident thing.  Consequently, politics, the social topology within which a radical 
democracy realizes itself, becomes a politics that organizes the status quo: 
hegemony posits an ontology of antagonism as the horizon for politics, beyond 
which no intelligible and legitimate politics can exist.  Antagonism, moreover, 
posits a completely enclosed ontology.  Because the excluded is allowed entry into 
the discursive field as a refraction of itself, politics, defined qua this discourse, is a 
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terrain within which antagonism becomes identical to itself.  This is the only way 
that Laclau’s and Mouffe’s moments can work: by speaking to each other.   
 There is no rupture in Laclau and Mouffe’s topology, if by rupture we mean 
a break in the form that politics, in order to be legitimate, must take.  There is no 
de-structuring of political ontologies in Laclau and Mouffe, only the constant 
redistribution and recombination of the terms that are said to comprise the 
immanence that is radical democratic politics.  Slavoj Zizek’s critique of Laclau 
and Mouffe on this point is accurate: “the real danger, the temptation to be resisted, 
is the very notion of a radical cut by means of which the basic social antagonism 
will be dissolved and the new era of a self-transparent nonalienated society will 
arrive.”13  Although Zizek’s notion of a self-transparent society does not in itself 
follow as a logical consequence of the cut, his principal criticism is solid.  Laclau 
and Mouffe are haunted by Marxism’s failure, which paradoxically forces them to 
fix the ontology of the social as antagonism.  Beyond the status quo, absolute 
negativity––as such––remains unintelligible and untheorizable: it is a legitimate 
object of theoretical inquiry only if it is seen as following the discursive “routes” of 
hegemony, without which it cannot be granted the right to conceptualization.   
 Politics, apprehended within the identitarian logic of the status quo, always 
falls back on this simple calculus: passivize absolute negativity, force it to become 
passive.   
 We can draw two conclusions from this: 
 1.  That negativity, when thought as an absolute, is potentially destructive.  
      This is why Laclau and Mouffe place a ban on its eruption, requiring that 
      it be refracted through the prism of the hegemonic moment so that it  
      remains knowable and, within the terms of political discourse,   
                                                
13 Slavoj Zizek, The Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 265.  
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      controllable, thinkable as a disruptor only when it can serve to merely  
      drive the positivity of the moments into a state of relative disarray.   
 2.  That this refraction of absolute negativity constitutes a passivization and 
      subsumption; absolute negativity becomes yet another term in the  
      discourse, and is then undercut by another one altogether in a continuous 
      oscillation between exteriority and interiority.  Such is the formula for  
      the antagonism described by hegemony, which consists of the   
      stabilization of the status quo as antagonism.   
 Even when Laclau writes of a radical break, this stabilization qua 
antagonism remains paradigmatic.  In his book on populism, Laclau says that “the 
passage from one hegemonic formation, or popular confrontation, to another will 
always involve a radical break.”  This radical break signals the emergence of “the 
people,” signified by “the unification of a plurality of demands.”14  Inasmuch as the 
“new order” whose advent this break designates remains hegemonic, since 
proposing otherwise would undermine the very theoretico-political foundations 
through which every positivity must be annulled, Laclau’s break is a break between 
two hegemonic topologies.  The form of politics remains the same.  What is broken 
is not the terrain of discursivity, the chain of terms expressed therein, but their mode 
of organization.  The manner in which antagonism is stabilized as the form of 
politics is left undamaged.  
 We should keep the following proposition in mind: that this form of 
antagonism is actually the structural precondition for the State’s constitution.  San 
Juan’s notion of the necessity of a Philippine national-popular/popular-democratic 
will is this pluralization of demands unified by the provisional “point” of the 
popular: the national-popular/popular-democratic formula is bracketed, in its 
                                                
14 Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (New York: Verso, 2005), 228.  
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presentation, by placing “the popular” in between the two conditions of the 
“national” and the “democratic.”  Who legislates the hegemonization and the 
definitions of the national and the democratic remains unclear in San Juan’s 
formulation.   
 If we recall the first conclusion above, however, this vagueness disappears: 
the “who” that legislates the hegemonic relation is the one that defines politics 
through force, the one who legitimizes a political relation by passivizing the 
absolute negativity of its form.  And if we think about Lenin’s definition of 
democracy as the formalization of capitalist force, this relation truly becomes 
democratic.  It is the democracy of the CPP-Maoist.  It is the Philippine State.   
 
 
1.2  FILIPINO AXIOMATICS: THE REIGN OF ANTAGONISM 
 
A.  THE ENVELOPMENT OF THREE TERMS 
 The problem that populism faces, in the case of the Philippine diaspora, is 
that the nation, the ideal site of an emergent democratic society, is 
indistinguishable, in the last analysis, from the State, which appropriates democracy 
for itself so as to suppress any truly egalitarian social formation––the formation, in 
other words, represented by the concept of the nation.  We can say that this 
designates the closure of a rift between two kinds of democracy: substantive, “real” 
democracy, and formal democracy.  The CPP-Maoist––who, among Filipino 
radicals, have advanced the most clearly delineated concept of a “free” Philippines 
thus far (as far as I have encountered)––erases this difference; we saw that their 
concept of a popular democracy, as a centralizing organizer of social, political, 
economic, and (as they state elsewhere in their “Programme”) cultural 
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developments, recognizes the State as the horizon for any real democracy’s 
existence.  The popular that appears to provide the substantive anchor for this 
democracy assumes the topology of the concept of hegemony I described in the 
preceding section.  It is the people that enters into the relation defined by the CPP-
Maoist as the meeting of “all democratic classes.”  Enclosed by the equally central 
force of the nation, it follows that the people can only be described as Filipino. 
 This may at first seem banal, too obvious to mention.  It is only natural, after 
all, that, yes, the popular masses of a non-Western nation struggling to free itself 
from foreign domination and internal corruption––what used to be called the 
postcolonial nation––should assume the sign of that emergent, rebellious 
collectivity that can only be thought by way of the inscription that the nation 
bestows upon its “members.”  This sense of membership, for the most part, has 
always assumed a kind of ethnic and racial character, which become the 
foundations for a properly cultural identification that is then capable of 
transforming the political economy of the country.  The concept of “Filipino-ness” 
becomes homogeneous, the name of a self-identical ethnic, racial, and cultural 
belonging that defines and delimits a political economic struggle for the nation that 
gives to the Filipino his or her identity.  The nation, in other words, arises as the 
meeting of all democratic classes, as the emergence of a democratic topology, 
identified as Filipino.  But because the CPP-Maoist conflates substantive, real 
democracy and formal democracy, the Filipino, as nation and as people, is virtually 
indistinguishable from the State––or rather, comes to be defined through the State 
as the organizer of consensus.  It follows that the force required of the State not 
only determines who is democratic, but who is properly Filipino as well.   
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 My thesis is runs as follows: that this imbrication and envelopment of 
nation, people, and State under the sign of the Filipino is itself enveloped in the 
logics of another power.  This power is Empire.   
 
B.  THE IMPERIAL AXIOM 
 As a political category, the Filipino emerged from the nineteenth-century’s 
nationalist, anti-colonial politics of the ilustrado class, who appropriated the name 
from the Spanish criollos in order to transform it into an ethno-political marker of 
anti-Spanish sentiment, the designator of a newly-born politicized collectivity.15  
This act of self-designation, of self-naming, is what concerns me, since its bears 
within itself the foundations of the problems outlined above: a) the unquestioned 
politics of a Filipino identity, and b) the subsequently unquestioned alignment of 
this identity with a nationalist political program.  There is, admittedly, a certain 
power in this act of self-naming, and it is what I will reconceptualize in order to 
develop a theory of a militant diasporic Filipino politics.  But we have not yet 
arrived at the moment when it is possible to develop this theory positively, since the 
problems of nationalism, conceived as the only proper politics for a genuinely 
radical Filipino ontology, have not yet been fully examined. Let us see what this 
alignment of identity and nation entails.  
 In his pioneering studies on the constitution of the Philippine State, Patricio 
Abinales has shown that the “patchwork character” of the Philippines’ political 
economy has remained, since the inception of American rule, the prevalent mode of 
                                                
15 See Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisited (3rd ed. Manila: Tala Publishing 
Services, 1975), 147 – 8; and León Ma. Guerrero, The First Filipino: A Biography of José P. Rizal 
(10th ed. Manila: National Historical Institute, 2001), 496 – 7.  
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State politics.  It is, as he says, the most “convenient way to keep together the 
‘series of societies’ that make up the formal body politic called the Philippines.”16  
 Abinales has isolated three significant forms of rule that were exported to 
the Philippines at the beginning of the twentieth-century by a Progressive-minded 
American elite, who privileged the creation of autonomous sites in the manner of its 
laissez-faire economic theories.  The result was a highly differentiated set of 
political economic “units” that were assimilated to the topology of the State: 
 1.  Tutelage.  The “civilized” and “civilizable” mestizos of the metropolitan 
      areas (namely, Manila) were engaged through the indirect means of     
      political and economic education so that, theoretically, the Philippine    
      elite could be guided towards national sovereignty. 
 2.  Military rule.  The “uncivilized” and “uncivilizable” populations of the  
      Moro and Cordillera provinces were ruled directly by the American  
      military administration. 
 3.  Cacique democracy.  The Americans preserved a decentralized form of 
      governance by maintaining the structure of the caciques (local patron- 
      client relations) implemented during Spanish rule.   
These differentiations were supported by a racial taxonomy.  Moreover, the logic 
that underpinned the military administration’s direct rule over the Moro and 
Cordillera regions verged on a kind of racist sentimentalism: the administration saw 
itself as preserving and protecting a race uncorrupted, unlike the mestizo elite, by 
the Spanish.  It used segregation to legitimize direct rule; the indio was incapable of 
governing itself and thus required surveillance.  If need be, brute force was also 
used, clothed in the infamous rhetoric of “benevolent assimilation.”  In spite of its 
                                                
16 Patricio Abinales, “Progressive-Machine Conflict in Early-Twentieth-Century U.S. Politics and 
Colonial-State Building in the Philippines,” The American Colonial State in the Philippines; Global 
Perspectives (Ed. Julian Go and Anne L. Foster. Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 173.  
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corrupted sensibilities, however, the Philippine elite, represented by the mestizos in 
the major cities, would preside over this Philippine commonwealth, educated––and 
educatable––by Western forms of science, political theory, and economics.17  The 
Philippines remained until roughly 1914 unintegrated.  Yet even after “integration,” 
when the commonwealth years gave way to the era of a fully centralized State 
under the designation of a “free” Philippine republic, this patchwork remained 
untouched.  Throughout the last century, this patchwork has supported and enabled 
the cooperation between the American government, international capital, and the 
Philippine State.  This failed integration, I maintain, is a prerequisite for the State’s 
constitution.   
 I will advance the following thesis: that the State’s function necessitates 
antagonisms.  There are two types of antagonisms that, in my estimation, are 
predominant:  
 1.  An internal antagonism.  This is positively constitutive of the State, and 
      is exemplified by the decentralized forms of rule that maintain a cacique 
      democracy in the provinces and a “normal” governmental form of rule in 
      the metropolitan centers. 
 2.  An external and negatively constitutive antagonism.  This kind can be  
      found in the forms of anti-Statist rebellion that still manage to be  
      reincorporated, assimilated, and ultimately neutralized by the State and  
      its political, economic, and military arms.  
The Philippine State is a heterogeneity, a politico-economic disunity, the agent and 
outcome of the reproduction of antagonisms.   
                                                
17 Patricio Abinales, Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine 
Nation-State (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2000), passim; and “Progressive-
Machine Conflict,” passim.  
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 But it is so inasmuch as it is also able to reconcile these antagonisms into a 
political economic positivity that is the State-form.  This is what I will call the 
State’s axiomatic production, its cooperation with Empire and capital as accomplice 
and product of its relationship to them.  This axiomatic production requires, in turn, 
that the components constitutive of antagonism possess an apodicticity.  Both a 
positively and negativity constitutive antagonism need to be intelligible as such in 
order for the State to be able to police itself––by either fully appeasing its 
politicians and citizens, or by a program of outright force, from impoverishment, to 
displacement, and to what is now called “low-intensity warfare.”  
 Insofar as a determinate negativity––a protester, an anarchist, a rebellious 
student––exists, it can, to the State, become a positivity.  I will term this 
positivization an axiomatic Filipinization, the product of the reproduction of the 
State’s constitutive antagonisms.  In this type of Filipinization, the disruptor of the 
State becomes intelligible––again, through force––as a partial identity of the State, 
and whatever excesses it represents become integrated.   
 This topology, moreover, is thoroughly hegemonic, in the formal sense I 
gave to it in my analysis of Laclau and Mouffe’s use of the term: as the continual 
reproduction of antagonisms.  These antagonisms reproduce the status quo.  A 
Philippine axiomatics is able to recognize that which is apparently excessive to the 
State, and turns it into a determination of its logic: as an element against which it 
can recompose itself (through reform, through negotiations, through escalated 
repression, and so on), thus positivizing, within the field of antagonism, that which 
initially presented itself as its negation.   
 This is where disengaging the national-popular/popular-democratic from the 
logic of the State becomes impossible.  Demonstrating the existence of a unified 
political field, defined as the hegemonic inscription of a national-democratic 
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Filipino-ness with which a diasporic Filipino politics can identify, is a highly 
strained procedure: it requires logically separating this politics from the antagonistic 
topology of the State.  It requires separating its concept of Filipino-ness from the 
State’s axiomatic Filipinization.  But this is not possible.  Both necessitate a single 
presupposition, their logical bulwark: the apodicticity of the terms through which 
the Philippines, both as an idea and a material outcome, emerges.  The 
antagonisms constitutive of a) the Philippine State, as both axiomatic generator and 
outcome, and b) of the Philippine national-popular/popular-democratic will, as the 
emanation of a hegemonic topology, are formally identical.  Their logic shares the 
following formula: produce antagonisms, but produce them within a unified field of 
determinate antagonists.  The national-popular/popular-democratic requires passing 
through the logic of the State in order to actualize the political relation it names.  
 The solution to this theoretico-political impasse is as follows: separate the 
category of the Filipino as a political signifier without passing through the State’s 
axiomatic.  An alternative Filipinization needs to be wrested from an axiomatic 
Filipinization and its primary function: to reconcile antagonisms by turning them 
into, in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, moments constitutive of State politics.  
 What this solution requires, if it is indeed a question of the power of self-
naming in the Philippine diaspora, is a theory of a new perspective within which the 
Philippines-diaspora relation can be rethought against a politics that recapitulates, 
by way of the formal equivalencies between identity, nation, and State, an 
axiomatic Filipinization.  This is a politics, in other words, that bears within itself 
the absolute negativity that is always being refracted in the relations that contour 
the status quo.  It is a perspective that disavows this refraction’s relation to the 
Philippine axiomatic and exploits its capacity to act as a destroyer of its discursive 
terrain.   
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 For the rest of this chapter, my analysis will turn upon developing, in their 
turns: 
 1.  The perspective of a non-hierarchical political subject. 
  2.  The “mutated” concept of the Philippines-diaspora relation that this  
      subject and its perspective encompass. 
 3.  The “place” absolute negativity occupies in the thought of a political  
      ontology of the Filipino diaspora.  
This requires demonstrating the possibilities of thinking a new concept of diasporic 
Filipino-ness itself, one that does not conform to the logic of the State and concede 
to its axiomatic topology. 
 
 
1.3  THE HORIZONS OF A POLITICAL ONTOLOGY II: TOTALIZATION 
 
A.  WHAT FREEDOM? 
 A non-hierarchical perspective of the Filipino diaspora would have to 
consist of the following: a thought on the diaspora that cannot be reduced to the 
nation or nation-state.  What, then, is the “place” of this thought and, conversely, 
the thinking subject?  It would have to be a thought through which the subject 
thinks his or her distance and separation from the Philippine nation.  I am not, of 
course, positing the geographical distance and separation that the diasporic subject 
faces; what I refer to as distance and separation involves an ontological and 
political distance from the site that, it must be admitted, nonetheless anchors, 
however strongly or weakly, the subjectivity in question.  For why call the militant 
subject, or even the diaspora itself, no less, Filipino at all?  Why not simply 
abandon this designation and absolve oneself of the inscription that, up until now, I 
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have attacked as an outright capitulation to the State, empire, and capital?  Because, 
and this answer forms the polemical core of this chapter, if not this dissertation, the 
name carries within itself that absolute negativity of which I earlier spoke.  It is the 
bearer of its own negation, one that cannot possibly erupt without in some ways 
conceding to the inexorability of the dominant forces at work in the very act of the 
designation itself. 
 This paradox is encapsulated in that dense philosophical category: the 
attribute.  I take my definition of the attribute from Antonio Negri’s reading, in his 
Savage Anomaly, of Proposition 19 of Spinoza’s Ethics: “God is eternal, all of 
God’s attributes are external.”18  The relation between God and the attribute is that 
between the Idea and its incarnations, the attributes being the profane manifestation 
of an eternal and divine Presence.  For Negri, the attribute allowed Spinoza to posit 
the existence of a thought on God, the substance; it is the vehicle through which the 
intellect can grasp the substance as substance.  Negri’s reading identifies a 
remarkable tension in this formulation: Spinoza, by positing the intellect, was also 
able to posit the existence of spontaneity.  This meant that the thinking subject had 
the capacity organize itself qua the substance.  Thought is thus independent of the 
substance while nonetheless seeking identity with it.  The tension, then, is this: that 
spontaneity, and the freedom of thought that finds itself imbedded therein, is 
animated by the mediations imposed upon it by the always external substance, the 
principal Idea, God.  Spontaneity is therefore possible only insofar as thought arises 
as the consciousness of this mediation, the awareness that the identity that it seeks 
with God is impossible except through the mediations that allow it indirect access.  
The subject thinks its inevitable separation from the substance; but it also thinks its 
                                                
18 Quoted in Antonio Negri, The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics 
(3rd ed. Tr. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 58.  
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unity to it.  But this unity is not an ontological unity––it is a purely conceptual 
unity, one that thinks the substance as substance and nothing more, an identity 
borne by the idea of the substance’s inaccessibility.  That it can never be reached 
without mediation is therefore the closest the subject can get to it.   
 Contrary to what Negri says,19 then, the substance is not the pure horizon of 
being, the ultimate guarantor of meaning that confers upon the subject his or her 
significance.  Rather, the horizon is the mediation, the insertion of the idea of 
inaccessibility into the relation and which then comes to define the concept of the 
substance.  Inasmuch as the attribute is an emanation of the substance, it is also the 
thinker of substance, the creator of the idea of substance and thus the creator of the 
horizon of being as thought itself.  This is why Negri can say that the attribute, 
despite the fact that it “[takes] root . . . in being,” “does not negate its function as 
the transgressor of the identity.”20  The attribute allows the subject to think itself 
qua the substance, a substance whose idea the subject has nonetheless produced as 
precondition and horizon for its being, which secures and transgresses identity in 
the same movement.  And this all happens in and as thought––in and as the 
subject’s perspective qua the substance.  
 This is a rather tenuous proposal.  Why?  Because it posits an immanence 
that distributes a plane of equality and absolute unity held together by an 
inaccessible Idea: God.  This immanence, in other words, limits itself by its 
aggressive fidelity to a hierarchy: all things are equal under the single, reigning 
legitimator.  Equally vexing is Negri’s solution to this apparent paradox.  He posits 
the following relation and attempts to locate the subject’s separation from the 
substance as the spontaneity required of a subject freed from the domination of the 
                                                
19 ibid, 56 – 7.  
20 ibid, 57 (emphasis added).  
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Idea: that thought takes over and produces a horizon of being that does not posit the 
existence of an all-determining substance, but rather a “dimension of the world that 
is not hierarchical but, rather, flat, equal, versatile and equivalent.  The absolute 
essence, predicated univocally, refers as much to the divine essence (the existence 
of God) as it does to all the things that descend from its essence.”21  This flattening, 
equalizing, and “horizontalizing” of the world means that “the attributes “are not 
mediated by anything; rather, they simply pose themselves in an immediate 
relationship of the production of substance.”22  What is univocal, then, is the 
capacity of every subject to participate in the production of substance, a production 
that in its turn also produces the subject––its self-constitutive force––and the idea of 
that great, Deleuzian category: univocality.   
 What is univocal is the attribute’s––every attribute’s––power to express the 
One that it creates.  But why posit the existence of an Idea that stands above us?  
Why posit humanity as the thinker of its submission to a higher power?  Is it any 
better to posit this submission as the outcome of a spontaneous willingness to 
produce the idea of this higher power as the capacity of every subject’s thought?  
The problem with Negri’s formulation on the subject, ultimately, is this: that the 
tension inherent in the separation-identity relation is dissolved by the immanence 
that he seeks to establish as a precondition for freedom and non-mediation.  It is this 
tension that allows us to ask, not only of Negri’s formulation, but also of the 
problems of diaspora, why the nominal strength of an Idea or nation can still prevail 
within a dispersed and topographically multiple ontology.   
 Immanence, it seems, needs to be reformulated beyond the apparent 
dissolution of all mediations, as Negri does.  It needs to be rethought through the 
                                                
21 ibid, 62. 
22 ibid, 63 (emphasis added). 
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tension that the attribute produces––which is essentially a self-mediation––so that 
the problem of how the subject can actually think itself––not only qua itself, but in 
relation to multiplicities and to States––can be reckoned with.   
 
B.  BECOMING-FILIPINO 
 This dissertation, of course, is only the first step towards this massive 
politico-philosophical undertaking, all the more so for having such a particular 
topic: the Filipino diaspora.  Following the problems I posed in the previous 
section, then, we can say that the attribute is the name “Filipino.”  Of course, the 
Philippines-diaspora relationship has very little to do, beyond the purely formal 
level, with the attribute-substance, subject-God relation that concerns Spinoza.  But 
because the relation, for me, is formal, the problems that Negri takes up in order to 
give a new philosophical dimension to immanence and transform it (especially in 
his more recent work) into the ontological horizon for a revolutionary, anti-imperial 
multitude are the same problems that I confront in this dissertation: namely, how to 
think a global political ontology as an immanent collectivity, and what kinds of 
constructions surreptitiously and unconsciously resurrect a hierarchy that this 
ontology seeks to abolish in the first place.  Such a problem encounters its most 
explicit limitations when this political ontology is circumscribed under the 
designation “diaspora,” for the name that the diaspora adopts for itself is linked 
directly to a nation or nation-state that maintains a primacy that it seems unable, or 
unwilling, to shake.  This is the same problem that Negri’s concept of immanence 
does not address: the fact that, as soon as the philosopher or theorist posits the 
existence of a self-constitutive collectivity qua the attribute, he will inevitably have 
to posit this collectivity’s submission to a concept or ideal that seems all the more 
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insidious because this collectivity has created this concept or ideal and transformed 
it into the legitimating force of its being.   
 What we can thus save from Negri’s theorization of the attribute is this: the 
idea (and not the form) of the subject’s self-constitution and its immanent power.  
Negri’s proposal that the subject, by way of the attribute, exceeds any relation of 
identity with the substance can be retained as the starting point.  With this in mind, I 
will advance the following hypothesis: that it is possible to think of the Filipino 
diaspora itself as an immanence, and that to do so would be to think through the 
tensions inherent in attribution, namely, its separation from a central, organizing 
principle and its necessary positing of this principle as the emblem and foundation 
for its existence.  A militant Filipino diasporic politics is initiated by such a 
thought; it allows the diasporic subject to think itself in the way peculiar to the 
operations of the attribute: as the self-mediator of its relation to the multiplicity that 
is the diaspora as well as to the Philippine nation that is its putative Idea. 
 In his introduction to novelist Carlos Bulosan’s collection of short stories, 
essays, and poems, On Becoming Filipino, San Juan proposes a reading of 
Bulosan’s work as the exemplary instance of a “becoming Filipino,” which, for San 
Juan, describes the trajectory of Bulosan’s racial and class consciousness.  What is 
striking about this formulation is that San Juan identifies this becoming’s catalyst as 
Bulosan’s displacement from the Philippines.  As a farmworker and cannery worker 
in the fields and factories of the U.S., he was able to find some sense of solidarity 
with the struggle against capital and empire “at home.”23  At first, this may seem to 
be a complete rehearsal of the nationalist paradigm I refuted earlier.  In some 
senses, it is.  If we take San Juan’s description of the paucity of a “genuinely” 
                                                
23 See Epifanio San Juan, Jr., “Introduction,”  On Becoming Filipino: Selected Writing of Carlos 
Bulosan  (Ed. Epifanio San Juan, Jr. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 1 – 44.  
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Filipino political ontology “at home,” however, becoming Filipino acquires a 
different meaning.  How is it that San Juan is able to posit two apparently different 
conditionalities for the diaspora?  On the one hand, there is the lamentation of the 
impossibility of establishing, in the U.S., a truly radical politics due to the absence 
of a hard core revolutionary––and collective––Philippine nationalism.  On the other 
hand, there is the celebration of Bulosan’s work as the expression of just such a 
diasporic subjectivity.   
 I think the difficulty lies in the fact that there are two different perspectives 
being developed here: the lamentation derives from the perspective of a delimitable 
collectivity, definable and made intelligible qua the Philippines, whereas the 
celebration of Bulosan comes from the perspective of the individual subject that has 
managed to redefine the Philippines qua the diaspora.  The latter is a complete 
reversal of the former.  It is the perspective of attribution conceived as the self-
mediation of the subject.  Because Bulosan became Filipino only by observing and 
experiencing American imperialism and capitalism, the Philippines is cut through 
with all the difficulties that empire and capital pose outside of its borders.  It is 
refracted.  Moreover, it is also displaced.  The name “Filipino” loses its ability to 
designate a diasporic subject’s total abandonment to a nationalist project because 
this nation no longer consists of the apodicticity it once upheld as the portico of 
diasporic being.  Becoming Filipino means redefining the Philippines as a mediated 
thing.   
 This should not be taken lightly.  Becoming Filipino is the perspective that 
arises when the diasporic subject thinks its capacity to place the Philippines at a 
distance and to thus turn its apodictic centrality into an obscure and mediated 
presence.   
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 We are far from an axiomatic Filipinization here.  To think diasporically 
involves a thought on the diasporic subject as the abolition of a collectivity, if we 
define a collectivity as a self-enclosed political commons, united by the organizing 
principle that is the Philippine nation and State.  Inasmuch as the name “Filipino” 
persists, its capacity to define the subject is transformed as well: in not naming a 
delimitable collectivity, it nonetheless serves to designate a general political 
ontology that creates the idea of a diaspora.  Let me state this more clearly.  The 
“Filipino,” if it neither designates allegiance to the nation and State, nor to a 
delimitable collectivity, becomes the principle of thought that allows the diasporic 
subject to apprehend itself as belonging within the two forms of being described 
therein: 1) as the “distanciator” of the Philippines, and 2) as the destroyer of the 
diaspora’s self-identity.  The “Filipino” designates a general political ontology of 
the diaspora inasmuch as becoming Filipino is a thought on this dual negation––as 
a general formula for establishing the immanence of the diaspora.   
 If attribution also means self-mediation, it is only because, in the case of 
becoming Filipino, this mediation happens doubly: to become Filipino is to name 
oneself qua this distanciation and destruction of identity.  It is a thought that adopts 
for itself a negativity whose power lies in its capacity to liquidate the very 
ontological foundations that materialize at the advent of the name.  This is the 
negativity of becoming Filipino: the absolute negativity of an axiomatic 
Filipinization.   
 Let us state more explicitly what this becoming consists of.   
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1.5  ABSOLUTE DESTROYER 
 
A.  A MILITANT CONSTELLATION 
 We have arrived at a set of premises by which to establish the core political 
ontology of this dissertation.  The “Filipino,” as a becoming: 
 a.  distances the Philippine nation and State, 
 b.  destroys the self-enclosed identity of the Filipino diaspora, 
 c.  designates a general political ontology, and 
 d.  produces the idea of an immanent diaspora. 
The premise to which we have devoted the least amount of analysis and exposition 
is the Filipino’s generality.  Nonetheless, it is the operative category, and for the 
following reason: the Filipino is both specific and delimiting and generic.  It is a 
generality with conditions: that the political ontology in question can be conceived 
as generic only insofar as it is also nameable.  The name Filipino imposes 
limitations that make it impossible to conceive of the diaspora, as a non-delimitable 
ontology, as infinite.  If the diaspora is indeed non-delimitable, it is also not without 
limits.  The question is how to think these limits––the horizons imposed by the 
name––such that the centrality of the State, which the name harbors within itself as 
a possibility, does not materialize and dominate the diaspora’s politics. 
 The Filipino is a general––or rather, generic––political ontology, I maintain, 
because it is the perspective of the subject––as a becoming Filipino––that thinks 
itself in the diaspora as its most basic political form.  We must not take for granted 
the apparently simple fact that the diasporic Filipino––conceived as such, that is, as 
a generic subject––is, geographically speaking, everywhere.  This is why adopting 
the name Filipino, the becoming Filipino that emblematized Carlos Bulosan’s life 
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as a migrant worker, requires a fundamental distance from the nation: it is 
impossible to locate the Filipino as a regional ontology, as a nationalist ontology.   
 Dethroning the Philippines, however, requires a certain rigor that demands 
thinking the name’s validity in spite of the nation and the State.  It means de-
positivizing, in the way that Laclau and Mouffe do to political subjectivities, the 
Philippines.  If the Filipino is everywhere, this is because an axiomatic 
Filipinization happens across the world, from every region of the diaspora to the 
regions that comprise the Philippines and its patchwork political economy.  Patricio 
Abinales’ studies allow us to see that the Philippines is a unity only because of an 
incredible amount of force; it seems to strain under the pressures of axiomatization, 
linking itself to neoliberal capital while it contends with the forces that threaten to 
pull it apart from within.  These regions, from the diaspora to the Philippines, must 
be thought as univocal sites where the expression of a becoming Filipino can take 
place, if only because they each designate a site for the axiomatic production of a 
Filipino aligned with the process of accumulation, the expansion of military 
aggression, and the constitution of electoral (formal) democratic States.   
 This “regionality” is to be taken literally: it can mean a suburb of Los 
Angeles, a street in Rome, a corner in Daly City, a district in Hong Kong, and so 
on.  And if the Philippines is de-positivized, this can only mean that it too must be 
thought as a series of regionalities inhabited by Filipino subjects: the student in 
Manila, the farmworker in Negros, the guerilla in the Cordilleras, the fisherman in 
Mindoro, and so on.  Each region represents a site within which axiomatization 
happens; each one designates a location that attempts to Filipinize the individual 
accordingly: as the domestic worker remitting her earnings to the Philippines from 
Los Angeles or Rome, as the student in Quezon City courted by IMF liaisons 
planted in the government, as the proletarianized rice and corn farmer forced by the 
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WTO to herd cattle and grow commercial crops on razed land.  Every region is 
emblematized by what I termed an imperial axiomatics, from the diaspora to the 
Philippines.   
 Formally speaking, then, the Philippines, must be “diasporized.”  Every 
region poses a challenge to the axiomatic production of the Filipino––wherever it 
takes place.  The subject’s perspective is thus deep inasmuch as it is able to think 
through the depths at which axiomatization occurs.  And it is because of this depth 
that the subject apprehends the Philippines in a kind of inverse position: the 
Philippines belongs within the diaspora, instead of the diaspora belonging to the 
Philippines.   
 I will call this new relation between the diaspora and the Philippines their 
mutual constellationality.  What I am writing of here, then, is a constellational 
diaspora.  The subject, the becoming Filipino, is the constellational subject that 
repudiates the imperial axiom’s attempt to devour it.   
 This is an open constellationality that opposes itself to the closed, 
hierarchical model that predisposes itself to adopting some version of nationalism, 
populism, and hegemony.  But towards what, in its constellationality, is this 
diaspora opened?   
 This is where the concept of absolute negativity returns.  Absolute 
negativity is a refraction that takes place through the name Filipino, which serves as 
simultaneous limit and instigator of the open and infinite––the necessary tension 
that characterizes a politics of the diaspora as an eternally named thing.  This is a 
name that precedes its ontological elaboration, and threatens to axiomatize it before 
it even has a chance to become militant.   
 But this is where the name’s power lies.  Because it is this tension, it has the 
capacity to give rise to the negativity––the absolute negativity––that the name, as 
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designator of a delimited positivity, posits: nothing less than a Filipino axiomatics 
itself.  Absolute negativity refracts itself through the name as designation of a 
constellationality and thus abolishes the power of axiomatization.  The absolute 
negativity of the name Filipino is its appropriation of the name as the signpost for 
the end––and this is where its excessiveness lies––of the Philippine nation’s 
viability as a political category.  It is the extreme negativity that cannot be 
incorporated into a status quo politics, because this politics’ aim is the opposite: to 
maintain, under the conditions of hegemony, a constant reshuffling of the 
constitutive “moments” so as to render effective the idea of the nation as an 
enclosed political totality qua the State.   
 This is a new kind of immanence, one that does not surreptitiously posit the 
existence of a principle beyond itself, and which thus redefines the attribute’s 
capacity to name the multiple. 
 
B.  THE NAME OF THE DIASPORIC EVENT 
 Becoming Filipino, in every sense, constitutes an event.  Here, I take up 
Alain Badiou’s formulation, since, for me, it allows us to think absolute negativity 
by way of the tensions that it engenders, tensions that, in the last analysis, comprise 
the militancy of its political consequences.   
 In the language of set theory, Badiou describes the event, from which the 
void (or, in my terminology, absolute negativity) erupts, thusly: “If there exists an 
event, its belonging to the situation of the site is undecidable from the standpoint of 
the situation itself.  That is, the signifier of the event [which he designates by the 
matheme ex, read as ‘the event of the site X’] is necessarily supernumerary to the 
site.”24  The event is undecidable from the standpoint of the situation because what 
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is called into question is whether or not the event belongs to it.  If it does, then the 
void’s eruption is barred from the start.  It is merely designated by a term 
“presented” in the situation, co-opted from the start by the discursive force of the 
status quo.  But if the event does not belong, then what it designates, the name it 
carries into the situation and introduces by way of the void, is unrecognizable 
except to the void itself, unintelligible except as and from the void of the situation.   
 But this creates an impasse: if the void abolishes the consensus, and by 
extension every categorical definition that allows thinking to happen, how can the 
void be thought at all?  Badiou’s solution is elegant: unite the two options, combine 
them in their effects and see the void from the perspective of its interruption of the 
logic of the situation.  The result is what Badiou calls “the being of non-being, 
namely, existing.”  Its “presentation” in the situation induces the void’s eruption as 
the being that designates the non-being from which it issues and from which it 
comes: it “[forces] the situation itself to confess to its own void, and thereby to let 
forth . . . the incandescent non-being of an existence.”25  The event, because it 
belongs to the situation, lets the void be named, but because it also cannot belong, 
what is named is the non-being and absolute negativity of the situation itself.   
 A common solution is encountered in the problem of the name “Filipino.”  
This is where the problem of the attribute can begin to be solved qua the problem of 
the multiple that, as we saw in Negri, is always potentially subjected to the 
authority of the Idea.  The attribute, ever the name of the State, by “using” the 
primary term of the axiomatic field––the Filipino––also discloses the existence of 
some originary point at which the imperial axiomatic’s self-constitution can be 
glimpsed as the banning of absolute negativity: “It is necessary to prohibit that 
catastrophe of presentation which would be its encounter with its own void, the 
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presentational occurrence of inconsistency as such, or the ruin of the One.”26  The 
One, in which the state of things becomes “structured,” by positing “being-qua-
being,”27 by regulating the correspondence of all the terms of the axiomatic field, 
attempts to actualize itself through the ban on absolute negativity, whose presence 
creates inconsistencies that cannot be subsumed under the form of a hegemonic 
politics, under the binary logic of positive and negative antagonisms I mentioned 
earlier.  Becoming Filipino names the negation of axiomatization and the 
dissolution of constitutive antagonisms because it discloses those radiant gaps of 
negativity dimmed when the State, Empire, and capital turn difference, in the 
manner of a hegemonic refraction, into their main features.  Becoming Filipino, as 
attribution, inscribes an elliptical path: it arises from the axiomatic field only to sink 
back into it, and in so doing blasts holes through it at those very points––or 
regions––in which axiomatization happens, like a missile fired at a ninety-degree 
angle.   
 The constellational diaspora thus describes the precariousness in which 
every constellational subject, every becoming Filipino, is submerged.  The attribute 
emblematizes the erosion of which this becoming is the advent.  Immanence is thus 
multiple inasmuch as the multiple expressed therein is characterized by its constant 
erosion of every ground––or rather, of the erasure of every horizon that materializes 
in order to imprison the subject within the walls of the axiom.  This erosion, 
moreover, is precisely the self-mediating capacity of the subject thought as a 
becoming Filipino.  Ultimately, this is its most militant gesture yet: that it thinks its 
own inability to be delimited, that it posits, in a very real sense, its infinity as the 
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impossible premise for its political ontology.  It is to this notion of time––or, if we 
are speaking of infinities, of time’s disassembling––that we will now turn.   
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CHAPTER 2 
(IN) THE NAME OF REVOLUTION 
 
 
                                      “. . . disarmed in the very citadel of their State machine . . .” 
                                 –––Louis Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination 
 
 
 
 
 We have defined a militant diasporic ontology as a becoming-Filipino, but 
we still need to define its ontological qualities.  This chapter will proceed as an 
enumeration and rereading of a now rather much maligned philosopher: Louis 
Althusser.  A lot has been made of his “theoreticism,” as it has been called; I do not 
wish to dispute this criticism, nor do I wish to defend it.  What I will do instead is 
simply think of it own its own terms, to offer up a reading of two of his most 
famous essays, “Contradiction and Overdetermination” and “From Capital to 
Marx’s Philosophy,” the latter included in his equally famous, if not infamous, text, 
Reading Capital.  If anything, this chapter, if not an outright defense of Althusser, 
is at least an acknowledgement of what, in my estimation, is a key development in 
the philosophy of revolutionary subjectivities: a philosophical methodology that 
conceptualizes what it means to think, and in so doing, to name and create, this 
revolutionary subjectivity. 
 This naming, of course, was the subject of the previous chapter; this chapter 
will thus develop this naming and the form of thought required to think it, a thought 
that initiates the becoming it designates.  Becoming, apropos of its logic, has 
everything to do with time.  If the first chapter was tinged with a bit of anarchism, 
then this chapter, proceeding as it does through Althusser’s theory of the subject, 
and then finishing off with a rereading of Marx’s Grundrisse and its implications 
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for rethinking the immanence of the Filipino diaspora, colors this anarchism with a 
Marxist logic of revolutionary time.   
 
 
2.1  AN ASSAULT AGAINST WHICH DEFENSE IS IMPOSSIBLE 
 
A.  A SELF-CONSTITUTIVE POWER 
 Althusser gives a name to the subjective force of a revolution: the ruptural 
unity, the prime example of which was the Bolshevik Revolution.  Described in 
“Contradiction and Overdetermination,” the concept of the ruptural unity initiates 
Althusser’s infamous attack on the Hegelian Ideal: namely, that history cannot be 
conceived as a sequence dominated by a single Spirit that simply unfolds itself, 
giving birth in the process to an understanding that merely has to determine the 
specific manifestations of this Spirit in order to make sense of political, economic, 
and social transformations.  For Althusser, these so-called transformations are not 
transformations at all; because they are nothing more than mutations of a single 
logic, they remain fixed, reflective of the Historical Ideal in all its intransitive 
permanence.   
 Althusser thus rethinks the Bolshevik Revolution as having arisen from an 
entirely new logic altogether, from an alternative perspective that, in opposition to 
the Hegelian perspective, which posits a standpoint outside of the concrete 
developments of history in order to paradoxically return to it (with a transcendent, 
immaterial logic), can best be described as immanent.  Consequently, Althusser 
refutes even the generalizing logic of a “general contradiction,” the dialectic 
                                                                                                                                 
 53 
between two antagonistic classes.1  Instead, he proposes the following thesis: that 
the Revolution was born from its own subjective force:  
  the possible revolution was a matter of an accumulation and  
  exacerbation of historical contradictions that would have been  
  incomprehensible in any country which was not, as Russia was,  
  simultaneously at least a century behind the imperialist world, and 
  at the peak of its development. . . . This exceptional situation was  
  ‘insoluble’ (for the ruling classes) and Lenin was correct to see in it 
  the objective conditions of a Russian revolution, and to forge its  
  subjective conditions, the means of a decisive assault on this weak  
  link in the imperialist chain, in a Communist Party that was a chain 
  without weak links.2 
In Althusser’s analysis, Lenin recognized these objective conditions, which are 
described in explicitly economic terms: Russia was not only a century behind U.S. 
and Western European imperialism, it was also a society marked by both feudalism 
and industrialism (at that time, Russia had the largest factory in the world, the 
Putilov works at Petrograd).3  .     
 The subjective conditions, however, remain irreducible to economic terms.  
These conditions are subjective because they represent a logic of recognition built 
upon the foundations of an immanent forging of revolutionary possibilities.  This 
logic consists of recognizing that these possibilities, in the case of Russia, arise 
when the objective conditions could be exploited by a collectivity driven by its self-
constitutive power.  This collectivity was composed against and in spite of the 
                                                
1 Louis Althusser, “Contradiction and Overdetermination,” For Marx (Tr. Ben Brewster, Vintage: 
New York, 1969), 99.  
2 ibid, 97 – 8.   
3 ibid, 96.  
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dialectic: its only way of inducing a “single national crisis” was to “fuse” into a 
massive collectivity uncontainable and indescribable according to the logic of class 
alone.  Ruptural unity is the precondition for Althusser’s elaboration of a 
revolutionary subjectivity that does not follow the line of History but instead 
constitutes itself according to the ensemble of relations it faces, which must be 
determined by the logic immanent to the collectivity itself, and not to the Historical 
Idea.   
 This collectivity, moreover, is always in the process of becoming; there is no 
“being” that precedes the recognition of the objective conditions; rather, the 
becoming of the revolutionary collectivity runs in tandem with the logic that allows 
it to recognize itself in its becoming as the subject of a national crisis.  This 
becoming is thus inseparable from its thought on its own subjectivity: militant 
practice is completely immanent to a militant logic, and vice versa.  
 In this formulation, then, Lenin plays a crucial role: he names the possibility 
of militancy.  The subjectivation that happens through him is doubled: the subject is 
both the effect of the naming and the one doing the naming, i.e. the Bolshevik 
Revolution and Lenin himself.  It is the collectivity as product of the naming 
process and the individual subject who posits the existence of an immanent, militant 
logic, the characteristic “correctness” of Lenin’s vision, as Althusser calls it.  The 
collectivity is thus marked by a profound contingency: its immanent logic is 
posited, it is named and given the force of a revolutionary will, but by an apparently 
exterior agent.  This is possible only insofar as this agent, by naming the revolution, 
becomes a subject him or herself, and as such can be said to belong within the 
collective that the naming subject subjectivates.   
 Here, we see a refinement of the form of becoming I advanced in the first 
chapter.  We saw that the  Filipino designates both the subject’s distanciation from 
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the Philippines and the diaspora’s non-delimitability, and that this describes the 
general political ontology of the diaspora’s immanence.  The advent of the 
revolutionary collectivity is thus directly articulated to the function of the name, 
which, by designating the subject’s inclusion within the collectivity that can neither 
be delimited nor anchored according to an identitarian logic, functions as a double 
negation.  The subject is logically incapable of being completely included in the 
collectivity that, by being named qua the subject, becomes immanent; actualizing 
this kind of diasporic immanence, moreover, is the process by which the subject 
subjectivates him or herself––by which the subject, in other words, names the 
revolutionary collectivity as the domain into which he or she introduces him or 
herself.  The naming of the diaspora qua subject, and vice versa, presupposes the 
recognition of a possibility. 
 In Althusser, this recognition is tied to an objective situation.  What could 
this mean for the Filipino diaspora?  Does this reduce the workings of a diasporic 
political ontology to a waiting game, where conditions have to be ripe in order for 
action to not only be possible, but legitimate?  If we recall Althusser’s analysis of 
the October Revolution, the objective situation is actually a concept that makes the 
possibility of revolutionary action thinkable, a concept that has nothing to do with 
“the economic base” or to the pure dialectical comportments of capitalist power.  
The objective situation, on the other hand, is a matter of perspective: it is thinkable 
only from the standpoint of the subjectivating force of the revolutionary collectivity 
in its becoming and through its immanent logic.   
 What we have are two separate logics: the logic of capital and the logic of 
revolution.  I should say, at this point, that this is the critical point of Althusser’s 
concept of overdetermination.  As against Laclau and Mouffe’s claim that he 
reduced every social and political relation to a determinate economic base, we 
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should see Althusser’s definition of overdetermination as a strategic thought on the 
economic “last instance” and ask ourselves what role it plays in an overdetermined 
situation.  As Althusser says in Reading Capital, it is an “absent cause.”4  Why is it 
absent, and why maintain it if, in the end, we are only going to disavow its manifest 
significance in any struggle against capital?  Because it allows us to see, from the 
standpoint of a thought against capital, the following: the mediated trace of the last 
instance in an overdetermined situation.  This trace removes the class struggle per 
se from anti-capitalist action.  Why?  Because class struggle, like the total structure 
of capitalist society, is merely an intelligible effect5 of the last instance, which 
nonetheless remains absent.  This is why Althusser describes Marx’s method in the 
Grundrisse as a theoretical revolution: not because it initiated a brand new 
abstraction that separated thought from the concrete world of political action, but 
because the theory Marx advanced was a form of thought that methodically carried 
out, in the demonstration of the political economic categories he reconceptualized, 
the concept of their subversion.  Marx, in other words, created a perspective against 
capital.  
 If class struggle is thinkable only as an effect of overdetermination, it is 
because it still has a place in any anti-capitalist action.  What is this place?  It is in 
the understanding that any anti-capitalist struggle is always going to be a struggle 
against capital’s primary means of self-actualization: its creation of surplus value.  
Surplus value, on a general scale, is a trace of the economic base, of the concrete 
means of production, the conflict inherent in the forms of labor through which 
capital actualizes itself, that makes its way throughout every constitutive feature of 
an overdetermined society.  
                                                
4 Louis Althusser, “Marx’s Immense Theoretical Revolution,” Reading Capital (2nd ed., Tr. Ben 
Brewster, New York: Verso, 1999), 188.  
5 ibid.  
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 This is the true significance of the notion of ruptural unity, where Althusser 
draws an impassable boundary between two separate logics: on the one side is a 
thought from the standpoint of capital, and on the other a thought from the 
standpoint of the militant against capital.  Althusser shifts its balance and takes the 
side of the latter.  He accomplishes this shift by maintaining the last instance as a 
trace.  It becomes the objective instance that delimits the struggle against capital as 
the struggle against the apex concept of Marx’s conceptual system: surplus value 
production.  But because the last instance is always posited by this perspective, the 
thought on such a struggle also posits the supercession of the class dialectic through 
this struggle.  The ruptural unity, thought in its immanent logic, is the becoming of 
a collectivity that cannot be contained by this dialectic.     
 We have to take into account, however, the fact that the 1917 revolution was 
a ruptural unity against tsarist Russia, that it was a revolution against the existing 
State, because to think ruptural unity is to think the State-capital manifold and its 
undoing.  This dual attack, as Althusser says, is indefensible.  The reason for this 
indefensibility lies in the form of subjectivation accomplished in the ruptural unity: 
the naming subject (Lenin), in subjectivating him or herself and thus including him 
or herself in the collectivity he or she designates as such, thinks of the possibility of 
militancy as the act of naming the militant.  And since this naming accompanies the 
designation of a collectivity in the process of its becoming, whose possibility the 
thinking subject posits in order to illicit nothing less than his or her becoming, his 
or her own becoming-militant runs in tandem with the possibility it thinks.   
 A ruptural unity arises not because the objective situation is recognized as 
granting legitimacy to anti-capitalist and anti-Statist action, but because the subject 
recognizes those points within an overdetermined situation that make it possible to 
overturn the entire capitalist edifice.  Ruptural unity is a completely subjective 
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process: on the one hand, it takes place in and through the subject, and on the other 
through the collectivity that emerges as an immanence whose possibility is tied to 
that of the subject him or herself.  Because it is not beholden to an objective 
situation, because it does not take place according to any recognizable logic or 
general law (such as the dialectic of classes in its purity), a ruptural unity allows us 
to think absolute negativity more concretely.  To put it bluntly, because ruptural 
unity is a subjective process it is therefore autonomous with respect to the 
objectively determinable situation, freed, at the moment of the collectivity’s 
naming, from the shackles of the State and of capital.  The act of naming the 
militant and initiating the revolutionary sequence is itself emblematic of the 
negativities within the status quo, negativities that allow the subject to persist as a 
militant disruptor of the political, economic, and even the revolutionary consensus.  
Ruptural unity is neither containable and thinkable by the logics of the State and of 
capital, nor by any other logic that attempts to reduce the fight against surplus 
value production to economic struggle––the general contradiction, the dialectic––
alone.  In the end, they amount to the same thing.  Absolute negativity becomes 
indefensible in the face of these three logics; it remains, appropriately enough, 
beyond the purview of their limited scope. 
 The method is clear: to think subjectivation as a naming through which both 
the individual subject and the collectivity becomes.  This is all Marx’s method, in 
Althusser’s remarkable reading, does: it militantly thinks.  We can thus derive the 
most general form of which this proposition consists and arrive at the central 
problem that drives this dissertation: the question of what it means to think a subject 
in its becoming through the force of attribution, in addition to the proper method 
required to think this subject in its becoming as a potential militancy.   
                                                                                                                                 
 59 
 Accordingly, I will advance the following thesis: that a thought on 
attribution, a thought that thinks attribution, is a form of attribution itself, one that is 
possible only by thinking itself as a thought on its capacities to think militantly.  
Such a thought apprehends its place within the collectivity whose militancy it thinks 
qua the name, a naming that simultaneously includes the subject, in his or her 
becoming, as the negation of the collectivity’s delimitability and the distanciator of 
identity.  It is a method, a form of thought, that consists of a sequence of namings 
and attributions.  
 The subject––the agent of attribution, the vessel of the common’s immanent 
logic––remains, as a concept, incomplete.  We have not yet seen its relationship to 
time.  This has everything to do with the subject’s recognition of possibilities.  We 
have already done much in this regard: this entire section was essentially a passage, 
by way of Althusser, into the subject’s revolutionary becoming against capital and 
the State.  The objective now is to clarify the subject’s constitutive features and to 
make its relationship to time more rigorous. 
 
B.  THE SUBJECT: F*** THE POLICE 
 There are two readings of Althusser’s “handling” of the subject that I would 
like to foreground, both of which are highly distinctive in their own ways: Judith 
Butler’s and Alain Badiou’s.  Both differ in their conception of the differences 
between, and the consequent significance of, a) the subject, and b) a subjectivity.  
Butler’s and Badiou’s respective positions on the matter can be summarized thusly: 
 a.  The subject exists, but a subjectivity does not.  Butler focuses her reading 
upon Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” essay, and 
concludes that the subject’s subordination to a higher power (the Law, the State, the 
Church, etc.) involves the subject’s conscientiousness, a form of recognition 
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through which the subject secures its existence as a subject, which becomes, by 
virtue of its recognition of “the call’s” authority, ambivalent.  For Butler, this is the 
meaning of Althusser’s example of the policeman’s “hailing” of the man on the 
street, the subjectivating force of “interpellation.”6  The subject’s conscience can be 
said to produce a guilt that forces it to respond to the call of Power.  The subject 
overshadows the possibility of thinking a subjectivity, which can be defined as a 
series of processes that constitute the subject and that allow one to think its 
constitution separate from its existence as a subject, which Althusser describes as 
the condition of “always already” being a subject, that is, as always already, and 
eternally, subordinate.7  The difference between a subject and a subjectivity, in 
other words, is the following: the former is a fixed, subordinate ontology and the 
latter a transitive, constitutive dynamic that comprises it, prior to any fixation and 
identification.  According to Butler, because Althusser describes ideology as the 
necessary precondition for the reproduction of the relations of production in capital, 
where subjects perform the reproduction themselves by accepting their 
interpellation as reproducers, by taking upon themselves the responsibility of 
reproducing the relations of production and mastering the “know-how”8 of capitalist 
exploitation, “neither submission nor mastery is performed by a subject; the lived 
simultaneity of submission as mastery, and mastery as submission, is the condition 
of possibility for the emergence of the subject.”9  It is this lack of subjective 
performance that Butler ultimately sees as the impasse in Althusser’s essay, and it 
leads her to conclude that there has to be a way to think the possibility that there is a 
                                                
6 Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays 
(Tr. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 115 – 20.  
7 ibid, 117.  
8 ibid, 100 – 06.  
9 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1997), 117.  
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“potentiality that remains inexhausted by any particular interpellation,” a 
subjectivity that emerges out of the impossible constitution of the subject who 
possesses “a willingness not to be” under the terms of Power.10  
 b.  For Badiou, on the contrary, there is subjectivity only because it is indeed 
possible to think against the subject.  It is important to note that Badiou arrives at 
this conclusion by making reference not to the ideology essay, but to a few passages 
from Politics and History, Reading Capital, For Marx, and “Lenin and 
Philosophy,” all of which deal not with the subject per se, but with the relation 
between philosophy and politics.  Quoting from an essay in Politics and History, 
“Marx’s Relation to Hegel,” Badiou draws upon Althusser’s now well-known (and 
well-contested) differentiation between science and ideology: “‘the concept 
‘process’ is scientific, the notion ‘subject’ is ideological.’  ‘Subject’ is not the name 
of a concept,” Badiou continues, “but that of a notion, that is, the mark of an 
inexistence.  There is no subject, since there are only processes.”11  For Badiou, 
Althusser’s subject is ideological and Statist and therefore non-existent from the 
standpoint of politics: “Althusser posits that only the ‘militants of the revolutionary 
class struggle’ really grasp the thought of the process in relations [of production, 
political relations, ideological relations, and so on, as long as they are material].  
Therefore, genuine thought of process is possessed by those engaged in political 
practice.”12  Thus, genuine thought is linked directly to a militant politics; 
moreover, since, as Badiou reminds us, Althusser’s concern is with philosophy as a 
practice,13 genuine thought is political inasmuch as it is “a separating activity, a 
thinking of the distinctions in thought [which] can draw new lines of partition, think 
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11 Alain Badiou, Metapolitics (Tr. Jason Barker. New York: Verso, 2005), 59.  
12 ibid, 60.  
13 ibid, 59.  
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new distinctions.”  And yet, Badiou acknowledges that “[p]hilosophy has no object.  
In particular, the ‘political’ object does not exist for it.  Philosophy is an act whose 
effects are strictly immanent.”  Althusser’s goal is to therefore “identify politics 
through its immanent effects within philosophical activity,” which is possible only 
because both politics and philosophy possess no object: both are processes whose 
principle characteristic is immanence, philosophy’s proof being the order of its 
logic, and that of politics’ being the “processionality” of the militancy that gives it a 
trajectory.14  This, for Badiou, is where subjectivity emerges.  “It is a process of 
homogeneous thought in the material form of militancy, one not determined 
through (scientific) objectivity, nor captive to the (ideological) subject-effect.”15  
Thought and politics, whose unity philosophy––Althusser’s method––thinks, is tied 
to the processionality of a subjectivity, which Badiou equates to militant political 
sequences. 
 Both Butler and Badiou, then, acknowledge the ideological constitutivity of 
the subject.  But their conclusions diverge, and for the following reason: Butler 
gives a positive reading of Althusser’s treatment of the subject, through which she 
is able to see it as a positive concept and a thinkable “object” with an actual content 
worthy of determination, whereas Badiou gives a negative account of the subject by 
defining it as empty of any philosophical significance precisely because it is 
ideological.  Neither reading, it seems, is completely incorrect.  But they are not 
wholly correct, either.  Butler eschews the philosophical question, i.e. the 
methodological problem, that Badiou underscores, one that, given his insistence of 
Marx’s “immense theoretical revolution,” to borrow the title of one of his essays, 
can be said to be one of Althusser’s primary concerns.  And yet, Badiou is too 
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easily dismissive of the value that the subject could have for a thought on militant 
politics, of the value it could have for theorizing its undoing as an ideological 
effect.   
 I want to focus on two propositions, the first from Butler and the second 
from Badiou.  Together, they can help to demonstrate the existence of a much more 
complete notion of the subject vis-à-vis subjectivity than either Butler or Badiou 
give.  They are 
 1.  That the “bad subject” arises from a willingness to be unconstituted,  
      refusing the call of interpellation and thus submitting itself to the void of 
      non-being. 
 2.  That the subject, as a positive ontological category for the State, is  
      unthinkable for a militant politics whose immanent logic is concerned  
      only with processes.  
Viewed through these two propositions, Butler’s and Badiou’s readings do not 
appear incompatible: the notion of the subject’s submission to non-being and an 
immanent logic’s immersion in and harnessing of political practice can be seen as 
two sides of the same militant process, where the subject’s primary willingness to 
“in-exist” is the precondition for its induction into the immanent processes of 
politics.  But this also means that to think the subject in and as its processionality––
to think the subject’s overcoming by subjectivity––is to think the subject’s 
becoming.  This is nothing less than the function of attribution and naming, the 
subject’s inclusion in a non-delimitable collectivity designated as the “site” of 
potential militancy.  This turns thinking the subject’s becoming into a thought on 
the subject as an immanent logic of a self-constitutive force, as the initiator of an 
absolute negativity whose emblem is its non-being towards the State and capital.  
The subject’s constitutive procedure is thus to think itself in its becoming qua the 
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non-delimitable collectivity it names, which, ultimately, is a self-voiding procedure 
that disavows the State’s and capital ability to subordinate and name it in their 
image, as it were, thus weakening their identitarian power and logic.  
 This recapitulates Lenin’s subjectivation of the Bolshevik Revolution: 
against a naming from “above”––from the police, from the State, from capital (all 
components of the same overdetermined structure)––a subject names itself.  It 
designates its within-ness in a collectivity whose becoming it has summoned by 
naming it.  This, and nothing more, is the power of the subjectivating force of the 
name and the attribute, and which the method developed by Althusser––a thought 
on this militancy––can think as a militant thought.     
 The “bad subject” is thus subjectivity thought as an immanent logic.  And 
yet, a subjectivity, because of the nature of attribution––to name a potential 
militancy through the terms given by the State, i.e. “the Filipino”––is unthinkable 
without acknowledging the residue of the subject, that still dominated thing.  In 
other words, as against Badiou, I maintain the necessity to think the subject if we 
are to think the potential of militancy.  This subject, however, is bad; it is a 
becoming, an immanent process, the absolute negativity of the logics of the State 
and of capital.  In order to not undercut the terminology I have been using so far, I 
will hereafter maintain my use of the term “subject,” which, let it be known, is 
always the bad subject of a becoming. 
 (As a side note, I also maintain that this is one way to get past some of the 
impasses of Badiou’s philosophical snags, which, in his rigorous insistence on the 
need to rethink the universal for the purposes of leaving behind the relativisms and 
weaknesses of what he derides as postmodernist and post-structuralist philosophy 
and politics, tends to leave untheorized the kinds of empowering moves that arise 
when a group militantly organizes around an ethno-political category.  As I have 
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been saying, however, these empowering gestures are also beset by their own 
limitations, a tension that merits great consideration.  These tensions, without 
performing the kinds of maneuvers I have been making, are what remain 
unthinkable in Badiou’s philosophy.)  
 We have thus come to the central concern of this chapter: the temporality of 
the subject.  We have seen that the potential for revolution is thinkable only if a 
ruptural unity, the overdetermined emergence of a revolutionary collectivity 
designated by the designating subject, is posited from the start.  For Althusser, this 
was a transformation of the Hegelian version of History, ruled by a single Idea.  
This means that a new notion of time, adequate to the subject whose theoretical 
determination we have performed above, is called for.  For this, we have to turn to 
that methodological substratum of Althusser’s own thinking: the Grundrisse.   
 
 
2.2  FUTURALITY / MARX’S METHOD: THE PRESUPPOSITION, OR, ABSOLUTE-
NEGATIVITY-IN-THOUGHT 
 Let us preface Marx by way of a debate that took place roughly twenty-five 
years ago concerning the problem of theorizing the transition out of capitalism: that 
between Norberto Bobbio and Antonio Negri.  This debate was focused primarily 
upon the question of the State, and especially of the place of democracy, in a 
revolution’s reversal of the production of surplus value.  The difference between 
Bobbio and Negri can be summed up as follows:   
 a.  For Bobbio there is quite simply no such thing as the reversal of surplus 
value.  Instead, he opts for a thoroughgoing analysis of the possibilities of a 
democratized distribution of the means of production, achieved by taking apart both 
the concept of democracy and socialism, and in turn disclosing the paradox of the 
idea of a “democratic socialism:” namely, that democracy is essentially 
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“subversive,” power flowing “upwards” and not downwards.  Bobbio distinguishes 
this bottom-up model of politics from socialism, which for him requires the 
“transfer of ownership of the means of production from the hands of private 
individuals to the state, in other words, another institution where power flows 
downwards.”16  The transition towards a democratic socialism involves determining 
not only the necessary form that it will take––the mechanisms that would enable a 
democratized distribution of the means of production––but more importantly the 
subject or agent that will ensure these goals’ actualization.  Bobbio’s concerns 
point to a single problem: that of organization, and in what way the concrete 
struggles of which it is constituted correspond, formally speaking, to the State-form.   
 b.  Whereas Bobbio concludes his analyses with this impasse, in which 
advocating a democratic socialism rather than a socialism in its historical guise 
(presumably in the manner of the Soviet) becomes the central argument devoid, 
however, of what exactly the form such a democratic socialism would take against 
the institutional form of the State, Negri is more definite: for him the State’s 
function is to preserve the form of the means of production, and no amount of 
freedom can be maintained under the conditions of State rule.  This means that the 
form of a democratic socialism is equivalent, in its effects, to that of the State: any 
attempt at equitably distributing the means of production presupposes, as Bobbio 
acknowledges, a centralized form of power: “the application of central planning to 
ensure that the law of surplus value is fulfilled.”17  In this sense, socialism is a mere 
homology of capitalism, both of which are premised upon extracting value from 
wage labor, the “form of the law of value.”18  The democratic model, unwittingly or 
                                                
16 Norberto Bobbio, Which Socialism? (Tr. Roger Griffin. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
1987), 74 – 5.  
17 Negri, “Is There A Marxist Doctrine of the State? A Reply,” ibid, 133.  
18 Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx (Tr. Harry Cleaver, Michael Ryan, Maurizio Viano. Brooklyn: 
Autonomedia, 1991), 127 – 50.  
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not, accepts the notion that the form of capital carries over into socialism, its formal 
transformation to a democratic socialism being unable by definition to introduce a 
complete transformation in the concrete relations of production.  The subjective 
form of organization that Bobbio calls attention to and defines as a fundamental 
problem is recapitulated by Negri, but with a significant difference: it is the index 
of a necessary revolution in the “traditional categories” and “conceptual 
framework” for determining the transformation out of capitalism.19   
 To sum up: the transition towards a democratic socialism, because of its 
central paradox––power on the ascent, i.e. power “from below,” combined with the 
practical function of the state “from above”––does not solve the formal problems of 
capital, which, for Negri, require not only an alternative project, but an entirely new 
system of concepts capable of determining the organization of a true revolution 
against wage labor.  This means producing new categories for thinking a militant 
subject, defined in opposition to both capital and socialism, even a democratic one.  
This militant subject, for Negri, is named Communism, and its constitutive feature 
is its radical break––both formally and substantively––with capital.  This notion of 
the break departs from the transitionality of a democratic socialism, of both a 
democratic revolution and a socialist revolution, a notion that cannot help but 
redeploy the presumptions of that thing that Althusser repudiated: the Historical 
Idea.  Such a break is thinkable, as Althusser knew, only by thinking a new 
methodology into existence.   
 It is therefore time to turn to Marx himself.   
 The problem of methodology involves the production of concepts, “the 
concrete in mind,” a production that Marx called an “abstract determination,” or as 
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it has been more popularly called, the “determinate abstraction,” which he defined 
as follows in the 1857 Introduction.  It is a passage worth quoting at length: 
  It seems correct to begin with the real and the concrete, with the real 
  precondition, thus to begin, in economics, with e.g. the population,  
  which is the foundation and the subject of the entire social act of  
  production.  However, on closer examination this proves false.  The 
  population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of 
  which it is composed.  These classes in turn an empty phrase if I am 
  not familiar with the elements on which they rest.  E.g. wage labour, 
  capital, etc. . . . .  The concrete is concrete because it is the   
  concentration of many determinations, hence the unity of the  
  diverse.  It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process 
  of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even though 
  it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of  
  departure for observation and conception.  Along the first path the  
  full conception was evaporated to yield an abstract determination;  
  along the second, the abstract determinations lead towards a  
  reproduction of the concrete by way of thought.  In this way Hegel  
  fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought 
  concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and unfolding itself out 
  of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from the abstract to 
  the concrete is only the way in which through appropriates the  
  concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in mind. . . . .  [T]o the kind of 
  consciousness––and this is characteristic of the philosophical  
  consciousness––for which conceptual thinking is the real human  
  being, and for which the conceptual world as such is thus the only  
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  reality, the movement of the categories appears as the real act of  
  production––which only, unfortunately, receives a jolt from the  
  outside––whose product is the world; and––but this is again a  
  tautology––this is correct in so far as the concrete totality is a totality 
  of thoughts, concrete in thought, in fact a product of thinking and  
  comprehending; but not in any way a product of the concept which 
  thinks and generates itself outside or above observation and  
  conception; a product, rather, of the working-up of observation and 
  conception into concepts.20   
He then goes on to develop his famous thesis: “Bourgeois society is the most 
developed and the most complex historic organization of production.  The 
categories which express its relations, the comprehension of its structure, thereby 
also allows insights into the structure and the relations of production of all the 
vanished social formations out of whose ruins and elements it built itself up, whose 
partly still unconquered remnants are carried along within it, whose mere nuances 
have developed explicit significance within it, etc.  Human anatomy contains a key 
to the anatomy of the ape.”21  The most important point of this passage is the one 
that Althusser himself called attention to: namely, that the “concrete in mind,” i.e. 
the concept, and the process of abstract determination in thought, marks a profound 
revolution against empiricist conceptions of knowledge.22  Let us keep this in mind 
as we separate the above passage into its constitutive propositions.   
 1.  The concrete is a product of overdetermination, “the unity of the 
diverse.”  In referring to an earlier passage in the Introduction where Marx defines 
                                                
20 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Tr. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Penguin, 1993), 101.   
21 ibid, 105.  
22 Althusser, “From Capital to Marx’s Philosophy,” 35 – 40. 
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production as a “totality” of the relations of production,23 Negri, in Marx Beyond 
Marx, defines Marx’s method of conceptualization as the production in thought of 
the concrete “as a relation and a unity of differences.”24  The concrete thus presents 
itself to thought and makes itself available to conceptualization only after this 
thought determines these determinations and their concentration into and 
production of the concrete.  This is a knowledge-effect, and what it designates in its 
methodological comportment to the society-effect is this: the positing of the 
concrete, objective conditions within the conceptual system, the unification by the 
objectivity posited by a thought on the overdetermined field of relations, a thought 
that thinks capital’s continual self-actualization vis-à-vis (but not limited to) the 
relations of production, i.e. the economically-based production of surplus value.  
This, as I said earlier, is the general form for thinking the economic last instance as 
a trace that permeates an overdetermined situation and which allows the militant to 
think the overturning of surplus value as the sole project of a revolution against 
capital, in all of its actualizations.   
 2.  The concrete cannot be thought as an empirical determination.  But in no 
way does this mean that the concrete exists only as a product of the mind, and that 
the world enters the head only as a “jolt from the outside,” a mere corrective or 
analogue to the world that the mind has produced.  It is impossible to move from 
one extreme (empiricism) to another (idealism).  This means, again, the positing of 
the concrete in thought by thought.   
 3.  Beyond empiricism and idealism lies something else altogether, 
something introduced into the world vis-à-vis thought and its relations (“the relation 
and unity of differences”) in the concrete.  This is what Negri describes as the 
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subject of “the transformation of knowledge” of the Grundrisse.25  “[T]he abstract 
determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought:” the 
subject of the methodology (the thinking subject who deploys the method) is also a 
product of it, but only insofar as it reproduces and posits in thought the concrete.  It 
reproduces the concrete and its overdeterminations, turning the totality into an 
object of knowledge and concretizing in thought capital’s self-actualization.  More 
importantly, this total view of capital also produces the thought of the revolution 
against it, of the categories that help to think capital’s overdetermined totality and 
thus to make thinking revolution possible.  This is the domain of the subject, which 
is capable of inducing a revolution by thinking and naming the collective agent as 
an immanent logic of its attribution.  This is what Negri has called “communism in 
methodology.”26  Thus far, I have merely been restating many of the propositions I 
advanced earlier;  with this last proposition, however, we encounter a radically new 
idea altogether: that such a revolution is immanent as concrete because it is posited 
in the totality of overdeterminations, that it is, that revolution is yet another 
overdetermination thinkable within capital.   
 4.  This will be clearer if we think of this immanence as a temporal 
category.  Determining and positing the concrete involves placing it along a 
temporal series, but as a function of the present: “Human anatomy contains the key 
to the ape.” This is what Marx meant when he said that the past is the 
“presupposition”27 of the present: “The point is not the historic position of the 
economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. . . . Rather, their 
order within bourgeois society.”28  The concrete, determined in its successive forms 
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26 ibid, 48.  
27 Grundrisse, 101 – 2 (emphasis mine).  
28 ibid, 107 – 8.   
                                                                                                                                 
 72 
up to its current manifestation, needs to attain a level of generality.  This is not a 
substantive generality, however; it is a formal one.  Only in this way is the concrete 
determinable in time, its constitutive elements capable of being posited as common 
throughout all of the modes of production in question, from the past to the present. 
“The conception of labour in this general form––labour as such––is also 
immeasurably old.  Nevertheless, when it is economically conceived in this 
simplicity, ‘labour’ is as modern a category as are the relations which create this 
simple abstraction.”29  “Labour as such” is the abstract form of the concrete object 
of the method.  Reduced to its simplest form, the concept is provided with a 
generality that gives it both its modernity and its antiquity.  The latter are the 
“remnants” whose relation to the former has produced the concept of labor “as 
such.”   A concept’s modernity is inseparable and in fact contiguous with its older 
forms.  A single concept can thus give rise to an entire historical relation conceived 
as a formal continuity, the concept unfolding itself backward in time so as to 
construct and reproduce all of History’s constitutive totalities.  But this is possible 
only if the present is conceived as containing within itself all of the past’s forms.  
The principle Marxist presupposition––that capitalism contains the seeds for its 
own destruction––posits the present, then, as the presupposition of a future world 
without capital, which must contain the present within it.   
 Let us recall the third proposition: a subjectivity is capable of thinking, and 
in so doing naming, designating, and attributing a collectivity’s revolution against 
capitalism, but only by reproducing it vis-à-vis thought, that is, in the totality, in the 
overdeterminations that a subject thinks and in which it posits the concrete 
objective conditions for its subjectivating and immanent logic.  This is the formula 
that allows Marx to suggest, in the famous “Fragment on Machines” at the 
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beginning of Notebook VII of the Grundrisse, that capitalism is leading towards a 
situation where not only will labor become increasingly socialized, but that 
“disposable time [rather than labor time, the source of value] will grow for all,” 
marking a shift towards the reversal of capital’s production of surplus value.30  The 
subject I mentioned in the third proposition above is thus thinkable only in its 
relation to time: it is the agent of the present’s presupposition of the future.  The 
subject induces and names the concrete totality of a world freed from capitalism by 
reproducing this world in thought and positing it as a potentiality within the world 
of capital itself.  It hurls the present into the future as a function of an immanent, 
subjectivating logic within a collectivity.    
 Using these four propositions as a foundation, I will advance the following 
thesis: a subject, because it presupposes the future as a constitutive moment of its 
thought on the overdeterminations of the present, introduces a constitutive 
negativity in thought and in the subject him or herself, thus producing the idea of an 
overdetermined totality marked by a temporal emptiness posited by this subject, 
which has done so only insofar as a future against capital can be thought as a 
concrete possibility of the present.  A subject thinks the future in the present and 
empties the latter of its positivity.   
 This is what I will term the futurality constitutive of a politics against capital 
and the State.  It is the temporal dimension of an immanent, subjectivating logic of 
a collectivity that a subject names and designates.  This returns us to the problems 
advanced in the concluding section of Chapter 1: namely, the problem posed by the 
attribute, the emblem of absolute negativity, one thinkable, nonetheless, only by 
being submitted (however partially) to the logic of the State.  This is the 
characteristic tension of the name and attribute “Filipino.”  This is also the problem 
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of what I called the residue of the subject (subordinate to the call of the police, of 
the State, and of capital) within a transitive subjectivity.  We must therefore offer up 
the following proposition as a supplement to the previous four: 
 5.  What might be called the subject-subjectivity duality––i.e. the tensions 
inherent to the namer and attributer of a collectivity––exceeds the Historical Idea 
and Historical Necessity (those two categories derided by Althusser) by thinking 
them as preconditions for a thought, in the present––still subject to capital––of a 
life beyond capitalism.  The fourth proposition showed that such a thought, as an 
immanent, subjectivating logic, is temporal, but because this logic thinks the 
present in terms of the futurality of an anti-capitalist and anti-Statist politics, and 
effectively posits its potential in the here and now, this temporality cannot be 
conceived as a sequential division of past, present, and future.  If Necessity names 
such a logic, then an immanent subjectivation of the future in the present designates 
a break in the present, a rupture in time.   
 But is it really possible to think futurality without in some way 
recapitulating at least something of Necessity, e.g. the transition?  The transition 
signals the movement from one mode of production to the next, but if repudiating 
Necessity also means repudiating the transition, it seems as though any thought on a 
potential life beyond capital is foreclosed from the start.  We seem to have missed 
something, and for the following reason: thus far, we have failed to theorize the 
relationship between a thought on a radical rupture with capital and a thought 
constituted by such a rupture.   
 As Marx showed, the method of following a determinate abstraction through 
its implications is primarily a question of form.  In the fourth proposition, I 
mentioned that the concept of the presupposition is successful inasmuch as the 
present is thought to contain all of the past’s forms.  If Marx’s method was to think 
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the potential of Communism, in its futurality, then this means that the present must 
be thought as the past of a future whose potential is posited now, a futurality 
thinkable in terms of the formal unity of the present and the future.  Inasmuch as 
this thought thinks by disrupting the apodictic movement of time from one point to 
the next––positing as it does the yet-to-be of Communism as a potential of the 
present, as an immanence that can be subjectivated and is therefore thinkable as an 
actual presence––it still remains tied to the logic of the transition as a formal 
category: it is what allows us to think past capital.  The formal unity of present and 
future, of past and present, makes it possible to think immanence, of its passage 
from a latent potential of the present to the presupposed, explosive disruption of 
capital.  This describes the thought on a radical rupture with capital.  What, then, 
comprises a thought constituted by this rupture? 
 Such a thought, because it posits the presupposition as a concrete thing and 
thus thinks––i.e. names––the existence of futurality, constitutes itself in its 
immanent, subjectivating logic by thinking itself as inhabiting the rupture as its 
namer, designator, and attributor.  A subject is the advent of the rupture, whose 
thought on the rupture turns around and constitutes this subject and sends it into the 
absolute negativity of the present it has just summoned.  This is what I mean when 
by a subject’s becoming, whose passage is lit by the black light of non-being; it 
hurtles itself into the absolute negativity of its own ontology by the process of 
attribution, through which it becomes qua the becoming of a collectivity whose 
delimitation it abolishes, and vice versa.  This becoming is the emblem of what 
Negri named Communism, of the subject’s immanent militancy.   
 We therefore have the unity of two categories: the form of time, and the 
substance of time.  The former is the framework in which a rupture is thinkable, 
and the latter the subjectivating logic that thinks qua the rupture.  But insofar as the 
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form of time allows a transition beyond capital to be thinkable, the means by which 
such a movement-beyond happens is in no way containable by the transition 
conceived as a concrete process, as a concrete organization that both induces and is 
included within a transformation beyond capitalism, the main point of contention 
between Bobbio and Negri.  The substantive organization against capital is an 
immanent subjectivation, whose logic concretizes this immanence against the 
transition, against the unitary flow from past, to present, to future.  It introduces 
into the present the absolute negativity of the future: Communism.   
 When what is at stake is the question of a revolution against and beyond 
capital, there is a necessary separation between time’s form and its substance.  It is 
therefore imperative that we maintain two apparently incommensurable categories 
of time: that of the transition and that of the break.  With this in mind, we can return 
to the debate between Bobbio and Negri concerning the State.  Because of the logic 
of the separation, it is impossible to think the transformation of capital according to 
the formal aspects of the transition alone.  If we follow the presuppositional 
method, and think what it would mean to adopt the transition as a formal model that 
doubles itself as a substantive description of the proper course of events, the 
following happens: the commonalities that are said to belong to all of the modes of 
production (here, capitalist to post-capitalist) and which constitute the present’s 
presupposition, if they are defined as in fact determinative of the substantive mode 
of organization and transformation, would produce nothing more than a homology 
between capitalism and that post-capitalist, transitional phase, or in other words, 
socialism.  This is the homology that Negri critiques.   
 The fifth proposition, by separating time’s form from its substance, says that 
form is deployable as the framework for thinking the present’s presupposition of the 
future, which enables this thought to posit the existence of futurality in the present.  
                                                                                                                                 
 77 
This positing in its turn disengages the substantive mode of organization––as a 
function of an immanent, subjectivating logic––from the present, introducing into 
the latter an absolute negativity that, although it is intelligible there, in no way 
belongs to it.  It is intelligible through the force of a thought that acts as the 
immanent subjectivation of revolution.  This removes the possibility of thinking that 
a transformation out of capitalism could take place by reorganizing its relations of 
production into a more democratic model.  Rather, this logic posits revolution as 
the negation of capital altogether, and not a compromise with its terms, a meager 
reorganization that does nothing more than democratically distribute the ownership 
of the means of production, to use that old phrase, rather than negating it altogether.  
As Negri says, this break or separation is a function of the revolutionary method 
that Marx created in the Grundrisse, which produced a method from the perspective 
of the “subjectivizing” processes within, but not belonging to, capital: the force of 
Communism.31   
 
 
2.3  FUTURALITY AND THE DIASPORA 
 We are led, if we are to think of subjectivation as the key to a becoming-
Filipino on an immanent diaspora, to the following conclusion: that the name 
Filipino can only be thought when submitted to the force of futurality.  Futurality, 
in this regard, has everything to do with the erosion of that which Filipino 
subjectivity is constituted.  In Chapter 1, I said that the Filipino is unthinkable 
without acknowledging its simultaneous acceptance and repudiation of the terms set 
forth within the axiomatic production, qua the Philippine State and American 
                                                
31 Negri, Marx Beyond Marx, esp. 151 – 69.   
                                                                                                                                 
 78 
imperialism, of the Filipino.  I proposed a number of theoretico-political 
coordinates for thinking the militancy inherent to this becoming: 
 a.  The diaspora must be thought in its immanence, and the Philippines as    
      logically diasporized.   
 b.  An immanent diaspora and a diasporized Philippines, the relation  
      between which I described as “the common,” rejects the “normal” model 
      of diasporic nationalism, where a liberated Philippine nation becomes the 
      locus of identification for a politicized diasporic Filipino.  
 c.  The common, as a function of a subjectivity’s perspective on itself in    
      common, is a new political ontology where the absolute negativity of the 
      Philippine State, conceived as the historical outcome of axiomatic  
      Filipinization, is manifest, and which in its turn manifests the global    
      repudiation of this Filipinization against both the State and Empire. 
 d.   A subjectivity’s thought on the immanent diaspora as repudiation of the 
      form of politics legislated by the State is possible only by thinking its  
      continuous attribution of the Filipino as the name of this repudiation, one 
      that expresses the common as a solidarity-in-erosion inasmuch as the  
      Filipino is indeed precarious because of what attribution does: undermine 
      the historical and contemporary stability of the term Filipino itself, which 
      always names the ontological product of the State and of Empire.   
When refined through the conclusions reached in this chapter, these propositions 
take on added complexity.  To think futurality without accepting the formal 
coordinates of the transition points towards the exceedance of time’s form by the 
substantive mode of organization that makes the transformation out of capital 
possible.  From the perspective of the Filipino diaspora, these two conclusions––1) 
that of the subject’s immanence qua the constellational diaspora, and 2) the 
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temporality that separates the form and substance of revolution––is a logical 
equivalence.  It concretizes the relation between the State and capital: in the face of 
an immanent, subjectivating logic, both are the ontological forms through which 
militancy is thinkable and nameable but, ultimately, uncontainable.   
 The immanent, subjectivating logic that thinks the diaspora in its 
immanence thinks attribution in its erosion just as it thinks the transition in its 
explosion––the ruptural unity.  Such a becoming takes place as an abolition of 
time’s apodicticity: the immanent diaspora manifests the repudiation of the State 
and Empire because it also manifests the rejection of any strict organizational 
principle around class alone and expresses the enfolding of an axiomatic 
Filipinization and the reproduction of surplus value.  Thinking the unity of 
becoming and time’s dissolution is thus a thought on the ruptural unity of the 
Filipino diaspora, against the transition legislated by the axiomatics of the State 
and Empire, against the passage through anything that involves a simple 
reorganization of capitalist principles in favor of the destruction of surplus value 
production in general.  
 It is up to the next chapter to supply the demonstration of how this thought 
is thinkable concretely––that is, in the contemporary global form through which 
axiomatization and the reproduction of surplus value happens, and into which an 
immanent Filipino diaspora deposits absolute negativity: neoliberalism. That 
chapter will demonstrate just what thinking the function of militancy means in the 
diaspora.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THINKING AGAINST HISTORY 
 
 
       “Perhaps the worst consequence of WWII is that it kept alive the idea that war could be 
                 just.” 
                     –––Howard Zinn, “Just and Unjust War” 
 
                                  “. . . the enemy today . . . is called Democracy.” 
                                     –––Alain Badiou, Metapolitics 
 
 
 
 
 If the preceding chapter was about thinking the future, in a process I called a 
thought on futurality, then the present one will provide a historical basis for this 
thought.  I will trace the paths of a thought on the historicity of what a militant 
diasporic Filipino must, in my estimation, inescapably face today: neoliberalism.  I 
will be making, in this chapter, a rather polemical argument.  Taking as my 
conceptual starting point the remarks I made in Chapter 1 concerning democracy 
and revolutionary action, my contention is this: that the conflicts endemic to 
democratic action require one to think, as Lenin admonishes, the potential 
separations between the form and content of democratic societies.  Formal equality, 
as Lenin said, is the shell for capitalism; today, as neoliberalism spreads across the 
globe and digs deeper into once autonomous regions, this formal equality has 
sufficed to justify military, economic, and political conquest and domination.  
Democracy, conceived in its formal qualities, becomes the name for freedom.  It is 
against this notion of democracy that I will make my claims on the historicity that 
the militant is today enmeshed.   
 This chapter’s analyses will proceed by way of the following operations: 
 1.  A genealogical determination (i.e. a diachronic exposition) of the present 
situation, in which we find ourselves confronting the twin forces of neoliberal 
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capitalism and democracy.  These are imperialism’s contemporary manifestations.  
It is my thesis that the foundation for this imperialism was laid at the end of World 
War II, the global restructuring of the political and economic spheres taking place 
alongside the creation of what was to become what Richard Peet has termed the 
U.S.-led “unholy trinity” of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO. 
 2.  An archaeological delimitation (i.e. a synchronic conceptualization) of 
the problem that thinking this foundation poses with respect to late twentieth 
century Filipino history.  I will critique the presuppositions made by Filipino and 
Filipino American scholars and Filipino and American revolutionaries––namely, 
Teodoro Agoncillo and Socialist and Communist leaders Pedro Abad Santos, James 
S. Allen, and Amado Guerrero (aka José Ma. Sison).  I am concerned with the 
knowledge these writers produce when they attempt to grapple with the predicament 
faced by the Philippines during World War II: namely, the question of the Japanese 
occupation and the problem of combating fascism in the name of democracy and 
anti-imperial liberation.  Despite the differences in their conclusions, these writers 
analyses betray, in the conclusions they reach, a shared presupposition: that fascism 
and democracy are easily identifiable as opposing political and economic ideologies 
and processes, that they are analytical positivities capable of being opposed to each 
other for the purposes of understanding both Filipino history and the legacy of 
World War II.  This presupposition has a tremendous effect on how Philippine 
liberation has been imagined; it has displaced, however implicitly or otherwise (and 
some quite explicitly and purposefully, as in Agoncillo’s case), any thought on how 
the conflation of Empire and democracy have been and are being conflated, in both 
political and economic terms, a conflation that has been the primary feature of 
geopolitics since the end of the second world war.  
 Let us now proceed to the diachronic axis of this problem. 
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3.1  AN UNHOLY DAWN 
 
A. BRETTON WOODS AND BEYOND 
 This section will give an overview of Richard Peet’s main arguments on the 
inception and subsequent mutations of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO.  
His Unholy Trinity, in my opinion, is the most comprehensive and succinct guide to 
the three organizations’ histories vis-à-vis American hegemony.   
 The IMF, World Bank, and WTO’s present manifestation are outcomes of a 
half-century long process that has consisted of a) continuing and transforming a 
legacy of capitalist ideology traceable to Adam Smith and classical liberal 
economic theory, and b) a mutation in this legacy itself, capitalist planners and 
bureaucrats attempting to respond to a number of economic crises plaguing 
capitalism throughout the twentieth century.  These legacies and mutations can be 
elaborated more completely as follows: 
 a.  Adam Smith’s theory of capitalism’s “rationality,” its “invisible hand,”  
      with the individual entrepreneur and the market acting as “self-  
      regulating” agents.  Thus was liberal economic theory born: as a reaction 
      against the authority of the British landowning nobility and the    
      monarchical state, which throughout 18th century regulated the British  
      market through divine right and feudal loyalties.  Classical liberal theory 
      upheld the notion of “natural liberty,” which “implied free competition, 
      free movement of workers, free shifts of capital, and freedom from  
      government intervention.”1  What it advocated was thus a relative  
                                                
1 Richard Peet, Unholy Trinity: The IMF, the World Bank and WTO (2nd ed. New York: Zed, 2004), 
4 – 5.  
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      dissociation between the economy and politics, between the market and 
      the State.  
 b.  The First World War, the global Depression of 1929, and the suspension 
      of the gold standard.  Prior to the war, the international economic system 
      established by the major Western countries was based upon classical  
      liberalism, currencies freely convertible to gold and thus freely   
      exchangeable between each nation.  But at the onset of war, the gold  
      standard was suspended: the Western governments imposed strict  
      controls over their national economies.  In the war’s aftermath, with state 
      treasuries still burdened by the costs of the war, countries began to pull  
      away from the international system to protect their domestic economies, 
      attempting first to revert to the gold standard (which failed as a   
      stabilizing measure), and then resorting to printing inconvertible paper  
      monies, thus depreciating national currencies worldwide.  Inflation and 
      underemployment ensued, and gave way to the massive global   
      devaluation of basic items and commodities (such as foodstuffs), which 
      ultimately lead to the Depression of 1929.2   
 c.  The Keynesian response to both the Depression and World War II.   
      According to Keynesian theory, depressions can be countered by a single 
      thing: real investment, the impetus for which is the State’s intervention in 
      the economy.  This lowered interest rates, thus making the ratio between 
      expected profits and interest rates more attractive to investors, who  
      “bought machines, providing income to machine-builders (companies  
      and employees) who, in turn, spent money, further increasing national  
      income, with the ‘multiplier effect’ (the degree of economic expansion  
                                                
2 ibid, 29 – 30.   
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      induced by an investment) varying with the proportion of additional  
      income that was spent rather than saved, and so on.”3  In addition, World 
      War II’s requirement of mass-produced weaponry had the effect of  
      unifying the economy and politics.  The latter’s immediate objectives  
      necessitated the State’s regulation of industrial production, thus fueling 
      the national economy and bringing together what classical liberal theory 
      had dissociated.4   
 d.  This, according to Peet, provided the means for Bretton Woods’ success.  
      With Britain’s economic and political hegemony having eroded after the 
      first World War, and with much of Western and Eastern Europe, in  
      addition to Japan, in economic and political ruin, the only major  
      capitalist country left to assume the role of hegemon during the post-war 
      rebuilding period was the U.S.  The collapse of the major economies  
      required States to intervene in resuscitating their domestic industries; and 
      yet, repudiating an international, supra-State mode of economic  
      stabilization was impossible as well: “Western democracies had to  
      ‘resolve the clash between domestic autonomy and international  
      stability.’”5   
 Needless to say, a series of radical fluctuations in the economic and political 
domains of the Western capitalist States took place between the liberal period of the 
late nineteenth century and the years following the second world war.  The IMF and 
the World Bank, initially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD), embodied the cumulative effect of these fluctuations: they 
were to function as the economic bulwarks for the resuscitation of the capitalist 
                                                
3 ibid, 34 – 5.  
4 ibid, 32.  
5 ibid, 36.  
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countries torn apart by the war, ensuring and overseeing the floating of exchange 
rates so that any country (theoretically speaking) that needed to restructure its 
domestic economy could do so and borrow from either institution without 
significantly affecting the currency value of any other country.   
 Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the two 
institutions, combined with what would eventually, in 2002, become the WTO, 
would diverge from these objectives.  Inherent to the structure of both the IMF and 
World Bank was, and has been, the unequal economic advantage given to States 
with the most capital, which, throughout much of the latter half of the twentieth 
century, has been the U.S.: not only is voting power in the Fund determined by the 
State with the most capital invested; the Bank itself is primarily a U.S. creation 
whose bonds were sold on Wall Street in U.S. dollars for the first ten years of its 
operation.6  The imperial designs laid by the U.S. since the turn of the twentieth 
century in Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Guam, Samoa, etc., and which 
intensified and expanded over the course of the post-war period to Korea, Vietnam, 
South America, and Iraq, pose a considerable challenge to the economic resolution 
promised by the establishment of the IMF and World Bank.   
 My thesis is this: that the politico-military machines unleashed by the 
American State at the latter half of the twentieth century have been enabled by the 
failure of this resolution between the economy and politics.  This is a failure that the 
IMF and World Bank contain as their key, constitutive features––they necessitate 
the impossible resolution of “the clash between domestic autonomy and 
international stability.”  This is why protesters, activists, and revolutionaries across 
the world have denounced the IMF and World Bank as imperial organizations.  
Domestic autonomy, in the end, is merely a euphemism for the ability of the 
                                                
6 ibid, 113.  
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Western capitalist States, and especially the U.S., to exert its authority and 
influence over the activities of both institutions.  To call the conflict between 
domestic autonomy and international stability a “clash” is thus, in a way, 
misleading.  Though very real, this conflict is a necessary component of the very 
lives, so to speak, of the IMF and the World Bank: they were set up, from the 
beginning, to benefit an American Empire whose rise was ensured by the 
devastation wrought upon the major capitalist States during the second world war.  
Although the conflict between the economic and politic situations was felt “at 
home” in the U.S., the question of resolving the division between the two domains 
is negligible when we consider the importance this conflict plays in the functioning 
of American imperialism.   
 Formally speaking, the IMF and World Bank were designed to create an 
equal economic field in which nations could theoretically enrich their economies; 
but because protecting domestic economies, especially during the Cold War period, 
meant protecting political ideals (democratic versus communist), this formal 
equality also entailed a single global system that required a unified economy 
articulated to a single political system, thus unifying economics and politics.  The 
unequal power granted to the Western capitalist States by the IMF and World Bank 
have thus been crucial, during the late twentieth century and the early twenty first, 
and especially over the last thirty years, to the advancement of neoliberal capitalism 
and its political counterpart: electoral democracy.   
 
B.  DEMOCRACY ≠ FREEDOM 
  David Harvey describes neoliberalism in this way: it is “in the first instance 
a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
 87 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
markets, and free trade.”7  The State is the protector of these rights; it guarantees 
the “quality and integrity of money” and sets up “those military, defence, police, 
and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to 
guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets.”8  Harvey locates 
the roots of neoliberalism in the shifts in economic policies that Great Britain, the 
U.S., and China underwent in 1979 under the authority of their respective economic 
and political leaders: Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, Paul Volcker, and Deng 
Xiaoping.  They, for Harvey, hastened the move towards neoliberalism by 
embracing an “ethic” of market exchange in a radically deregulated global political 
economy, an ethic that guides “all human action” and determines the proper 
distribution of rights and the protection and defense of “the social good.”9   
 In what follows, I will elaborate on what the social good means and what its 
defense entails, and in the process will clarify its importance to this dissertation.   
 (i) Ethics and Democratic Right.  Neoliberalism becomes an ethic in itself; 
it systematically engenders the concepts of right and wrong, claiming for itself the 
authority to determine justice and the meanings of freedom and liberty. The 
subsumption of every dimension of human action into the notion of right 
constituted by and constitutive of a free market, free trade, the protection of private 
property, and the ideals of social welfare and the common good has meant that 
humanity itself has become unthinkable without simultaneously thinking of a highly 
specific notion of right: that of the rights of a particular freedom guaranteed by the 
cooperative forces of neoliberal accumulation and electoral democratic governance. 
                                                
7 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2.  
8 ibid.  
9 ibid, 3.   
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 At this particular juncture, I will advance the following thesis, which will 
guide the political and polemical trajectories of my arguments: namely, that this 
notion of freedom is rooted not in the political economic transformations of the late 
1970s, but in much earlier––though by no means distant––events.  The originary 
moment of what may be termed today’s neoliberal-imperial ethic is World War II, 
whose ideological effects and socio-political traces affect the thinkability of the idea 
of rights themselves.  More specifically, the originary moment of this ethic is the 
advent of U.S. imperialism’s particular manifestation in the aftermath of the war.  
We will see, a little later, how this form of power, a conflation of imperialism, 
justice, and freedom, has been able to displace any thought and critique of 
American imperialism when we read the works of Teodoro Agoncillo, Amado 
Guerrero, and James Allen and their theories of America’s role in the Philippines 
during World War II.   
 For now, let me emphasize the following: that this ethic has as its vehicle a 
concept of right that has been capable, as Harvey says, of “substituting [itself] for 
all previously held ethical beliefs.”10  This concept, as can be guessed, is 
democracy, the kind of formal democracy whose rise Lenin’s revolution aimed to 
prevent.  This democracy is a political, economic, social, and cultural ideal.  But it 
is also a process that consists of advancing humanity’s ability to pursue, participate 
in, and enjoy these ideals (development, modernization, deregulation, etc.).  
Democracy is both a set of values and a politics within which these values are 
realized.  It is this relationship between value and process, or what may called 
valuation-as-process, that I am concerned with, for it produces the idea that 
democratic right, which is ultimately equated with the Good, is limitless.  This 
limitlessness is both conceptual and geographical because a) apologists of 
                                                
10 ibid.   
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neoliberalism, globalization, and American power cannot imagine anything better 
(we are after all at the so-called end of History), and b) such an ethic does not and 
should not respect national, ethnic, and cultural boundaries.  
 (ii) Necessary War, Just War, Infinite War.  This is where we begin to see, 
from the perspective of imperialism, the intimacies between economics and politics.  
Conceptual and geographical limitlessness turns the neoliberal ethic into a priority 
that supercedes every other consideration, whether it be the law or the autonomy 
and sovereignty of nations.  As Jacques Rancière says, this priority is to be taken 
literally: it is prior to everything.  It means that neoliberalism has total precedence, 
invoking, before all laws, boundaries, jurisdictions, and limitations, the most 
abstract concept in today’s political economic ethic: the human, the universal 
subject that unites every political economic individual.  An ethics based upon this 
abstract humanity operates as a limitless process because this ethic requires those 
with political, economic, and military power to demonstrate their humanitarianism.  
In other words, this ethic requires “human interference.”11  The ethical concept of 
humanity, by preceding all other codifications, is the concept of a humanity that 
needs to be defended, whose prior-ness with respect to all purported codes and 
meanings must always have to be maintained and secured.  Democracy requires a 
humanitarianism that produces the concept of an abstract humanity upon which the 
limitlessness of its valuation-as-process can work, encoding that which is said to be 
prior to all codes and in so doing subsuming it as human into the limitless, universal 
code of democratic freedom.  This encoding turns the human into the linchpin of 
any thought on freedom, which turns the value of liberty into the ethic and goal of 
neoliberal democracy.  Once the human, as the object to be defended by the rights 
                                                
11 Jacques Rancière, “Prisoners of the Infinite: Guantanamo, Justice, and Bushspeak.” Tr. Norman 
Madarasz. Counter Punch. 30 April 2002. <http://www.counterpunch.org/ranciere0430.html>. 
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this ethic advances, is thought to have priority over everything, the foundations for 
neoliberalism’s attack have been laid: it hijacks the very definition of humanity for 
its own purposes.  Abstracted thusly, humanity assumes a limitlessness that can 
only be conceived vis-à-vis neoliberalism.  As an ethic, neoliberalism creates the 
idea that humanity’s limitlessness is realizable––precisely because this 
limitlessness, which is the limitlessness of freedom and liberty, is humanity’s one 
and true potential and thus its inviolable right. 
 It is not difficult––indeed, it is inevitable––to pass from this notion of 
democratic right to the idea that anything that impedes neoliberalism, as the final 
Good, is ultimately Evil.  This Evil, however, is in its turn thought as equal in its 
abstractness and limitlessness as the humanity that is its apparent prey, inversely 
proportional to the Good that nurtures and protects it.  It has been called a variety of 
things: in the fifties, sixties, seventies, and eighties, it was Communism; in the late 
nineties and early twenty-first century, it was and is Terrorism.  Manifest Evil, these 
names designate an equally diverse generality that is nonetheless identifiable: they 
serve to designate the identities and activities of groups of people determined to 
crush every freedom, whether economic (capitalism) or socio-political (democracy).  
Alain Badiou has made a now notorious critique of this binary.  He has suggested, 
quite rightly, that a humanity that pits itself against Evil, a humanity that is the 
abstract political category of the neoliberal ethic, when diverted from its potential 
(its actualization and embodiment of Democratic Right), is “worth little more” than 
this: as the potential victim of this Evil.12  When the neoliberal-imperial ethic guides 
“interventions” (deposing dictators in Guatemala or Iraq, countering “terrorists” in 
Afghanistan or the Philippines, devaluing currencies in Indonesia or Argentina), it 
                                                
12 Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil (Tr. Peter Hallward. New York: 
Verso, 2002), 11.  
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does so in the name of the humanitarian principles that support it, on behalf of what 
it perceives and actually precipitates as the victim of an absolute and infinite Evil.  
For both Rancière and Badiou, this describes the conceptual apparatus through 
which waging a “humane war”––a limitless war in the name of freedom, a 
protracted battle against the ultimate Evil that is Terror in the consensual language 
of neoliberal politics today––is not only possible, but necessary.13   
 This is the moment when democracy’s constitutive valuation-as-process 
enters the field.  The neoliberal ethic that holds this democracy together is justified 
from the start: by purportedly preceding all codes, it incorporates and subsumes 
every other value so that they become thinkable only in its terms and solely within 
the horizons of a justice, a freedom, and an equality that are redefined and created 
by the manifest force of this ethic.  By concerning itself with the protection of the 
human and his or her absolute right to exist, to consume, and to produce, this ethic 
sees itself as waging a war that is nothing if not humane because it is also, in its 
means and in its outcome, entirely just.    
 (iii) Neoliberalism in the Philippines.  These have severe consequences for a 
place like the Philippines.  I will limit my discussion to three significant areas of 
State-formation and their relation to neoliberalism and Empire:  
 1.  Although the shifts in capitalist production I outlined earlier have 
transformed the nature of capitalist investment in the Philippines, in addition to the 
legal and political channels through which cheap Filipino labor is reproduced, the 
purpose of the U.S.’ presence in the country has always been to secure it as a 
strategic political economic base.  This was achieved, in the years before World 
War II, by delaying the granting of the Philippines’ nominal independence, a delay 
that meant that low trade barriers and export tariffs for American investors could be 
                                                
13 See Rancière, “Prisoners of the Infinite;” and Badiou, Ethics, 11 – 17.   
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implemented, which was thus conducive to the free flow of capital, labor, and 
goods between the U.S. and the Philippines.  This delay granted Philippine labor 
free access to migratory circuits, having no restrictions, as American nationals, to 
entering the U.S.  In the contemporary era, the IMF, World Bank, and WTO have 
taken over as managers of this trade route: trade liberalization decreases tariff rates 
and multilateralizes the privatization of industries, and WTO agreements, like the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) and the Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), “balances out” (i.e. democratizes) local 
economies by aligning them with the global market.  This creates a steady supply of 
surplus labor for the export processing zones in the Philippines and for work abroad 
in Europe, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the U.S.  Financial planners and 
IMF, World Bank, and WTO liaisons from the Philippines remain tied to neoliberal 
economic theory, maintaining a Philippine State in accord with a market economy 
that continually channels capital from the country, thereby placing it in deeper debt, 
as the story goes for hundreds of other nations, so that it can be reproduced as a) a 
major supplier of cheap labor, and b) a lucrative site for transnational production 
and the extraction of national resources.   
 2.  One way this has been achieved at a discreet level is the U.S.’ support of 
local militias.  These militias were used by local bosses in the caciques of the early 
years of American rule to patrol the peasantry, and are still strong today: before, it 
was called the Philippine Constabulary, and today, trained by the American military 
under the terms of the Multilateral Assistance Initiative (MAI), there are the 
Civilian Armed Forces Ground Units (CAFGU).  The “insurgent” and “unruly” 
populations require direct military intervention and surveillance, so that anyone 
from anarchists, militant farmers, communist rebels, labor organizers, and human 
rights activists can be labeled, or axiomatized, as I termed it, anti-Statist and 
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therefore inimical to the proper functioning of not only neoliberal capital, but of 
Philippine democracy itself.   
 3.  These “insurgent” and “unruly” populations––those critical of the 
Philippine State and its alliances with the U.S., of the continual constitution of the 
Philippine State qua the Filipino axiomatic and its political, economic, and military 
manifestations, and of the axiomatic’s violent disciplining and production of proper 
State subjects (i.e. capitalists, or appendages thereof, and democrats, or 
embodiments of its ideals and servants of its processes)––can find their most 
extreme counterparts in the contemporary clashes over Mindanaoan sovereignty.  
Here, the axiom of Terror has been deployed against the Moro rebels in order to 
consolidate State rule, itself enforced by a tremendous amount of firepower.  One 
year after U.S. troops were deployed en masse to the Philippines, through the 
sanction of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and as part of the Bush 
administration’s infinite war on terror, the Philippines received $30 million in 
military aid from the U.S. as part of a bilateral counterterrorism agreement, in 
addition to another $30 million devoted to “assisting” the “peace process” in 
Mindanao alone.14  This “pacification,” however, is only a part of a more protracted 
process: much of the weapons being used to quell the rebellions today (2006) were 
sold to the Philippines during the Clinton administration.  Between 1992 and 1998, 
the latter gave the Philippine State 3,638 M-14 rifles, 16,488 Colt M-1911 pistols, 
10 M-240 machine guns, 22,500 Colt M-16A1 automatic rifles, two refurbished 
Lockheed Martin transport planes, and, through a $13.8 million deal brokered 
between the Philippine State and Textron Marine and Land Systems (a division of 
Textron, Inc., a defense contractor specializing in manufacturing attack 
                                                
14 The White House, “Fact Sheet: Announcements Related to the Visit of President Arroyo.”  
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helicopters), 12 Commando V-300 personnel carriers and 12 V-300 infantry 
fighting vehicles.15   
  This brief archaeology of neoliberal accumulation and politics in the 
Philippines serves to highlight one thing: that if neoliberalism, contrary to classical 
liberalism, advocates a relative dissociation between economics and politics, 
between the market and the State, this relativism is intensified when Empire is seen 
as the central form of power, as the organizer, discipliner, and police force of both a 
neoliberal economy and a democratic world.  That the politico-military machines 
unleashed by the American State at the latter half of the twentieth century have 
been enabled by the failure of the resolution between the economic and the 
political, a failure that the IMF and World Bank contain in themselves as the 
impossible resolution of “the clash between domestic autonomy and international 
stability” and which is characteristic of the Western capitalist States, and especially 
of the U.S.––the thesis I advanced earlier––is here disclosed for what it is: an 
American-led ethic that determines both the definitions of Good and Evil and the 
means by which the former is to be upheld, protected, and secured and the latter 
destroyed, “pacified,” and contained.  It is a political ethic that, articulated to the 
domain of neoliberal economics, finds it expression as the accumulation of capital 
through politico-military aggression.   
 This is precisely the overdetermined structure of relations of which the 
neoliberal ethic consists.  This structure of relations, moreover, ends up 
overdetermining the concept of democracy itself.  The originary moment of this 
overdetermined structure of relations and their overarching concept (democracy), in 
which the articulations between the political, economic, and military were manifest 
                                                
15 Mother Jones, “Arming an Old Colony.” <http://www.motherjones.com/news/special_reports/ 
arms/philippines.html>. 
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in their earliest stages, was World War II, and more specifically, America’s 
“identity” as political, economic, and military “victor.”  These, then, are the 
overdeterminations that must be kept alive in any thought that attempts to grapple 
with the question of the potential politics of the Filipino diaspora, of the militant 
Filipino diasporic subject whose thinkability is premised upon acknowledging and, 
more importantly, concretizing itself through these overdeterminations.   
 This is what I described in the previous chapter as the continual production 
in thought of the concept of capital’s self-actualization.  Thinking the possibility of 
militancy against surplus value production is the same thing as naming the militant 
whose possibility the thinking subject posits in order to illicit the concept of the 
militant’s becoming.  This time, capital’s self-actualization is explicitly articulated 
to two other processes: 1) the constitution of the Philippine State qua the axiomatic, 
and 2) the self-actualization and enforcement of the neoliberal ethic, i.e. the unity of 
the political and military arms of formal democracy with the form of capital 
accumulation specific to the late twentieth and early twenty first centuries––
neoliberalism.   
 
C.  TOWARDS AN IMMANENT LOGIC OF THE PAST 
 Thus ends our genealogical exposition.  We are now in a better position to 
understand why, in Chapter 2, I said that any becoming-militant is not limited to the 
economic domain alone, why it exceeds the general dialectic between the classes.  
Such a becoming-militant, in its attack upon capital and the State, must strike at the 
ideologico-ethical heart of its manifest power: formal democracy itself.  The State-
capital articulation I presented in Chapter 2, it must be said, and given the 
conclusions reached in the present one thus far, cannot be thought without 
democracy, the ideal that upholds them and the process by which they become, 
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though military aggression, manifest: the State, capital, and democracy are 
unthinkable except as each other’s counterparts, united through and as imperial 
violence.  This imperial violence, moreover, is what comprises the concrete 
actualization and enforcement of the axiomatic production of Filipino identities––as 
State-imperial subjects who are reproduced in order that they can in turn work for 
and towards the reproduction of the State’s and Empire’s economic, political, and 
military objectives, and who are otherwise, if determined to be “improper,” the 
objects of aggression, war, and violence.  We have thus expanded and refined the 
conclusions reached in Chapter 1 by giving them their general form, by providing 
them with their concept qua the positing of the overdeterminations of the neoliberal 
ethic.   
 Let us bear this in mind: these overdeterminations constitute what may be 
called a primary and general site for a contemporary democratic subject.  We will 
see shortly just what constitutes a second and more specific version of this subject, 
one that occupies an explicitly anti-imperialist position that nonetheless harbors the 
same presuppositions as any other (whether rightist, pro-imperial, etc.).   
 Thinking the militant diasporic subject will be based upon the following 
procedures: 
 –––positing what I will term its ontological incommensurability to the  
       production of surplus value, the State, and their enforced actualization  
       and reconstitution by military aggression (both in the form of “large  
       scale” State-imperial intervention and localized militia units)––or in  
       other words, its ontological incommensurability to the very   
       overdeterminations constitutive of the neoliberal-imperial ethos and its 
       valuation-as-process––democracy; 
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 –––positing, through this ontological incommensurability, the militant  
       subjectivity’s name, which ultimately means positing its subject-hood,  
       its unthinkability from within the conventional terms of politics, its  
       manifestation of an ontology incommensurate to the knowledges given 
       by the political and economic status quo, or what Badiou has called  
       “State knowledge.”16   
Positing a subject against State knowledge means thinking this subject in its 
becoming; it involves positing the potential of this subject.  It requires, in other 
words, giving it a name.  Naming this militant against the axiomatic production of 
the Filipino is a thought on a becoming-Filipino that, in order to think against this 
axiomatization, must also think the overdeterminations of the neoliberal ethic, of 
democracy as valuation-as-process.   
 It is therefore critical that the idea of democracy be placed under scrutiny, 
especially when it is used by radicals and militants as the basis (ethical or 
otherwise) for a project that explicitly declares itself to be anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist.  This is not the place to embark upon a lengthy disquisition on the 
histories and pitfalls of democracy; however, the preceding analyses of the 
difficulties of the term, in its formal guise, should point to the problems that 
confront anyone who wishes to suggest that democracy is an ethic that points, 
ultimately, to a more equal distribution of goods, that it is a right that every living 
human being deserves.  Let it suffice that when I criticize democracy, it is the 
formal democracy that Lenin described as the “best political shell for capitalism,” a 
formal equality that is by all means irreducible to the substantive equality that this 
formalism can only name.   
                                                
16 See Badiou, Being and Event, Meditation 28 and 31, 286 – 94; 344 – 54.  
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 The most significant problem that historians of the Philippines face is 
precisely that of this impasse: that the dialectic between Good and Evil, represented 
in the second world war as that between democracy and fascism, can be used as the 
framework to understand the Philippines’ pre-war, wartime, and post-war political 
economic situation.  The democracy-fascism binary is key to the consensus’ 
understanding of the most pressing critical and political problem of the war: the 
U.S.’ return to the Philippines as the country’s savior from the fascism of the 
Japanese. We will see to what extent accepting this binary displaces the problem of 
Empire and the genealogy of the neoliberal ethic that accompanies it.   
 Any thought on the constitution of a militant Filipino diasporic subject must 
thus think of an ontological position that exceeds the limitations of the democracy-
fascism binary.  It means rethinking the U.S.’ return altogether.  What follows will 
present the archaeological coordinates for such a thought.   
 
 
3.2  UNFAITHFUL TO HISTORY  
 
A.  FREEDOM ON THE BEACHES 
 Of the more mainstream opinions of what was at stake in America’s return 
to the Philippines, let the following stand as the clearest expression of the idea of its 
benevolence and absolute necessity, the cooperation between Filipino guerillas and 
U.S. forces acting as a sign of the ineluctable dependency (with a heavy advantage 
given to the U.S.) that solidified the relationship between the two countries: 
  Particularizing the American return to the Philippines in 1944 –  
  1945, it can be said that the guerillas made MacArthur’s task easier 
  and less costly than it would otherwise have been had the resistance 
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  fighters elected to remain indifferent to the American invasion forces 
  or chosen to continue fighting one another to death. . . . It is difficult 
   to assess in material terms the contribution of the guerillas to the  
  winning of the war in the Pacific.  It  is certain, however, that  
  without their support and fanatical loyalty the American invasion  
  forces would have suffered serious losses in men and matériel.   
This statement was made by famous Filipino historian Teodoro Agoncillo.  He 
continues: “On the Filipino side, the resistance movement definitely kept alive the 
faith in America and in the way of life she showed the Filipinos in her forty years as 
an understanding tutor. . . . America’s ‘experiment in the Orient’ was a success 
beyond even great expectations, and her colonial policy, which underscored  
humane attitude, gave the Filipinos reason to remain faithful to her.  The war in the 
Pacific, then, tested the validity of America’s experiment, and the result justified 
that policy.”17  The message is clear enough: given America’s benevolent imperial 
past, it was only natural that Filipinos should help to hasten its return.  America is 
the savior come to rectify the four years of “bad” Japanese imperialism; its 
liberation of the country, whose beacon was MacArthur’s landing on the shores of 
Leyte, thus fulfilling his prophecy, justifies the resurgence of imperial rule under 
“different” means (i.e. American democracy).  More importantly, however, this 
liberation retroactively justifies America’s pre-war “experiment.”  World War II 
thus served as the violently explicit validation of American power, in addition to the 
Filipinos’ share in the lugubriousness of its manifestation, the former’s resurgence 
and post-war intensification becoming unthinkable without the latter’s consent, and 
vice versa.  Creating, promoting, and expanding American-style democracy is both 
                                                
17 Teodoro Agoncillo, The Fateful Years: Japan’s Adventure in the Philippines, 1941 – 1945 Vol.2. 
Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001), 728.   
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the burden of the invader and the responsibility of the cooperative invadee.  Among 
writings by Filipinos, there is no stronger acceptance than this of the terms by 
which democracy axiomatizes the Filipino as imperial-State subject. 
 
B.  THE IMPASSES OF THE LEFT 
 The more difficult terrain to cross is the one occupied by the Left.  The 
argument can be summarized as follows: that America’s return signaled the 
resumption of imperial rule, one that cannot be recuperated by its opposition to a 
“worse” form of imperialism––fascism––but whose defeat, nonetheless, was of 
prime importance.  In order to make this argument, these analyses tend to reproduce 
Agoncillo’s principal assumption: that some form of cooperation was necessary, 
that to defeat the bad empire of Japan the Filipinos had to cooperate, however 
reluctantly or otherwise, with the better empire of the U.S. 
 It becomes apparent that the category of necessity unites these two positions, 
and that a violent tension comprises it.  The U.S. is the simultaneous liberator and 
invader of the Philippines, the reintroduction of whose rule was both a strategically 
welcome operation, necessitated by the apparent stranglehold that fascism had on 
the Pacific region, and an ethically and morally reprehensible one, which merely 
replaced one Empire with another and served to extend and continue what had been 
America’s forty-one year long reign over the Philippines’ political and economic 
domains prior to the Japanese occupation.  
 The implicit logic that enables such a claim is a common one: that 
Philippine history has been marked by a series of betrayals on its way towards 
actualizing full political and economic sovereignty, freed from the corruption of 
American influence.  The betrayal of the ilustrados, who cooperated with the 
Americans after the Philippine-American War, was only the first in a sequence that 
 101 
finds its apogee in America’s own betrayal of its promise to grant the Philippines 
total sovereignty (i.e. more than formal independence and freedom) when it 
returned with full strength in the post-war era.  This narrative of betrayals, which 
conjures up the idea of a Philippine nation-state destined to be freed and 
democratized, allows the ways in which America’s return has been defined to work.  
That the Japanese needed to be removed from the Philippines in order for the latter 
to actualize its dreams of sovereignty has become conceptually inextricable from 
thinking of Philippine history, including the American return, as being marked by a 
sequence of betrayals of its destiny.    
 We thus come upon an apparently insurmountable problem: the category of 
historical necessity means that the American return can be both accepted and 
vilified at the same time.  This impasse is produced when what I described in 
Chapter 1 as the greatest mistake in thinking a diasporic politics is adopted as the 
conceptual cornerstone: hegemony.  Recall my argument: that hegemony organizes 
a diasporic politics by first appealing to a delimited notion of the diaspora qua 
political hierarchies, and that the ontology this posits leads to the abolition of 
absolute negativities.  Moreover, this model of action recuperates dialectics as the 
principle for struggle, which is also aimed towards achieving a condition of pure 
formal egalitarianism vis-à-vis the democratic ideal.  This is Laclau and Mouffe’s 
position, and it is one that is inseparable from the State’s logic and thus its power to 
axiomatize the subject.  
 This problem is constitutive of the second and more specific version of the 
Filipino subject I am concerned with: the radical Filipino subject.  Its historical 
parameters are highly specific: it can be found in the policies of the United Front, 
imported to the Philippines by the country’s Socialist and Communist leaders 
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through their contact with members with the Communist Party of the United States 
(CPUSA).    
 Two books, when read together, clearly show the impasses of the United 
Front ideology and its ways of contouring a Filipino political ontology.  The first is 
Amado Guerrero’s Philippine Society and Revolution, a dialectical materialist 
reconstruction of Philippine history from the pre-Spanish era to the fourth year of 
Ferdinand Marcos’ presidency.  Guerrero, aka José Ma. Sison, is the founder of the 
newly reestablished Communist Party of the Philippines under Maoist-Leninist 
lines, formed in 1968 as the CPP-Maoist.  In Philippine Society and Revolution, he 
uses Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism to diagnose the problems of the Philippines 
and to theorize the proper course that a communist revolution must take.  The 
second book is James S. Allen’s The Philippine Left on the Eve of World War II.  
Allen was a member of the CPUSA who was sent as an emissary to the CPP.  While 
in the Philippines, he came into contact with Filipino radicals and developed 
political relationships, some of them close, with the likes of Crisanto Evangelista 
(founder of the original CPP), Pedro Abad Santos (leader of the Socialist Party of 
Pampanga), and Bishop Gregorio Aglipay (head bishop of the Philippine 
Independent Church, founded in 1902 alongside the Union Obrera Democratica, the 
Philippines’ first labor union).   
 Let us now turn to these two books.  
 
C.  THE LANGUAGE OF UNITY 
 Philippine Society and Revolution is strategic in its methodology: 
Guerrero’s primary concern is to reconceptualize Philippine history as a dialectic, 
through which the Filipinos’ continual struggle for political, economic, and social 
freedom becomes visible against the betrayals and setbacks that have beset it, from 
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the landed bourgeoisie’s cooperation with both the Spanish and American 
conquerors to the bureaucrat capitalists’ acquiescence to the rule of dictators like 
Marcos and their allegiance to IMF and World Bank policies.  For Guerrero, the 
two greatest chances for the Philippines to have established an independent nation 
were 1) the period after the war of independence against Spain, and 2) the war 
against Japanese imperialism, during which the now defunct CPP (led by Jesus 
Lava and Luis Taruc) “sabotaged” the “people’s war” that could have erupted 
against all forms of imperialism, both Japanese and American.  Taruc’s slogan, for 
instance, was “Anti-Japanese Above All.”18  For Guerrero, the CPP “contravened 
the line of the Third International to conduct unity and struggle in the united front at 
all times and use the anti-fascist popular front to establish a people’s democratic 
government.”19   
 Such a critique, however, is difficult to sustain: the Third International’s 
United Front policy was itself flawed.  This is where Allen’s book becomes 
important.  My claim is that the problem of thinking of a wartime transnational 
politics (of which Allen’s book gives an excellent account), one that occurs 
between the U.S. and the Philippines by way of the CPUSA’s adoption of this 
United Front policy, is the problem of conceiving of the concept of the national-
popular/popular-democratic prerequisite for a Filipino diasporic politics.  This is the 
originary moment of which I have been speaking, the problem that the second 
world war poses for thinking both a national and international political situation.  It 
is in this sense that the enormous intellectual effort required to sustain a critique 
like Guerrero’s reveals itself to be a futile task:  it is a mistake to think that adopting 
a United Front Policy for the Philippines can in any way be separated from the 
                                                
18 See ibid, 626.   
19 Amado Guerrero, Philippine Society and Revolution (w/ Specific Characteristics of Our People’s 
War) (3rd ed. Oakland: International Association of Filipino Patriots, 1979), 30 – 1.  
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problems of conceiving of a transnational militancy according to the same political 
logic.  Guerrero’s critique, in other words, is symptomatic of an error in the United 
Front policy, one that, when it was transported to the Philippines by way of the 
CPUSA, made it impossible to think beyond the limitations it imposed upon 
thinking anti-imperial struggle and the question of Philippine liberation within the 
space of the transnational struggle against Empire.  These limitations can be traced 
to the Third International’s misconception of the national-international tension 
when it came to elaborating a strategy against both Empire and capital, the 
distinctions between which were themselves left undetermined. 
 There are three principal conditions upon which the theoretico-political 
edifice of the Third International’s United Front policy was built: 
 1.  The United Front, as expressed through the Soviet’s standpoint and  
      interests, was heavily influenced by its policy of protectionism, which  
      involved the attempt to construct an internationalist vision of anti- 
      fascism through the primary coordinates of Soviet nationalism.20  
 2.  Left-wing analyses of fascism tended towards instrumentalism, where it 
      became conceived as an appendage of bourgeois interests and whose  
      imperial project was seen through the lens of its supposed monopoly  
      capitalist designs.  This perspective was blind to the fact that fascism  
      emerged from specific historical circumstances (the global Depression, 
      Germany’s inability to fully recover politically and economically from  
      the first World War).21 
                                                
20 See John Gerassi, “The Comintern, the Fronts, and the CPUSA,” New Studies in the Politics and 
Culture of U.S. Communism (ed. Michael Brown, et al. New York: Monthly Review, 1998), 77.   
21 See Larry Ceplair, Under the Shadow of War: Fascists, Anti-Fascists, and Marxists, 1918 – 1939 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 4.  
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 3.  There was a general failure to understand fascism as a hegemonic  
       project, the instrumentalism of left-wing analyses reducing the historical 
       complexities from which it arose to a kind of “dictatorship” by the  
       bourgeoisie over monopoly capital, which blocked any thought on its  
       manifestation of a set of interests among a diverse set of classes and  
       groups articulated within the historical and material circumstances in  
       which the country in question (Italy or Germany) was able to act as the 
       host for fascism’s growth.22  
The United Front was thus born from an idea of unity and popular action whose 
proponent, the Third International, was unable to negotiate the limits of its national 
agenda vis-à-vis the international problem of Empire and capital.  But there is a 
fourth condition, which functions as the source for the other three: Soviet 
nationalism rabidly clung to the idea that it was the vanguard of communism, and it 
was through this vanguardist nationalism that led it to think that fascism was not a 
hegemonic project but rather a mere “adjunct to traditional counterrevolution and 
white terror.”23  The Third International reduced fascism’s complexities by thinking 
it through the instrumentalism of a monopoly capitalism conceived through the lens 
of the 1917 revolution’s failure to elicit the same upheaval in the rest of Europe as 
it did in Russia. 
 The Third International thus failed to make a distinction between 
imperialism and fascism.  We can add to this another undetermined “enemy:” 
capitalism itself, insofar as imperialism, vis-à-vis fascism, was still being described 
through the prism of monopoly capital as a bourgeois, anti-Soviet, and therefore 
                                                
22 See Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism-Fascism-Populism 
(Norfolk: Verso, 1979), 87 – 8.  
23 Ceplair, 13.  
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anti-Communist (white) plot.24  Fascism, it must be said, became, from out of this 
confusion, a monolithic, positivistic entity, a single Evil against which all forms of 
anti-fascism were to be mobilized.   
 This positivism was impossible without thinking it through some version of 
historical necessity: the Third International could posit the notion of a United Front 
only because the Soviet Union’s unity with capitalist States (the U.S. and England), 
as well as the proletariat’s unity with anti-fascist bourgeois, would ultimately be 
justified by protecting the interests, projected into the future, of a Soviet-led 
communist world, and whose single, greatest enemy at that point were the fascist 
States.  Historical necessity, more importantly, displaced American imperialism 
altogether as a threat.  This articulation of fascism’s positivity to a Communist 
narrative of historical necessity explains why, in many of the writings done by 
Leftist scholars of the American Popular Front (cf. Michael Denning’s The Cultural 
Front), U.S. imperialism is rarely (if at all) an object of analysis and critique.   
 The consequences of this displacement are severe when we track it through 
the concept of anti-fascism among the Philippine Left.  This is where Allen’s book 
is particularly revealing; in it, we can see how this displacement functioned to 
secure the legitimacy of a United Front in the Philippine situation.  In a letter to 
Abad Santos, which he was to then relay to Evangelista for proper publishing, Allen 
makes the following statements:  
  The United States is moving toward alignment with the democratic 
  power  against the fascist bloc, albeit slowly and indecisively. . . .  
  The national interests of the Philippines call for vigilance and  
  precautions against Japanese aggression.  This coincides with the  
  interests of the United States in the Pacific area, and it would be  
                                                
24 ibid, 53 – 4.  
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  folly not to take full advantage of this concurrence.  In the broader  
  perspective, the outcome of the struggle in China will be crucial for 
  all the people of the Far East, and if the United States were to  
  withdraw from the Philippines this would be a serious blow against 
  China and encouragement to Japans’ designs upon Southeast Asia  
  and the islands of the Pacific.  The cause of Philippine independence 
  at this time can best be served by cooperation with the United  
  States.25 
Allen wrote this letter on September 26, 1937, a crucial year: it was the year 
halfway between the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth (1935) and its 
invasion by Japan (1941).  It was also the year Japan launched its “Greater China 
War” and occupied Shanghai, in addition to being two years prior to Germany’s 
invasion of Poland.  Just three months prior, Abad Santos says the following in a 
letter to Allen:  
  I think that a good possibility now exists to obtain greater freedom of 
  agitation and action for the really revolutionary and democratic  
  forces in the Philippines, if an effort is made to broaden the Alliance 
  to include all the progressive elements of the Government Coalition.  
  It is even possible, in view of the world situation, to extend support 
  to certain aspects of Quezon’s foreign policy.  Specifically, I refer to 
  his recent proposal for the shortening of the transition period  
  [towards the granting of Philippine independence] and his following 
  supplementary proposals: (a) dropping the plan for neutralization of 
  the Philippines, since this is entirely utopian  and will play into the  
                                                
25 James S. Allen, The Philippine Left on the Eve of World War II (2nd ed. Minneapolis: MEP, 1993), 
63 – 4. 
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  hands of Japan; (b) a military understanding with the United States, 
  to the extent of permitting the retention of the naval bases, since  
  these bases are primarily defensive positions against Japan, and  
  since the problems of Philippine defense for the moment coincide  
  with American defense plans in the Pacific; (c) trade agreements, on 
  a reciprocal basis, with the United States, since these, besides their  
  economic benefits to the Philippines, tend to keep the United States 
  involved in Philippine affairs and affairs of the Far East. . . . In  
  connection with national defense, we cannot afford to oppose  
  national defense in principle, but support it fully since it is tied up  
  with the question of Philippine independence.26 
We see a confluence of a) the ideals of democracy and an independent Philippine 
nation, b) the ideas and tactics for anti-Japanese resistance, c) an alliance with 
America, and d) the unity between Socialists and Communists and non-Socialists 
and non-Communists alike (as long as they were “progressive”).  American 
imperialism needed to be displaced––it was strategically removed as an obstacle to 
a Communist or Socialist future, the opponent of which at present was the same 
one as that of American imperialism: the Japanese, or, more generally, fascism 
itself.  The logic of historical necessity required conflating the Philippines’ and the 
U.S.’ national, political, economic, and military interests.  
 This is not the unity, however, whose failed realization Guerrero laments.  
For Allen and Abad Santos, this unity is thoroughly imbued with the logic of 
necessity.  But for Guerrero, the question of necessity becomes more complicated.  
His critique of the CPP’s sabotaging of what could have been a genuine people’s 
war still conforms to the logic of necessity when he advocates the opportunistic 
                                                
26 ibid, 111 – 2.  
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deployment of anti-fascism in order to actualize a very real war carried over 
against the U.S. as well, a struggle as much against the Japanese as any other 
organization, State, or individual that posed a threat to the establishment of “a 
people’s democratic government.”  For Guerrero, an alliance with the U.S., no 
matter how strategic, is anathema.  Historical necessity, here, is articulated to the 
project I critiqued in Chapter 1: the hegemonic project realized through the 
establishment of a national-popular/popular-democratic politics, or in other words, 
a politics enclosed within the State-form.   
 Historical necessity, moreover, conforms to the logic of the transition I 
repudiated in Chapter 2.  The model of time implicit in Guerrero’s narrative is 
based upon a logical split between the present and the future, where the latter is 
unthinkable except through an appeal to a past that shows itself to be a continual 
series of betrayals against a people’s democracy, the creation of which Guerrero 
shows to be a consistent potentiality whose interruption is the very marker of time 
itself.  Without it, his dialectic is impossible.  He would be unable to describe 
history and time as moving towards an eventual realization of this latent 
revolutionary force; the transition allows him to posit the unity of what I called the 
form and substance of revolutionary transformation, where time becomes the 
marker for a transitional, in-between that needs to accept (however temporarily) the 
form of the State (its apodicticities, its abolishing of absolute negativity) as the only 
vehicle for the establishment of a truly Communist society, the prevention of which 
can then be described as a betrayal to this otherwise wholly intelligible process of 
historical movement.   
 The potentiality of the State, the manifest form of the people’s will, is 
founded upon nothing less than the hegemonic ideal and the positivities upon which 
it relies.  The positivity that anchors hegemony as a radical project, as we saw in 
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Laclau and Mouffe’s Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, is democracy––formal 
democracy.  In Guerrero’s analysis of World War II, democracy, historical 
necessity, and the transition are all united, conceptually and concretely, by a single 
positivity, one posited as the former’s dialectical counterpart: fascism.  While 
historical necessity, in Guerrero’s hands, does not displace American imperialism––
his attack on it is as vehement as it is consistent––it does reproduce another of the 
Third International’s errors: it posits the all-too-easy opposition between democracy 
as ideal and fascism as its negation, an Evil aligned with all forms of Empire but 
which is nonetheless, as this Evil, the originary point against which a genuine 
people’s democracy is thinkable.  This is the meaning of Guerrero’s critique of the 
CPP: they failed to use anti-fascism as the nodal point for the creation of a truly 
democratic hegemony.  
 In the Philippine situation, then, the Third International’s errors have 
overdetermined the notions of the proper course of action and the terms by which 
historical knowledge––which is nothing less than a thought that has been captured 
by State logic, or the logic of the axiomatic––have been proposed by the Philippine 
Left.  Let us summarize these errors and their transmutations:  
 –––It displaced American imperialism and found its way into Allen’s and  
       Abad Santos’ calls for unity between the Philippines and the U.S. during 
       the Commonwealth period.   
 –––Its conception of fascism was recuperated by Guerrero in his positing of 
       fascism as the positivistic nodal point for a democratic hegemony  
       constructed qua the people’s war. 
Formally speaking, both positions are homologous: the former implicitly accepts 
the binary logic that the latter explicitly deploys.   
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 We have thus arrived at the following conclusion: among both the Filipino 
Right and the Left, in both the Philippines and in the diaspora, analyses of World 
War II have been framed by the strict opposition between democracy (Good) and 
fascism (Evil).  Axiomatization, then, occurs from the start.  It is easy enough to see 
it in the pro-U.S. position, but for the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist one, 
axiomatization happens by determining the very terms of struggle itself.  The 
opposition between democracy and fascism, between Good and Evil, has become 
unthinkable without first conceding to the ontological horizons of the State-form.   
 At present, thinking of World War II in these binary terms means thinking 
according to the neoliberal ethic, or formal democracy, the valuation-as-process 
whose ability to grant significance to struggles for freedom is the function of 
Empire and capital.  This is why this logic is inadequate for a militant politics of 
the Filipino diaspora: it will always resort to an identitarianism that posits the 
knowledge of struggle as already determined and determinable by the axiomatic.  
Axiomatization interpellates the Filipino as democratic subject the moment he or 
she accepts the terms by which democracy becomes definable as the liberatory 
principle of social, political, and economic organization against its enemies past and 
present, whether this means fascism, communism, terrorism, and even capital itself.  
Democracy, then, defines the notions of equality and freedom for both apologists of 
neoliberalism and the mainstream Left; as a result, the terms and categories by 
which revolution is thinkable become indistinguishable from that by which 
democracy, in its formal guise, actualizes capital’s means of exploitation, 
oppression, and domination.  The idea of revolution becomes a confused concept, 
and the question of change merely an empty gesture towards some Leftist ideal.   
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D.  TOWARDS A THOUGHT AGAINST WHICH DEFENSE IS IMPOSSIBLE 
 What, then, is left for a militant politics of the Filipino diaspora to think?  
The answer is this: to think the impossible, to place thought in touch with the 
absolute negativity of historical knowledge.  This means that a militant thought 
needs to think beyond the oppositional positivities that not only condition the way 
that the Philippine situation in World War II has been defined, but the very horizons 
by which the Good is thought, produced, and defended today: that democracy can 
and must be the only Truth of human freedom.  If the post-war reconstruction set 
the stage for the neoliberal ethic’s development into its contemporary form, then 
the war itself, and the oppositions attributed to it, have become the ideological 
bulwarks of this ethic’s self-actualization: the general and formal ideal of 
democracy against which fascism has been posited serves as the originary point for 
the notion that democracy, as neoliberalism or a Leftist popular-national 
democracy, is both the advent and manifestation of equality and freedom.    
 Let us outline, using the conclusions reached thus far, what a thought in 
touch with the absolute negativity of historical knowledge involves: 
 a.  an understanding of the genealogy of the neoliberal ethic; 
 b.  a conceptual engagement with the archaeology of this ethic’s constitutive 
      dialectic, i.e. that between Good (democracy) and Evil (non-democratic); 
      and 
 c.  positing the concept of this genealogico-archaeological nexus alongside 
      the political, economic, and military arms of the neoliberal-imperial  
      ethic.  
These coordinates can be further divided into the following sub-coordinates: 
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 d.  rejecting the notion of historical necessity and the transition, which posit 
      the State as a prerequisite for a radical politics, i.e. a rejection of the  
      temporal dimension of hegemony; 
 e.  an equal rejection, within the strict historical coordinates given in this  
      chapter, of the terms by which the second world war becomes available 
      to and as knowledge, i.e. that it was a war between two positivities: Good 
      (democracy and the democratic unities) and Evil (fascism); and 
 f.  positing a non-ethical and anti-historical idea of revolution and   
      militancy, one that exceeds the horizons of democracy’s constitutive  
      dialectic (Good vs. Evil) and thus repudiates not only the justification of 
      war waged in order to protect accumulation and democratic governance 
      (e.g., voting rights), but also in order, in more general terms, to secure an 
      idea of freedom against that which is posited as unfreedom (including a 
      people’s national democracy against capital), a positing that always  
      happens through the authority of State logic. 
Ultimately, a thought in touch with the absolute negativity of historical knowledge 
will not only have to think World War II as the originary moment of the neoliberal 
ethic; it will also have to think against the idea that fascism was the Evil it was 
imputed to be––but only because this Evil is posited, as a kind of genealogico-
archaeological residue, according to the terms of the neoliberal ethic, where 
democracy, by producing and defending it, is constituted.  
 This means thinking against history, a thought that must also move beyond 
the dialectic, where the State not only determines the qualities of a valid rebellion, 
but also the values by which this validity is measured.  Only then can a thought on 
the function of militancy––a thought on and as attribution, or a thought on and as a 
becoming-militant, or subjectivation––arise.   
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 A militant must do what is nearly impossible: be un-democratic, inasmuch 
as thinking militantly, inasmuch as becoming-militant, means determining in what 
ways democracy’s uses become inseparable from that of Empire, which defends 
itself and strengthens its fortresses by defining, “smoking out,” in George W. 
Bush’s terms, and then killing its enemies.   
 If this is a nearly impossible task, there is, nevertheless, some hope.  
Thinking un-democratically, conceiving of how a becoming-militant can happen 
against democracy’s many impasses, finds one of its operators in the following 
aesthetic form: literature.  It is to this domain that we will now turn, for literature 
allows us to think an ontological immanence, against both the crushing hierarchy of 
identity and the constraining hierarchies of history.  
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CHAPTER 4 
LITERATURE AND PRAXIS: THE NEGATION OF BEING AND 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
        “Art anticipates work because it carries out its principle: the transformation of sensible 
                      matter into the community’s self-presentation.” 
       –––Jacques Rancière, “On Art and Work” 
 
 
 
 I will propose, in advance, the following thesis: that literature, as a variable 
operator of a militant politics, is a form of thought capable of inducing a subject 
that encounters through literature the absolute negation of being and knowledge in 
its negation of time.  Such is the general formula of literature’s function for 
militancy: it is capable of abolishing what may be termed the ontology of time, 
which posits a homogeneous political sequence tied, as such, to the State and to 
axiomatization.  Let us keep in mind, then, that the four conditions mentioned at the 
close of the previous chapter comprise a kind of militant braid of thought only 
because they are held together by a single, principal condition: that this thought is a 
thought that thinks itself in its becoming, a thought on the thought of the function of 
militancy itself, a thought that includes itself in its thought on the function of 
militancy.  In the case of literature, it is the reader who encounters the literary 
work, an encounter that, through the act of reading––conceived as a dynamics of 
thought––is capable of constituting the reader’s thought on him or herself as a 
militant subject.   
 In the field of literary theory, a general ontology of literature has been 
developed and which can aid us in elaborating the dynamics of reading-as-militant-
thought, serving thus as the portico to the literary theory I will henceforth advance.  
This ontology is the phenomenological one, an ontology that can be seen in its 
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literary theoretical antecedents that some have termed aesthetic response theory or 
reception theory.  The two ontologies that I will address, respectively, are Edmund 
Husserl and Wolfgang Iser.  Hans Robert Jauss, another major name in literary 
reception theory, will be another significant figure: although he does not, unlike 
Iser, develop an ontology, he does posit temporality––namely, the future and the 
past––as a prerequisite for rethinking the militant potentialities of reading, a 
potentiality that signals the way towards thinking the negation of the present, the 
political consensus, and the ontological status quo as the horizon for thought.  I will 
then end with a discussion of Jacques Rancière’s contribution to a theory of 
literature’s constitution of a militant subject, which serves as an extension and 
radicalization of the admittedly limited scope of some of phenomenology’s 
categories.  The limitations of these categories, and the radicalization that 
Rancière’s theories perform, have everything to do with their conception of two 
interrelated things: time and community.   
 In what follows, I will be introducing a series of theoretical coordinates 
upon which the last three chapters of this dissertation are based.  Hence, the rest of 
this chapter will appear somewhat incomplete; it is a mere skeleton for Chapters 5, 
6, and 7, which will not only elaborate in concrete terms these theoretical 
coordinates’ full implications for a diasporic politics––what I will term an 
immanent literary theory based upon the principles of a militant process of 
attribution––but its connection to an anti-democratic Filipino diasporic subjectivity 
as well.  This immanent literary theory, in other words, will be a theory on how it is 
possible to think absolute negativity qua literature.  This chapter thus acts as the 
fulcrum of the dissertation, the analytical mechanism that supports the weight of the 
preceding chapters and swings them over, with added force, towards the final three. 
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4.1  THE READER-SUBJECT AND BEYOND  
 
A.  THE DUAL CONSTITUTION OF THE READER-SUBJECT 
 One of the key aspects of reader response theory is its use of the Husserlian 
categories of retention and protention, temporal categories that describe, 
respectively, the moment of the phenomenological subject’s recollection and of its 
projection towards and anticipation of the future.  Husserl described these 
categories as elements of an intentionality––that is, the subject’s investment of an 
object of thought and comprehension with the value of certainty and belief (that the 
object possesses this or that feature, this or that quality, etc.).  The object becomes 
endowed with a contemplative value, and thus becomes worthy of thought itself.  
For Husserl, the ultimate intentional object is the material world, what he calls the 
“life-world.”  Intending the life-world is a thought process that takes place between 
two poles:  
 1.  The temporal pole.  This is the place of recollection and projection, 
where the subject’s past, present, and future constitute a continuum, each level or 
dimension synthesized into the “unity of one time.”  Retention and protention are 
variations of the present, and are intelligible only as, respectively, the “present 
which has passed” and the “present-to-come.”  As a function of intentionality, the 
past and the future in truth intend only one thing: the present.  The intending 
subject, by occupying the present, is central to this intentionality.  We can rephrase 
Husserl’s language by describing the temporality of the intending subject as the 
subject-who-has-passed and the subject-to come.  This subject is thus the absolute 
horizon of being in time.1  
                                                
1 Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Tr. David 
Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), 169 (§49).  
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    2.  The communicative pole.  This is where the subject’s intentions are 
made the object of communication and are “communalized.”  When the subject 
intends an object in the life-world, it submits this intention to a communication with 
other intending subjects, what Husserl calls “ego-subjects.”  Here, thought becomes 
spatial.  The intentions are distributed within a given group, however concentrated 
or dispersed, communicating the same region of the life-world or the same object in 
question.  The important point here is that these intending subjects all belong within 
the same life-world, which becomes the universal ground for this communication.  
The subject that inserts itself into the community of ego-subjects as yet another 
intending ego-subject is the ontic horizon of being.2  
 The Husserlian subject, then, emerges from out of a specific relationship 
between time and the communalization of thought, which, as we will see, is a 
function of representation.  This three-fold relationship, harbored within the 
Husserlian life-world, will be the main concern for the rest of this chapter and for 
the immanent literary theory I will be developing and elaborating in the subsequent 
ones, containing as it does the core elements for determining the phenomenological 
dimensions of the literary work.  This three-fold relationship can be schematized in 
the following way:  
 
 
  time – subject – communalized thought 
 
              representation 
 
life-world 
 
Figure 1.  Simple Constitution of the Phenomenological Subject 
 
  
                                                
2 ibid, 162 – 4 (§47).  
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 The belongingness that Husserl develops in The Crisis, however, and 
especially in the pole of communication, is not without its problems.  As many have 
commented, the Husserlian subject is conceivable only after positing its necessary 
retreat into the transcendental space of serene contemplation.  The epoché performs 
this enclosure.  Jean-Paul Sartre, for instance, as said that Husserl’s description of 
thought “remained on the level of pure, formal consciousness apprehending itself in 
its formality.”3  In Husserl, however, this “formality,” as the precondition for true 
thinking, is always a temporary construct; the subject requires that it position itself 
in relation to the other ego-subjects of the life-world in order for this thought to 
have any validity, i.e. this thought’s communalization and communication, its 
circulation within the life-world in question.  Sartre does not take this dynamic into 
account.  What is problematic, however, is Husserl’s treatment of time and the 
subject’s occupation of and constitution by it, which ultimately affects 
communalization itself.  The epoché, I will advance, will always be enclosed by the 
present, the life-world being the final horizon for experience posited as pre-given.   
 This notion of time has a direct influence on reader response theory, which 
posits the subject (in this case, the reader or the receptor of the text) between the 
same poles of time and community that Husserl does.  This is where Iser comes in; 
specifically, my concern is with his book, The Act of Reading, and the manner in 
which he conceives of the temporal dimensions of the reading process and its 
inclusion, as the object of a discourse, within a given concept of the social.  
 
 
 
                                                
3 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, Vol. 1 (Tr. Alan Sheridan-Smith. New York: 
Verso, 2004), 35.  
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B. DEMOCRATIZING LITERATURE  
 Two concepts that Iser derives from Husserlian categories are “the 
wandering viewpoint” (from Husserl’s concepts of passive synthesis) and 
“intersubjectivity” (an explicitly Husserlian derivation), the former being directly 
linked to temporality and the latter to community.   
 For Iser, the wandering viewpoint actualizes Husserl’s notion of passive 
synthesis, which for the latter is the mental process by which images consumed by 
the mind are processed sequentially, such that every image reproduces every 
preceding image, but with a difference: it reproduces the image as having a past, as 
acquiring the quality of “past-ness.”  Within the literary work itself, this, for Iser, is 
the formula for how readers produce the work’s meaning: the unity of the past, 
present, and future into a meaningful whole, the wandering viewpoint passing 
across the narrative’s temporal “axis,” as Iser calls it, in such a way that the “first 
meaning” produced by the reader (that is, the meaning that one initially encounters 
in the literary work) is continuously being modified and transformed by subsequent 
images, a meaning whose future manifestations the reader intends (to use Husserl’s 
concept) in the literary work whose “fulfillment” vis-à-vis meaning the reader 
anticipates.4 
 This temporal model recalls that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s, who 
describes the Husserlian axis of time in his Phenomenology of Perception as a 
“network of intentionalities,” the criss-crossing of the future and the axes of the past 
and the present, each of which are enmeshed with each other as the past carries over 
into the present as past projected forward into a future anticipated and intended 
                                                
4 Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1980), 148 – 9.   
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simultaneously with the present.5  Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology radicalizes 
Husserlian phenomenology by taking the latter’s notion of the “unity of one time” 
and submitting it to an immanentist critique: there can be, for the former, a single 
time only because each temporal axis is “in communication” with the others and is 
internal to the rest, disavowing the need for an external standpoint from which time 
can be thought as a unified process.  This is what Merleau-Ponty calls a 
“subjectivity’s” “disruption” of “the plenitude of being:” for him, a subjectivity is 
the one in time, whereas being designates that position from which time, and the 
objects encountered within it (including the subject), is seen as a separate “thing” 
from the one doing the perceiving.  This is an ontology, in other words, that 
displaces being, thought as the absolute separation between thinking and perceiving 
subject and phenomenal object, in favor of the immanence of the subject vis-à-vis 
the phenomenal world, an ontology of a subject’s immersion and, even more, its 
total involvement and inclusion in the dynamism of time’s networked 
intentionalities.6 
  This immanent subject is an important category for the phenomenology of 
reading, and it is one whose manifestations, henceforth, I will track in the various 
theories I will address in the remainder of this chapter. 
 For Iser, the immanent subject is a wholly textual subject, the networked 
intentionalities emerging from the reader’s encounter with the phenomenal object 
that is the literary work (in addition to the images to which it gives rise).  It is that 
which creates the meaning of the literary work: like Merleau-Ponty, Iser conceives 
of the reader-subject as having ontologically transcended the subject-object binary.   
This immanence is why, for Iser, the reader’s existence, during the act of reading, is 
                                                
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception (Tr. Colin Smith. New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 484.   
6 ibid, 489.   
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reshaped: his or her life, or life-world, in Husserl’s terms, is negated by the literary 
work, bringing about a “deformation” of “reality” that in its turns elicits a 
questioning of this reality itself, of the very terms, categories, and horizons by 
which it is itself made meaningful, by which it is intended.7  By way of the 
wandering viewpoint’s production of meaning, the reader’s life-world is turned 
upside down, the quintessential experience of being’s abolition and literature’s 
temporal dynamic, i.e. its collapse of past, present, and future into a network of 
intentionalities.  The subject, as Iser says, is divided from him or herself.8 
 But if Merleau-Ponty posited the necessity to think the eradication of the 
subject-object dyad before temporality could be properly thought––that is, that it 
includes the subject within the networks of which it consists and thus must, 
alongside the subject, be thought immanently––then Iser does something else 
altogether: he posits the necessity to recuperate the subject-object dyad before 
existence, properly speaking, can be thought.  For him, the world that the reader 
enters once he or she ceases to be a reader, once he or she begins once again to 
exist, because it has been warped and challenged by the literary work and by the 
meanings created by the reader, can arise anew: Iser calls it an “awakening,” 
reading being a “temporary isolation” from the world that returns us to it with a 
refreshed outlook that makes the real world “observable.”9   
 This is where knowledge, in the sense I gave to it in the preceding sections 
(i.e. State knowledge, legislated, controlled, and regulated meaning), rears its ugly 
head.  The difference between meaning and signification, for Iser, is crucial: the 
former is completely textual, whereas the latter is “the reader’s absorption of the 
                                                
7 ibid, 228.  
8 Iser, The Act of Reading, 155.  
9 ibid, 140. 
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meaning into his own existence.”10  Signification is nothing less than the 
transformation of what was once a negation, a warping of the life-world and the 
means of its understanding, into an affirmation of things as they are: the passage 
from the reader-subject to what may be called the subject-in-general (the subject of 
the life-world) is the passage from the warped vision of the world to a clarified 
version of it, the observable version of itself as seen by the erstwhile reader, whose 
standpoint is that of the subject that apprehends everything in its totality and in its 
apodicticity, the standpoint Merleau-Ponty repudiated as the apperceptivity of 
being.  Iser restores being, and in so doing recuperates the impassable difference 
between subject (the subject-in-general) and object (the life-world and its 
inhabitants, animate or inanimate).   
 This recuperation of the subject-object binary, moreover, affects the concept 
of time.  Time’s network, in which the past rises up to meet the present intended 
alongside the future, can be equally applied to the shift from reader-subject to 
subject-in-general: the act of reading and its warping of the life-world recedes into 
the past, a collection of images that are continually being reproduced in the present, 
a reproduction, however, that by recuperating the subject-object binary also 
recuperates the life-world, in its clarity and apodicticity, as it is, i.e. in the way that 
knowledge defines it.  The clarity of the world, and the future intended within it, is 
possible only because the subject stands apart from it.  The subject, in short, is 
thought as an objective observer and nothing more, coming out of the literary 
experience with heightened senses, but whose thought is completely eradicated 
from the materiality of the life-world.  
 This is the problem of Iser’s notion of community.  What he calls an 
“intersubjective communication of . . . meaning”  is possible only within the genteel 
                                                
10 ibid, 151.  
 124 
spaces carved by those have already undergone such a distancing from the world.  It 
is only by doing so that meanings can be produced such that, once set loose among 
the community, significations can arise that are conditioned, as the production of 
meanings are, first of all by the subject’s division from him or herself, which allows 
the subject to “observe [his or her] own decisions.”11   
 We see here, in Iser’s recuperation of the subject-object binary, his 
correlative recuperation of the general formula of the deliberative process of 
democracy itself, modified in the tradition of the rationalist modernism of a Jürgen 
Habermas.  In such a model, thought can be thought only through the strict division 
between the subject and the object, the reader and the life-world, community being 
possible only as the circulation of the signs of this division––and nothing more.  
This community, then, as is the community posited by democracy, is a community 
that cannot think past the present life-world, whose clarity is taken as the emblem 
of those who wish to make it better, whose rationalization is the means by which it 
can become the condition for intersubjective freedoms.  It is a community, in short, 
that does not seek out a radical transformation of life; what it seeks out, ultimately, 
is the creation of yet another consensus.  Thinking this community requires a 
thought that accepts, in its form, the status quo.  The reader-subject, then, is just 
that: the subject of knowledge.   
 
C.  “PREFORMING” THE NEW  
 If it is impossible to think, through Iser, a thought that thinks a break with 
the status quo, that thinks absolute negativity qua literature, what we see in Jauss, 
on the contrary, is a remarkable move towards establishing such a thought, which 
thinks by passing into the domain of non-knowledge manifest in literature.  Jauss, 
                                                
11 ibid, 230.   
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however, does not posit an ontology; his reader is not the phenomenological reader 
Iser constructs.  Instead, his concern is with the sequence of literary transformation 
and innovation itself, from its production to its reception (each process being, for 
Jauss, unthinkable without the other), with the literary tradition, in other words, and 
the thought its shifting forms enable.   
 Jauss’ principle aim is to rethink the notion of literary history by 
foregrounding literature’s reception, the manner in which it is read, consumed, 
circulated, categorized, and so on.  As a general theory of receptivity, Jauss is 
already at a more material level than Iser, his theory being based not on the 
transcendental ego, the subject-turned-being, but rather on a community of readers 
and, in addition, writers.  By refracting his starting point, Jauss is able to address 
(quite convincingly) Marx’s question, posed in the 1857 Introduction, about how a 
work of classical art can still manage to move a spectator today when the political 
economic life surrounding its production (its sculpting, painting, drafting) has 
already passed.12  At the heart of Marx’s question was his inability to imagine how 
communication is at all possible between a work of art and its consumers.  For 
Marx, this communication is mediated by what is essentially gone: the world of the 
artwork’s production and the artist who responded to this world.  In addition to the 
alien quality of the world depicted in the artwork, the temporal distance between 
that world and the world of the contemporary consumer erects an ontological 
barrier that, for Marx, should disable the artwork’s ability to “speak” to the 
audience, whose ontological horizons are founded upon an entirely different and 
nearly irreconcilable mode of production to that of the dead artist.  And yet, Marx’s 
question concedes to this “speech’s” continual occurrence.   
                                                
12 See Marx, Grundrisse, 111.   
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 Jauss turns to Karl Kosík for a solution: “‘The work lives to the extent that it 
has influence.’”  Jauss goes on to elucidate this formulation in the following 
passage, which deserves to be quoted at length:  
  If the life of the work results “not from its autonomous existence but 
  rather from the reciprocal interaction of world and mankind,” this  
  perpetual labor of understanding and of the active reproduction of  
  the past cannot remain limited to the single work.  On the contrary, 
  the relationship of work to work must now be brought into this  
  interaction between work and mankind, and the historical coherence 
  of works among themselves must be seen in the interrelations of  
  production and reception.  Put another way: literature and art only  
  obtain a history that has the character of a process when the  
  succession of works is mediated not only through the producing  
  subject but also through the consuming subject––through the  
  interaction of author and public.  And if on the other hand “human  
  reality is not only a production of the new, but also a (critical and  
  dialectical) reproduction of the past,” the function of art in the  
  process of this perpetual totalizing can only come into view in its  
  independence when the specific achievement of artistic form as well 
  is no longer just mimetically defined, but rather is viewed   
  dialectically as a medium capable of forming and altering   
  perception, in which the “formation of the senses” chiefly takes  
  place.13 
                                                
13 Hans Robert Jauss, Towards an Aesthetic of Reception (Tr. Timothy Bahti. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 15 – 6, emphasis added.  
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A new version of literary tradition arises in this passage: Jauss demands a 
rethinking of literary history qua history in general, and vice versa.  As Jauss says, 
this demands a double perspective, one that not only thinks both diachronically and 
synchronically, inasmuch as the literary tradition needs to be rethought qua the 
reading public’s synchronic and even, one might say, overdetermined, production 
of concepts regarding the development and evolution of a particular literary 
sequence, but also literature’s “‘special history’ in its own unique relationship to 
‘general history.’”14  This dialectical relation between literature and history allows 
literature to be thought in its relation to two things: 1) the modality of its reception, 
the way in which a reading public categorizes literature vis-à-vis itself (the shifts in 
generic codes, the emergence and disappearance of a particular mode of address, a 
voice, a form); and 2) this reception’s refraction of literature into perception itself, 
where what is affected is not just a new concept of literary history, but of history 
itself, the terms, concepts, and categories by which it has thus far been understood 
as being capable of mutating through the force of literature’s “active reproduction 
of the past,” its reshaping of “the senses.”   
 Although the notion of reproducing the past is clearly important for the 
present study, let us delay its discussion for the moment and move on to one of the 
temporal categories that concern us: the future, or what may be termed a literary 
futurality.   
 Like Iser, Jauss also privileges, as an analytic category, literature’s essential 
negativity: it can “liberate” the reader from his or her “adaptations, prejudices, and 
predicaments of a lived praxis in that it compels one to a new perception of things.”  
A key to this new perception lies in the reader’s expectations: “The horizon of 
expectations of literature distinguishes itself before the horizon of expectation of 
                                                
14 ibid, 39.   
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historical lived praxis in that it not only preserves actual experiences, but also 
anticipates unrealized possibility, broadens the limited space of social behavior for 
new desires, claims, and goals, and thereby opens paths of future experience.”15  
Literature negates the world by reshuffling and sometimes even creating those 
terms by which it is made thinkable.  But Jauss moves beyond Iser’s recuperation of 
being by positing the transformation of the subject as having a bearing towards an 
unknown future, the idea of which is nonetheless expressible in the literary work.  
Given Jauss’ refusal to enclose the subject within what is ultimately the ontological 
prison of being, the way opens up for advancing a theory of absolute negativity 
encounterable in literature.  This, then, is what his double perspective accomplishes: 
it allows him to posit the existence of a reader that thinks his or her thought, his or 
her production of concepts and categories, qua literature and history, a thought that 
in its self-reflexivity, its questioning of the horizons that limit its conception of 
experience itself, is then capable of being transformed by nothing less than the 
literary work itself.   
 At this point, it is necessary to retrace our steps a little, and say that what 
Jauss means when he says praxis is nothing but the experience that the subject 
undergoes with respect to both literature and its lived reality, of history in its 
unfolding.  Literature is capable of transforming praxis because it forces the 
subject to rethink what praxis means in the first place––to rethink not only what it 
means to encounter meaning in the literary work, but how this encounter is tied to 
lived praxis itself.  This rethinking, it must be said, is the nodal point for Jauss’ 
reconceptualization of literature: for him, it exists as thought, and as thought 
becomes what I have termed a variable operator of a subject.  Literature undercuts 
the reader’s expectations––of both the literary work (by surprising him or her 
                                                
15 ibid, 41.  
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through a stunning flourish of form, a new metaphor, a new modality of expression) 
and of the very values by which the idea of a particular object, both material and 
immaterial (a bird, love, a political sequence), is imbued with meaning.  These 
meanings can be overturned; they are invested with a new image, a new value, a 
new code.   
 These meanings are always, for Jauss, social.  But this is not the sociality or 
community of Iser’s transcendental ego-subject; this sociality is a form of 
community that posits the existence of a non-communicative function: what 
becomes thinkable in literature is not communicable precisely because it does not 
exist in the horizons within which current definitions and values circulate.  His 
community is not one that moves within the boundaries of consensus; rather, it is a 
community that is first of all thinkable because it does not exist.  What it does, as 
idea incarnate in the overthrowing of expectations, is persist as the immanent 
potentiality of what can be formed beyond but within the present––of “anticipating 
reality,” as Jauss puts it.16  This is what Jauss means when he talks of literature’s 
ability to “preform”17 reality: its production of new expectations, its creation of an 
anticipation of something that has been hitherto buried by the consensus, by the 
status quo, by the dried up field upon which knowledge is sown.  This new 
expectation, this anticipation of what has remained unthinkable, is the thought that 
literature manifests.   
 We are now in a better position to understand fully the importance of the 
past, especially as it pertains to Jauss’ analysis of Marx’s query into classical art.  It 
has to do with the relationship between form and content.  For Jauss, preforming 
reality means preforming its content.  But what if this content is the content of the 
                                                
16 ibid, 14. 
17 ibid, 41.  
 130 
past, both written in and about a past that, more or less, is long-since gone?  This is 
where Jauss’ solution to Marx’s problem is extremely elegant, since for him this 
question is irrelevant.  For the reader, that the content is explicitly of the past is 
negligible inasmuch as literary futurality’s ability to preform reality is contingent 
first of all on the reader’s rethinking of history itself, of the means by which, within 
the spaces of literary history and history in general, the past has overdetermined his 
or her expectations and knowledge.  The reader’s praxis includes an “active 
reproduction of the past,” as Jauss says, only because this past is nothing more than 
the residual effects of the values, concepts, and categories that have up until the 
moment of reading become the sediments of knowledge––of both literature and 
lived reality.  The question of content is thus ill-formed: what matters is its dynamic 
interaction with form, of the reader’s reception of this dynamic and the thought that 
it animates: a reevaluation and ultimately a reconstitution of the past that proceeds 
by way of a headlong plunge into the future’s night.  What ultimately happens is 
this: that this night overcomes the subject, the past become unrecognizable except 
as the function of a thought that thinks the negation of the present.   
 We have thus arrived at the preliminary formulations of a literary absolute 
negativity.  The reader’s perspective is in accordance with the perspective I posited 
in the first chapter: that of a militant Filipino diasporic subject, whose belonging 
within a common is conditional upon this subject’s continual introduction of 
ontological negativities into its dense fabric.  It is also in accordance with the 
modalities of time elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3, i.e. futurality (the presupposition 
of an anticipated life) and historicity (the rethinking and, ultimately, the rejection of 
historical knowledge).  But in what way literature is able to express this community 
has been left unsaid.  Its key to its unlocking, however, has already been given: that 
this community, the common, must be incommunicable, that it must exist beyond 
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the fringes of what is acceptable in linguistic and literary comprehension itself.  
How, then, does the common become thinkable––how can it be named and 
attributed––by such an incomprehensibility?  
 Recall that the paradox of attribution is that it must take from axiomatization 
its repertory of meanings and signs in order to disclose and thus make thinkable the 
absolute negativity that is always threatening to render the axiomatic obsolete, and 
that the attribute Filipino is precisely the name of a subject (the becoming-Filipino) 
that points beyond any attempt to enclose it within the field of the State-Empire 
nexus.  This is the analytical starting point from which it becomes possible to think 
literature’s capacity to operate the thought on this becoming-Filipino.   
 The idea of the common, then, must be induced in the literary work, in 
whose linguistic aspects this idea must also disable the idea that this common is 
completely delimitable, that there is something in the work of literature that cannot 
be communicated and thus produces in the literary work an extra-dimensional 
capacity that cannot be described, defined, and thought within the parameters of 
linguistic communication, beyond the claims of knowledge, one that, along the 
temporal axis of thought, is both for the future (the negation of everything that can 
be known) and against the past (the negation of everything that is said to be 
known)––in other words, atemporal.  It is thus this convergence of atemporality and 
non-communication that we must discover in the literary work, a convergence that 
elicits the thought on the non-delimitable common and thus brings us a step closer 
to discovering literature’s ability to operate the thought on militancy, of how it can 
be a variable operator of attribution and thus becoming-Filipino. 
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4.2  MILITANT UNIVOCAL 
 
A.  ABOLISHING  COMMUNICATION 
 Jacques Rancière, in his collection of essays entitled The Politics of 
Aesthetics, repudiates the communicative function of literature, a repudiation that 
he sets out to demonstrate by way of literature’s relation to what he calls the 
“distribution of the sensible.”  Contrary to Iser and Jauss, Rancière devotes his 
attention not to the reader per se, but to the literary work and to the questions that 
literary writing raises with respect to the values placed on communication––to the 
social position of the writer, to the mode of address that his or her writing deploys, 
to the idea of the reader that arises from this address.   
 Rancière begins, in the book’s opening essay, “The Distribution of the 
Sensible,” by engaging Plato’s banishment of poets from the Republic.  Rancière 
starts with a definition of the distribution of the sensible: it is “the system of self-
evident facts of sense perception that simultaneously discloses the existence of 
something in common and the delimitations that define the respective parts and 
positions within it.  A distribution of the sensible therefore establishes at one and 
the same time something common that is shared and exclusive parts.  This 
apportionment of parts and positions is based on a distribution of spaces, times, and 
forms of activity that determines the very manner in which something in common 
lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals have a part in this 
distribution.”18  This distribution and partitioning of activities within a community, 
the delimitation of the common by way of what is made “visible” qua the activities 
performed in prescribed spaces, is what, for Rancière, the writer destroys: Plato 
                                                
18 Jacques Rancière, The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (2nd ed. Tr. Gabriel 
Rockhill. New York: Continuum, 2005), 12.  
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derided the poet because, first, “fantasies” (in the form of the fable) that circulated 
in the public disrupted the hierarchy of identities and overturned socio-political 
mores, and second, the act of writing itself meant that “the relationship between 
effects of language and the positions of bodies in shared space”19 was completely 
abolished, the idea of a public space, the notion of delimitable common, in which 
addressor and addressee mark out a definite space of communication, being called 
into question and communication rendered indeterminate, uncertain, and, 
ultimately, null.   
 Rancière, turning to the controversy surrounding the publication of Madame 
Bovary (in which moral outrage was directed specifically against Flaubert’s use of 
an impartial and “indifferent” narrator, which disabled the reading public’s ability 
to delimit the question of moral value qua the writer’s attitude towards an 
“immoral” Emma), calls modern literature’s linguistic variation of this abolition of 
the common’s delimitability a “refusal to entrust literature with any message 
whatsoever,” an “equality of indifference” that is “the result of a poetic bias: the 
equality of all subject matter is the negation of any relationship of necessity 
between a determined form and a determined content. . . . This equality destroys all 
of the hierarchies of representation and also establishes a community of readers as a 
community without legitimacy, a community formed only by the random 
circulation of the written word.”20  Let us say for now that what Rancière is 
describing here is the non-unity and non-correspondence, in modern literature, of 
form and content, and that an equality inheres in this divergence which, ultimately, 
makes it difficult to derive any absolute message from the novel.  Before moving 
towards and exposition of this statement, however, let us clarify what Rancière 
                                                
19 ibid, 13.  
20 ibid, 14.   
 134 
means when he says that this community of readers is a community without 
legitimacy.  In another essay (“Is History a Form of Fiction?”), Rancière calls this 
community an “uncertain one,” one that “[contributes] to the formation of 
enunciative collectives that call into question the distribution of roles, territories, 
and languages.  In short, they contribute to the formation of political subjects that 
challenge the given distribution of the sensible.  A political collective is not, in 
actual fact, an organism or a communal body.  The channels for political 
subjectivization are not those of imaginary identification but those of ‘literary’ 
disincorporation.”21  We have thus, in the short while that we have been 
summarizing Rancière, arrived at a trajectory that should be familiar by now, one 
that, nonetheless, gives an added dimension to our preceding analyses by explicitly 
relating them to literature.   
 Let us plot this trajectory, the relationships of whose parts describe the non-
delimitable common qua literary absolute negativity: 
 –––literary language posits the common as a reconfigured site, the   
       distribution of the sensible repudiated as a hierarchized, regulated, and  
       controlled apportionment of bodies, activities, and temporalities whose 
       proper delimitation ensures the reproduction of what is said to be a  
       functioning socio-political and socio-economic community; 
 –––the literary language of the modern novel is indifferent, insofar as the  
       form and content of a novel have no determinate relation to each other, 
       and where the mode of address does not of necessity correlate with the 
       content of the novel, i.e. where the (political, religious, etc.) message  
       ceases to exist because the unity of form and content, which formerly  
                                                
21 ibid, 40 (emphasis added). 
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       secured the transmission of a readily comprehensible “moral” traceable 
       back to authorial intent, has been dissolved;  
 –––literary language is thus based upon equality, every subject matter being 
       representable by the novel and no longer contingent upon the specific  
       form of the novel (the morality tale, the religious allegory, etc.); 
 –––the common, because this equality entails, as the previous point says, a 
       repudiation of any message, can no longer be delimited according to the 
       conventional addressor-addressee relation but is rather a common  
       constituted by its illegitimacy and uncertainty, the delimitation of the  
       common qua communication being rendered impossible and thus  
       remaining beyond the purview of the legitimizing forces of the   
       distribution of the sensible; and 
 –––this common, because of its excessiveness (with respect to the normal  
       distribution of the sensible), is thus in excess of those forces of   
       knowledge and is as such uncontainable by any normal concept of the  
       political, that the constitution of political subjects happens beyond  
       identification and through these excess of knowledge that the common’s 
       non-delimitability represents. 
We therefore have an accumulation of theoretico-political points around which the 
analyses thus far, throughout this dissertation, have implicitly revolved, but this 
time related explicitly to the core category that concerns us: literary language.  We 
can say that what Rancière is arguing is that literary language not only abolishes 
communication, but in so doing can set to work the idea of a common as non-
delimitable, and that the political subject that arises from this encounter with the 
non-communicative function of literature––a reader-subject, if we take subject to 
mean what I have given it to throughout this dissertation––is him or herself 
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constituted by way of the negativities that emerge from the schisms that this non-
communicative function introduce into the common.  This is a common, in short, 
the idea of which the reader-subject is able to think only by positing its non-
delimitability, by thinking its perforation and incompletion, its lack of apodicticity 
and thus its exceedance of every form of identity, politics becoming possible only 
through these excesses and these negativities––which are absolute negativities 
inasmuch as non-communication entails the repudiation of both knowledge (of what 
is communicable) and being (between two communicants, addressor and 
addressee).   
 This is what Rancière calls a “recomposition of the landscape of the 
visible:” what becomes visible, what becomes available to the senses, is a new 
common that is otherwise imperceptible in the normal distribution of the sensible, 
in the hierarchized mode of life that partitions the roles, spaces, and times that serve 
as the bulwarks to the reproduction of the status quo.  This recomposition, 
moreover, is directly related to work.  Labor, as Rancière says in the example of 
Plato, is possible as the reproduction of a certain form of hierarchized life only 
because it is delimited: labor becomes the reproduction of the status quo because 
jobs, spaces, and times are divided up to ensure this productivity.  The poet, in the 
example, and literary language in general, for Rancière, disrupts this 
reproducibility; it forces a thought on a different mode of distribution, one that is, 
according to the status quo, both inefficient and non-productive.   
 Non-productivity, however, is recuperated as a form of production itself; 
Rancière’s goal is to demonstrate that literature is itself a kind of production 
because it forces the reader to think the non-delimitable common and its capacity to 
produce the reader-subject.  The literary work “[defines] a new relation between 
making and seeing.”  Art is production insofar as it is able to produce a thought on 
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sensible matter, on the new distribution of activities and bodies beyond the normal 
productivity based upon hierarchies and control, a thought on sensible matter that is 
also its presentation, its making visible.   
 This is why Rancière can say that art “anticipates work,” that it “carries out 
its principle,” which is “the transformation of sensible matter into the community’s 
self-presentation.”22  In the second chapter, we saw that thinking beyond the status 
quo meant presupposing the future in the present––the presuppositional method 
Marx developed and which Althusser elaborated, and which states that the future, as 
the absolute negativity of all that is knowable to the consensus as and in the present, 
is the concept of the concrete immanence of revolution today (or Negri’s 
“communism in methodology”).  This is where Rancière's notion of the 
community’s self-presentation takes on new meaning.  Self-presentation is not the 
presentation of the self through the literary work; it does not imply the collective 
production of the novel, but rather, in keeping with what may be called the 
disruptive productivity of literary language, is an entirely individual and almost 
always private form of praxis: the individual mode of the becoming-subject that 
takes place as the production of the concrete-in-thought of the non-delimitable 
common qua literature.   
 We are at the threshold of formulating in full the general formula for 
becoming-Filipino, whose precondition is its acquisition of a thought on the thought 
of the function of militancy.  That literature can force the production of the 
concrete-in-thought turns literature into a form of thought itself; literature-as-
thought can be the shorthand way of saying this.  Inasmuch as it presents the non-
delimitable common, literature-as-thought turns the reader into a reader-subject, a 
process that happens by way of the thought on the non-delimitable common, this 
                                                
22 ibid, 44.  
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thought being a thought on him or herself in this common, whose non-delimitability 
is itself a function of the reader-subject’s thought, i.e. his or her abolition of the 
common’s delimitability––or in other words, the thought on the non-delimitable 
common attributed as such, emblematized by the attribute and named qua the 
reader-subject’s becoming, the basic process by which a becoming-Filipino 
happens.   
 Becoming-Filipino, qua literature-as-thought, can be thought as a non-
communicable summoning, the common that arises from the literary work being 
produced as a concrete-in-thought that reconfigures the idea of the common as 
being beyond any apodicticity, beyond identification, as Rancière says, the political 
ramifications of which is to induce a thought by way of the absolute negativity it 
presents qua the common that the reader as reader-subject thinks in his or her 
becoming, as his or her becoming within the common attributed as Filipino.  This is 
the making visible of the common that through the reader-subject’s praxis ceases to 
be delimitable.   
 Moreover, what this praxis expresses is its immutable relation between the 
two temporal poles––futurality and pastness––whose equivalence implies the 
abolition of time itself, of which we caught glimpses in Chapter 3.   This is a 
subject for the future and against historical knowledge, a subject constituted by the 
praxis of producing in thought that which is encountered in literature-as-thought: 
the non-delimitable common attributed as such.  We thus have four categories with 
which to grapple qua literary absolute negativity: 1) time (its abolition), 2) praxis, 
3) community, and 4) communication (its repudiation).   
 These four categories, for Rancière, produce a relation of equality, a non-
hierarchical modality of thought through which the distribution of the sensible 
becomes reconfigured.  What kind of equality, then, is established qua the literary 
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work and the “random circulation of the written word,” as Rancière calls it?  If 
literature-as-thought and its non-communicative function are non-democratic, what 
form of equality can be thought that does not recapitulate that found in democracy, 
i.e. neoliberal ethical, ideal?  In order to answer this question, we must return to 
Husserl, whose notion of the bipolar phenomenological construction of the 
individual was tied directly to a single question: univocality, which gives an added 
complexity to the very question of the non-delimitable common, and thus to non-
communication and equality, itself.  It will also, accordingly, allow us to grasp the 
full implications of what Rancière calls art’s anticipation of work.  
 
B.  “AN UNBROKEN, COHERENT LIFE” 
 Earlier, I advanced the idea that the Husserlian notions of time and 
community enclose the horizon of phenomenological experience within the present.  
Let us see exactly how this happens.   
 Recall that the two categories, time and community, are contingent upon the 
notion of intentionality, defined earlier as the individual’s investment of a particular 
object with contemplative value.  This intentionality intends, first, the present, and, 
second, the life-world the individual inhabits, such that the community that is 
intended becomes a community of what Husserl called ego-subjects whose shared 
space is the ontic horizon of being.  Husserl, however, posits a world that pre-exists 
intentionality, and which acts as the conceptual ground for all potential 
phenomenological reductions; this is what he calls the “pre-given world,” the ontic 
horizon that encloses all “theoretical” and “practical” activity and is thus the 
“universal field into which all our acts, whether of experiencing, of knowing, or of 
outward action, are directed” and beyond which “[we], the subjects, in our normal, 
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unbroken, coherent life, know no goals.”23  Husserl sets up as a precondition for the 
phenomenological reduction the delimitations of both time and community: what is 
thinkable must be posited in advance as already having an ontic validity, one that 
ensures that the subjects of the reduction maintain their coherence because of the 
universality imputed to what is, to the ontic validity and the ontological security of 
beings and being.  Intentionality thus presupposes a bias against any potential 
negativity that may arise to send the ontology of the individual into a crisis, what 
Husserl calls the “passive synthesis”24 of the life-world by the individual prior to 
the epoché.   
 Moreover, the universality imputed to the pre-given life-world is itself the 
precondition for communication; this universality serves as the conceptual bulwark 
to the notion that the experience of the phenomenological reduction become 
communicable within a given community of ego-subjects inhabiting and sharing the 
same ontic and ontological bearings, namely, that what has been experienced and 
what is experienceable in communication remain universal constants, intelligibility 
and comprehension being impossible without presupposing this universal substrate.  
Understanding is thus premised upon “reproducing” this universal substrate, both 
the idea of the life-world as pre-given horizon and the concrete life-world inhabited 
and created anew through communication, a reproduction that in its turn ensures the 
unity of the community constituted by communication: “In the unity of the 
community of communication among several persons the repeatedly produced 
structure becomes an object of consciousness, not as a likeness, but as the one 
structure common to all.”25  This is the structure of univocality that anchors 
Husserl’s notions of community and communication, and it must constantly be 
                                                
23 Husserl, The Crisis of the European Sciences, 144 (emphasis added).   
24 ibid, 361.  
25 ibid, 360.  
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reproduced.  As Husserl says, this reproduction of univocality consists of making 
“self-evident” what is communicated to the listener or reader “by reactivating its 
meaning.”26  This active production is therefore opposed to passive synthesis, and is 
secondary to it, logically speaking.  
 What we have here, then, is a kind of pact between addressor and addressee, 
a mutual acceptance of the universality of the conceptual ground from which both 
enable communication, which involves turning that which is said or written, and 
then heard or read, into an apodictic object of thought, the outcome of what is 
essentially an agreement within and by the community to recreate the structure of 
relations within the present and its universal givens, the immutable barriers for 
both thought and experience.  
 There are two modes of representation here: the first concerns that of 
passive synthesis, in which the individual represents to him or herself a passively 
accepted notion of the life-world, its representation as horizon, and second that of 
the active production of this life-world as the structure common to all ego-subjects 
within a given community of communicators, of addressors and addressees, in 
which the life-world that springs forth from the passive synthesis and the 
phenomenological reduction it made possible becomes represented to others.  If we 
introduce literature into the equation, as one component of the communicative 
apparatus of this universal structure, we arrive at the same problems we found in 
Iser: namely, the individual’s inability to exceed the limitations of the present, a 
temporality that in its turns affects the notion of community, wherein 
communication happens only by continuously reproducing the self-evidence of 
things as they are––in other words, by recreating the status quo.   
                                                
26 ibid, 361. 
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 We thus have a more complicated version of the diagram given in the first 
section of this chapter.  When introduced into the community, the individual’s 
epoché qua literature, what might be termed a literary epoché, looks like this:  
 
 
                                     communalization of thought / representation2  
(the life-world activated and expressed within the structure of univocality) 
 
 
                    
 
     subject (in time) – literary work                                                          life-world 
    reading process / literary epoché 
                    
 
 
communalized thought / representation1 
(the pre-givenness of the life-world prior to the transcendental reduction/ 
passive synthesis) 
 
Figure 2.  The Constitution of the Reader-Subject  
Within Univocality 
 
 
 To Husserl’s credit, however, the material life-world, as the immense 
presence that surrounds and penetrates us all, is never an a priori thing, but emerges 
from out of a thought process that constitutes the thinking subject along the way, in 
time and within the space of the life-world.  If we take this as our starting point, 
Husserl’s systematic phenomenology can be said to be driven by a single idea: that 
of the univocal, or the immense structure of equality within a community of 
communicators.   
 This is where Rancière’s notion of equality can help us to rethink the 
constitution of the subject such that it becomes thinkable as a political subject, one 
that resides within the community whose constitution in its turn happens in time.  
The objective, in short, is to concretize the relation between the active production of 
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the common qua subjectivity, and vice versa, and its temporal, or rather, non-
temporal, dimensions, the continual production of the common and its non-
delimitability qua the becoming of a subjectivity under the terms of equality––but 
without recapitulating the democratic, neoliberal project.   
 We can accomplish this if we reintroduce into the problem that which 
Husserl denied: absolute negativity.  We saw in Rancière the possibility of thinking 
this negativity along two axes: 1) that of time, where futurality and, by extension, 
pastness disable time’s constitution into a unified field for the communicability of 
literature; and 2) that of space, where literature’s non-communicative function calls 
into question the distribution of the sensible and the partitioning of the community 
into categories of production and consumption.  These two axes depend upon a 
single thing: praxis, the praxis of literature, which a) presents a community that the 
reader must actively produce as a concrete-in-thought against the horizon of the 
present, positing in it an immanence that disrupts its constitution; and b) presents in 
this community the idea of the production of this community itself, the praxis 
involved in creating the idea and presentation of this community.  This is nothing 
less than the praxis of attribution.  In order, then, to understand in what way this 
praxis has as its emblem the equal or the univocal, it necessary to do two things: 
 1.  Remove from Husserl’s communal typology the impulse to suture the  
      rifts and fractures that besiege it. 
 2.  Formulate a theory on how it is possible to still think of univocality,  
      which seems inseparable from the self-evidence of the life-world,  
      especially since the constitutive element in the common is its non- 
      delimitability and its continual opening towards absolute negativity.   
The goal, in short, is to construct a theory of militant univocality.   
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 What follows in the final section of this chapter will be merely a preliminary 
sketch of how to think militant univocality qua literature, since the remaining three 
chapters of this dissertation will concretize and demonstrate this thought in their 
analyses of actual works of literature. 
 
C.  THE COMMUNITY OF PRODUCERS: THE EQUAL 
 We thus have to think a new relation between the equal and univocal and the 
One, that structure of relations Negri posits as the immanent and unmediated 
production of substance by every single one of its attributes which I discussed in the 
Chapter 1.   
 Let us begin by saying that the equal and the univocal must be rethought 
against the One, and instead from the principal perspective of what Badiou calls 
“the Two,” the duality constitutive of a radical break with the status quo, the 
precondition for militant thought and the onset of absolute negativity.27  If thinking 
the Two is an indispensable precondition for thinking militant univocality, how are 
we to conceive of equality when it seems that equality runs counter to positing a 
break, where equality presupposes some level of countability whose repudiation the 
Two sets to work by being the indiscernible of the common?  The answer lies, 
oddly, in the paradox of attribution itself: what is indiscernible is expressible and 
presentable within the consensus, a presentability that exposes the consensus’ 
displacement, but ultimately failed abolition, of absolute negativity, thus revealing 
its vulnerability to being attacked and destroyed by it.   
 What is equal is the subject’s becoming, its capacity to abolish the 
delimitations of the common.  What, then, is common to all within a given militant 
topology?  Every subject’s capacity to think the absolute negativity of their 
                                                
27 See Badiou, Being and Event, 188.  
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axiomatic Filipinization, the undermining––through and through––of their current 
state of being.  What is common, what is equal, is thus double: not only every 
diasporic individual’s capacity to become a subject, which is imposed in this 
thought on absolute negativity, but every individual’s becoming-subject as the 
thought on this becoming’s potentiality, a thought that in itself is tantamount to 
attribution.   
 My thesis is this: that what is common and what is equal is this thought, 
hence, what is equal, through this thought, is the very meaning of praxis itself.  Or 
perhaps it is more accurate to say that what is equalized by this thought is the 
meaning of praxis.  This is exactly what Jauss says of the relationship between 
literature and praxis, the former being capable of transforming the latter because 
what it does is force the subject to rethink what praxis means in the first place––to 
rethink not only what it means to encounter meaning in the literary work, but how 
this encounter is tied to lived praxis.  This connection is secured by attribution, that 
which makes the common’s delimitations impossible, the result of the reader-
subject’s production of the concrete-in-thought of the common whose idea is 
encounterable in the literary work.  If Rancière can say that art anticipates work 
because it transforms sensible matter into the community’s self-presentation, it is 
only insofar as the correlation between art and work is introduced by praxis, whose 
meaning cannot be contained by notions of productive labor alone, but rather in so-
called non-productive labor, including thought itself.   
 The thought encounterable through the literary work, however, is unique, 
because its praxis involves the reconceptualization of praxis, a thought on praxis 
that in this thinking becomes praxis because it draws, as Rancière says, lines of 
affinity between making and seeing––the active production, in other words, of what 
can be seen beyond the normal purviews of the distribution of the sensible, the 
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active production of the non-delimitable common, whose self-presentation is its 
praxis.  The common, moreover, in its self-presentation beyond the distribution of 
the sensible––beyond the status quo and in exceedance of the political consensus––
becomes thinkable in its self-constitution, insofar as the reader-subject that 
produces it in thought does so only to the extent that he or she includes him or 
herself in it, a production in thought that imagines the common in its becoming, in 
its attribution and naming, which coincides with the reader-subject’s own 
becoming, with his or her own attribution and naming.   
 What is encountered in the literary work, then, is this: the community’s self-
constitution, its attribution against the axiomatic.  Praxis is equalized because there 
is no longer any privileged site for struggle; the reconceptualization of praxis qua 
the common’s self-presentation, its production by the reader-subject as concrete-in-
thought, means that thought and politics are united in such a way that the 
presentation of the community is a form of self-constitution tied directly to its 
reproduction against axiomatization, against the State, against Empire, against 
capital, against democracy, and it takes place, as we saw in Chapter 1, wherever 
axiomatization happens and in whatever way.  Literature-as-thought is able to 
induce attribution precisely because it induces the thought on the common from 
whose constitution the reader-subject is inextricable, a presentation and production 
of the non-delimitable common that redefines, against axiomatization, the meaning 
of Filipino itself.  We can call this the militant univocal, the function of literature-
as-thought.  
 Husserl’s life-world, both the represented thing of passive synthesis and the 
reproduced object of the epoché, is thus removed completely; if there is any 
presupposition at all, it is a presupposition of another equality altogether: that of the 
potential, wherever axiomatization happens, for absolute negativity’s eruption.  And 
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if the reader-subject’s thought happens in time, it is not the same kind of time that 
we find in Husserl and in Iser; the reading process, we must say, does not obey a 
phenomenological trajectory, but is rather a series of attributions that accumulate, 
that shift, that slide into one another, that transform, refusing to settle on any stable 
idea of the life-world by drifting over the field of absolute negativity and allowing 
the common to be thinkable during the act of reading, as the reader-subject 
becomes, is constituted by, through, and in the literary work: literature-as-thought.   
 If there is to be any communication at all, what is thinkable is not the 
consensual democratic type we found in Iser and even Husserl.  Communication 
must be non-communication, the non-delimiting capacity of language to 
continuously produce the absolute negativity of the common, its non-delimitability: 
a non-communication whose negativity arises from its continual attribution, its 
continual summoning of subjects against any axiomatization of the Filipino within a 
common thought as a constellation of militancies. 
 The militant univocal, in short, is a new horizon, a horizon of non-being and 
non-knowledge; it is the horizon of self-constitutive power that Negri finds in 
Spinoza.  It is a One that is subordinate to a primary Two, the radical split within 
the political and ontological status quo that conditions the emergence of a possible 
militancy constructed as a univocal immanence, a militant immanence that arises 
from positing in thought an unbridgeable gulf between what is and what is-not: 
absolute negativity, the thought of which is capable of inducing the thought on the 
potentiality of revolution within and as the common, the thought of which is a 
subject’s becoming-Filipino and praxis qua literature-as-thought.   
 The function of the reader-subject is equivalent to thinking futurality 
through historicity, and vice versa, a function of praxis which is the function of 
thinking the function of militancy itself.  What the subject can encounter in 
 148 
literature-as-thought is a way to think his or her becoming-Filipino, conceived as 
the equal potential of every subject’s becoming against axiomatization and under 
the terms of an immanent, diasporic topology.  The attribution that happens in this 
thought is a form of praxis inasmuch as this thought includes itself in its thought on 
the function of militancy, includes itself in its process of attribution and thinks itself 
thusly.  This is why, ultimately, the diaspora, i.e. the constellational diaspora, is 
immanent: because the subject that thinks its potentiality includes him or herself in 
it as its potential actualization and its contemporary realization.  The reader-subject, 
in other words, encounters the constellational diaspora as something that one does 
not wait for: thinking it is already the first step towards its possibility––precisely 
because thinking its possibility is to have already divested oneself of the 
axiomatizations that constrain a Filipino ontology today. 
 The remainder of this dissertation will expand the terms by which this 
reader-subject can emerge.  By no means, then, are the following chapters 
exhaustive of the full potentiality of literature-as-thought.  Rather, they serve to 
enumerate and demonstrate, by way of three novels, three key categories within 
which a reader-subjectivity can be thought.  Respectively, and in correspondence 
with each novel, these categories are: 
 1.  The populist balikbayan (in Tagalog, the one who returns “home” to the 
      Philippines), conceptualized as the literary manifestation of the national-
      popular/popular-democratic subject I have criticized.  This category       
      can be found in F. Sionil José’s Viajero. 
 2.  The “a-militant,” which in this case is also a balikbayan, but who is  
      figured as the extreme opposite of the militant subject I have been  
      describing.  This category can be found in Carlos Bulosan’s All the  
      Conspirators. 
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 3.  The traitor, who can be said to represent the condition of absolute  
      negativity of the State, capital, and Empire, and is thus the category that 
      allows a reader-subject to think the potentiality of the militant   
      univocality of the Filipino diaspora.  This category can be found in  
      Wilfrido Nolledo’s But for the Lovers.   
Accordingly, each novel will, in its own way, represent these categories’ 
relationship to what I defined as the foundational moment of the democratic subject 
against which the militant diasporic Filipino subject must be thought: World War II, 
and the problem of the U.S.’ return to the Philippines as “liberator.”  The following 
three chapters, then, will proceed in a kind of ascending order: first through the 
literary negation of absolute negativity, second through the ironic presentation of a-
militancy, and third through the positive representation of absolute negativity and 
militant univocality as an object of what might be called, to modify my 
terminology, “literary thought.”  
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CHAPTER 5 
VOYAGES OF “THE PEOPLE:” THE BALIKBAYAN AND 
REVOLUTIONARY MORALITY 
 
 
 “. . . the glimmer of light in the distance, the promise of renewal, of rebirth.  Finally I revel in this 
       light, this now where, at last, I’ve also found my real home.” 
                      –––F. Sionil José, Viajero 
 
               “It is indeed the ideal paradigm of modern socialization: I desire to do what I in any case 
                    should have done.” 
                                                                             –––Franco Moretti, The Way of the World 
 
 
 
 
 It is necessary to begin our literary analysis with F. Sionil José’s Viajero 
for one reason: it presents, quite explicitly, the literary attempt to precipitate a 
reader-subject’s emergence by deploying and bending “the rules” of a specific 
literary genre.  Viajero embodies more clearly than either All the Conspirators or 
But for the Lovers the way that literary form is put to the service of securing the 
production of a reader aligned with the political coordinates that contour the 
novel’s “shape.”  The genre in question, and which José modifies (in ways and for 
reasons that will become clear), is the bildungsroman.  
 It is difficult, however, to categorize Viajero.  On the one hand, it follows 
the typology of the classical bildungsroman; on the other, it departs from it 
radically.  In what follows, I will elaborate on this generic ambiguity, the causes 
of which, as we will see, have a lot to do not only with the political function that 
José seems to want to impart to the novel, but also with the way that this function 
itself is highly limited and actually finds its logical impasse in the very form that 
José gives to the novel itself, an impasse that is actually built into the politics of 
narration without which the novel’s function would cease to exist. 
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5.1  FORM AND REVOLUTION 
 
A.  A CLASSICAL BILDUNGSROMAN? 
 Viajero expresses the geopolitical problem with which I began this 
dissertation: how to imagine a topology of revolutionary action within the 
Filipino diaspora.  The ontology that the novel presents is clear: one must become 
a Filipino, but only by returning to the Philippines to fight there.  We have to see 
whether or not this becoming follows the militant becoming-Filipino that I 
elaborated in previous chapters, and if not, what kind of a becoming this entails. 
 The novel revolves around a single protagonist: Salvador de la Raza 
(Savior of the Race, no less), who goes by his nickname Buddy throughout most 
of the novel.  The novel’s narrative proper begins with Salvador’s orphaning: his 
biological parents are caught, during the procession of the Black Nazarene, in a 
rampage of firing Japanese soldiers during the final year of the Occupation 
(1945).  Salvador, having accompanied his parents, is hidden away in a church by 
his father during the chaos, and is then found by an old man called Apo Tale and 
is taken to a remote village in the provinces, where Tale and his wife (Mayang) 
are in their turns attacked, it is implied, by Japanese soldiers.  Salvador flees 
during the attack and is eventually found by a troop of African American soldiers, 
one of whom, James Wack, takes him back to the U.S to live with him in home in 
the Pacific Heights area of San Francisco where he works as a professor of 
anthropology.  Thus begins Salvador’s story, which follows him as he goes to 
college, earns an M.A. and Ph.D. in history, travels to Germany, Spain, Japan, 
Mexico, and the Philippines; meets Benigno Aquino, the assassinated political 
opponent of Ferdinand Marcos and the husband of Marcos’ successor, Corazon 
Aquino; he publishes books and articles in prominent journals (one of his most 
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famous is entitled “Exile and Revolution”); and encounters revolutionaries and 
militants and eventually joins a guerilla squadron, of which he becomes, it is 
implied, the supremo, head organizer and intellectual leader.  He is eventually 
killed by an AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) death squad, burned to death 
in his home, “accidentally” set aflame.  
 This cursory description already hints at Viajero’s bildungsroman-like 
qualities: the novel’s trajectory is essentially plotted by following the life of a 
single individual who acquires his true identity through a gradual process of 
education and self-formation. That Salvador is an orphan only exacerbates this 
search for identity, a search that eventually leads him to contemplate the many 
historically-determined contradictions in which he finds himself––i.e. being 
transplanted from the Philippines to the U.S. and adopted into Wack’s wealth, his 
simultaneous identification (because of his ethnicity) and misidentification 
(because of this wealth, because of his “American-ness”) with Filipinos in the 
Philippines––to his one true home, his genuine ontology: abandoning the U.S. and 
everything it entails (political, economic, and social comfort and safety), he 
becomes the “model Filipino nationalist,” as critic Sharon Delmendo calls it.1  
But this typology per se is not what concerns us; what is of primary importance is 
the way in which this typology, and its modification, can potentially induce, or 
block, the production of a reader-subject.  What, then, is the relation between 
Salvador’s becoming and that of the reader?  Are they parallel becomings or do 
they diverge?   
 
 
                                                
1 Sharon Delmendo, The Star-Entangled Banner: One Hundred Years of America in the 
Philippines (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 142.   
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B.  1789: TIME AND THE SUBJECT 
 Franco Moretti defines the classical bildungsroman as a novel in which 
“the ending and the aim of narration coincide.  The story ends as soon as an 
intentional design has been realized: a design which involves the protagonist and 
determines the overall meaning of events.  The happy ending, in its highest form, 
is not a dubious ‘success,’ but this triumph of meaning over time.”2  Here, as it is 
in Iser, meaning is a function of the reading process; this time, however, it is 
linked to the production of narratological events.  For Moretti, what distinguishes 
the novel as a general narrative form from the short story or the tragedy is that the 
event or “episode” “does not refer back to an objective necessity, but to a 
subjective possibility.  It is that event which could also not have taken place.”  As 
such, the event is “never meaningful in itself.  It becomes so because someone [a 
character, the protagonist] gives it meaning.”  Consequently, the “novelistic plot 
is marked by this curvature toward interiority, which dispenses meaning and 
thereby creates events.”3  The novel’s trajectory is driven by a primary 
focalization, centered on the protagonist, to which the narrative is ultimately 
subordinate.  Events only become significant qua the protagonist’s decisions, qua 
his or her interaction with other characters and the environment, thus producing 
the realm of interiority.  And it is through this interiority that the protagonist 
acquires subject-hood, through which meaning becomes the subjectivated logic of 
the focalization.  In the classic bildungsroman, the novel’s trajectory is aimed at 
the protagonist’s self-creation, with the build-up towards the resolution being 
marked by a series of deferrals and frustrations of the final meaning, where the 
protagonist acquires his or her identity.  This, then, is the way that meaning 
                                                
2 Franco Moretti, The Way of the World: The Bildungsroman in European Culture (2nd ed. Tr. 
Albert Sbragia. New York: Verso, 2000), 55, emphasis added.  
3 ibid, 45 – 6. 
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triumphs over time: the final meaning (the protagonist’s identity) predetermines 
every event in itself but also in its relation to other events––in other words, in 
their diachronic succession.   
 What we have here is the first coordinate of our analysis of the potentiality 
of the reader-subject’s emergence: the subsumption, in the classical 
bildungsroman, of the synchronic by the diachronic, the flow of events being 
logically coordinated towards that end where the protagonist is fully “identified” 
(given an identity).   
 In the terms of the previous chapter’s elaboration of a theory of reader 
response, this means that the reader would be putatively interpellated (in 
Althusser’s sense) by the focalizations that animate the novelistic plot.  Indeed, 
this interpellation had a specific function in the era of the classical 
bildungsroman: as Moretti says, in eighteenth century Germany and England (the 
two countries upon which he focuses his analysis), the “pedagogical ideal . . . 
[substituted] admiration for precocity with the image of a gradual growth, a few 
steps at a time,” which entailed controlling the imagination.4  Since the 
protagonist’s formation was meant to be mirrored by the reader’s own formation,5 
what was the reader to learn from “encountering” the protagonist’s development?  
Moretti’s answer is this: “how the French Revolution could have been avoided.”6   
 At the heart of this pedagogical attempt to resolve the problems of the 
Revolution was the concept of time the latter engendered: if indeed it initiated 
“modernity,” the French Revolution produced the idea of a time that was 
limitless, the protagonist of which lived for the future and was responsible for 
precipitating what Marx called the “permanent revolution” without a conceivable 
                                                
4 ibid, 46.  
5 ibid, 56.  
6 ibid, 64.  
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end, an abrupt rift in social and political life as opposed to gradual growth.7  This 
is why youth was heroized by the novelist’s of the early bildungsroman: it was 
the representation, in narrative form, of the ideal of beginning that modernity 
embodied.  The pedagogical function, however, arises because the 
bildungsroman’s trajectory must by definition track the protagonist’s growth from 
youth to maturity, thus forcing youth’s end, and thus serving to place a block on 
the permanent revolution by positing an end; furthermore, by constructing a telos 
(by allowing meaning to triumph over time), a sense of significative harmony is 
created.   
 Moretti identifies two factors that, when combined, create this novelistic 
harmony: 
  1.  The fact that the classical bildungsroman developed in  
       Germany and England and not France.8  
  2.  The fact that the bildungsroman staked its existence on its 
           inability to leave youth unhampered by maturity and old age, a 
        gradual growth designed to curb the disruptive energies of 
        what was essentially a dangerous precocity.   
I will address each of these factors accordingly. 
 1.  Unlike France, Germany’s and England’s social, political, economic, 
and cultural milieux made it impossible to conceive of the kind of upheaval of 
values witnessed during the French Revolution.  England was enjoying a 
century’s worth of stability after the overthrow of James II during the Glorious 
Revolution, which resulted in the establishment of parliamentary democracy.  The 
case of Germany is a little more ambivalent.  As Stathis Kouvelakis has shown, 
                                                
7 ibid, 5, 60.   
8 ibid, 64.  
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Germany’s most prominent thinkers and artists displayed an irresolvable 
contradiction in their attitudes towards the Revolution: Germany had undergone a 
spiritual and intellectual revolution during the Reformation, a theoretical 
revolution that nonetheless remained unrealized in political freedom.  It therefore 
“lagged” behind France.  Germany, however, did have an advantage: it had 
experienced this revolution inwardly.9  A philosophical and political impasse thus 
emerged, one that can especially be felt in Hegel: if, for the latter, philosophy is 
indeed the embodiment of the Spirit that has been perfected in Germany; if in the 
Spirit’s unfolding it unites with the State and in so doing cancels out the 
contradiction between them and sublates the latter into a new, divine 
transcendence, then it follows that philosophy’s “new rationality” cannot help but 
abandon, despite the fact that its proximity to the Spirit is internal to the historical 
processes that they purportedly animate, the concrete realm of politics and 
history.10  Privileging the revolution in inwardness that Germany had undergone, 
as represented by its most illustrious thinkers, was therefore inseparable from a 
concept of time that would eventually harmonize all aspects of society by 
sublating its cultural and intellectual advances into a transcendent State, a 
sublation, however, that was conceivable only at the expense of politics––a 
politics of rupture, division, and irreconcilable differences, one that exploded all 
timeframes and in so doing created a sense of limitlessness and infinity.    
 2.  This political harmonization affects the bildungsroman in the following 
way: this harmony requires of the novel that it produce a novelistic interiority, an 
ideal subject-hood embodied by a protagonist who recognizes this harmony as the 
order of things, and in so doing focalizes the reader’s perspective in such a way 
                                                
9 Stathis Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx (Tr. G.M. Goshgarian. New 
York: Verso, 2003), 32.  
10 ibid, 43.  
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that the pedagogical function of the novel and its philosophical core are actualized 
qua the reader’s identification with the protagonist, or what I will term the reader-
protagonist identification axis.  This returns us to the question of the episode or 
the event and the subjective possibility that gives it meaning.  The novelistic 
episode is characterized by the relative flattening of what can be represented and 
narrated; the most mundane and quotidian experiences can become the most 
significant events to the protagonist, but only insofar as he or she invests it with 
the meaning that arises from his or her interiority, his or her subjective response 
to the situation, his or her judgment.   
 This interiority has significant consequences: the bildungsroman 
squelches in narrative form the contradictions that eighteenth-century liberal 
thought sought to resolve: namely, the problem of the State’s relation to civil 
society.  The former’s job was to punish crimes and conduct wars but not 
intervene in the “free and harmonious formation of the individual;” the State was 
thus thought to be external to the operations of civil society, the domain of those 
“spontaneous and concrete bonds” inherent to self-government and the harmony 
of the normal course of everyday life.   
 This division between the State and civil society, however, is maintained 
at the expense of establishing forms of micro-surveillance and control: “Only 
where the causes of conflict have already been removed from the start is there no 
need for repression.”11  The site of this removal was the inwardness so prevalent 
in the German philosophical mind, a transcendent space that could indeed be 
described as harmonious only to the extent that the conflict between the State and 
civil society could be effaced by a much more insidious form of repression––that 
is, by an inwardness that sees itself as having mended the rift because it has 
                                                
11 Moretti, 52 – 3.  
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already been interpellated by the State, because it has shown that it can 
successfully police itself.  
 Here, we see a fundamental component of the classical bildungsroman’s 
form of interiority: the subject-hood that the protagonist embodies, the narrative’s 
“curvature” towards an inner life that makes events what they are, and his or her 
ability to construct his or her identity, is actually symptomatic of eighteenth-
century liberal thought’s requirement that civil society internalize control.  This 
internalization of control, this self-policing conflated with self-creation, is 
thoroughly contingent upon the novelistic episode, and vice versa: the concept of 
daily life that marks the flattened domain of the classical bildungsroman (as 
opposed to tragedy, as Moretti says), and within which the protagonist’s 
investment of things with meaning happens, needs a milieu in which social 
relationships are left undisturbed.  The harmonious functioning of civil society 
ensures that the protagonist can pass through safely and acquire an identity, 
something that a revolutionary situation, in which hierarchies, socio-political 
values, and the consensus are forced into a crisis, cannot guarantee.12   
 Such is the classical bildungsroman’s method of constructing narrative 
temporality: once meaning’s production is secured, the gradual flow of time can 
begin uninterrupted, a time that, nonetheless, is purely apodictic––that is, a time 
that is overcome by the meaning, i.e. the protagonist’s ultimate destiny, that is 
posited from the start.  This meaning, secured by the elaboration of interiority, 
this curvature towards an inner life that grants to the protagonist the gift of self-
reflection and by extension self-constitutivity, is thus nothing more than the 
literary counterpart of liberal thought’s self-policing function.  A society of 
                                                
12 ibid, 54.  
                                                                                                                                 
 159 
control is filtered through the protagonist’s identity, submitted thoroughly to the 
diachronic axis without whose support the novel would fall apart.   
 This is where Moretti’s first factor dovetails with his second: the State, 
either by being sublated by Spirit or by being placed at a distance from civil 
society, is exonerated, it is expunged from thought; what is left is a concept of 
politics that preserves the status quo by opting against revolutionary rupture and 
for gradual change within civil society alone.  But this change is impossible: if 
civil society exists only to police itself, what we have is the same problem we 
encountered in Chapter 1, i.e. that the failure for politics (radical or otherwise) to 
base itself on rupture or absolute negativity ends up doing nothing more than 
reshuffling the terms by which civil society understands itself and constitutes its 
topology.  The pedagogical function of the classical bildungsroman is now much 
clearer: its job is to interpellate a reader by focalizing his or her perspective 
through that of the protagonist’s path towards self-discovery.  The classical 
bildungsroman is a literary form that requires the reader’s complicity in 
recreating the form of self-policing characteristic of liberalism.  In so doing, the 
reader is invited to accept the terms by which subject-hood is secured:   
  a.  gradual change vs. a radical break;   
  c.  the apodicticity of time vs. the uncertainty of an infinite  
          revolutionary sequence; and 
  c.  the fullness of meaning vs. the void of revolution. 
The classical bildungsroman aims to create reader-subjects subordinate to the 
status quo, the consensus, the police, power, the State.   
 It is now time to see how Viajero, as a bildungsroman, fits into this 
ontological paradigm. 
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5.2  A HISTORY OF BETRAYALS 
 
A.  A REVOLUTIONARY TRAJECTORY 
 The narrative temporality of Viajero, and, concomitantly, Salvador’s self-
formation, is propelled by a single thing: Salvador’s gradual acquisition of the 
knowledge of Philippine history, its diasporic history.  As he travels throughout 
the world, searching for his identity (but also prompted by his studies and 
graduate research), he comes across a number of figures, both fictional and 
historical, both in person and in archival documents, who ultimately push him 
towards his final decision to “become” Filipino.  (I will henceforth place 
Salvador’s “becoming” in quotes to distinguish it from the kind of becoming I 
have been describing, i.e. a becoming under the force of attribution.)  I will 
enumerate these figures in the order in which their stories are revealed to both 
Salvador and the reader: 
 1.  Parbangon, a datu from the pre-Spanish days, whose story Salvador 
finds in a translated Chinese document in Chicago’s Newberry Library and which 
recounts Rang-ay’s (Parbangon’s daughter) elopement with a rival Chinese 
merchant and whose child Parbangon poisons (and buries in a plot far from “the 
honored dead” of the Daya, his people) in order to secure the (racial and ethnic) 
“honor” and “lasting peace” of the Daya.13   
 2. Robert Scapini, professor of anthropology and adviser of Salvador’s 
dissertation, and James Anders, another of Salvador’s anthropology professors, 
both of whom encourage Salvador to travel to Mexico in order to do research on 
the relation between the Spain and the Philippines vis-à-vis Mexico,14 where 
                                                
13 F. Sionil José, Viajero (3rd ed. Manila: Solidaridad, 2004), 48.  
14 ibid, 56.  
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Spain established the Real y Supremo Consejo de Indias (1524) as the 
administrative organ of its empire and thus through which the Americas and the 
Philippines were ruled.  This prompts Salvador to write his dissertation, entitled 
“Revolutionary Nationalism: The Philippines and Mexico.” 
 3.  José Rizal, who is mentioned for the first time in the novel (aside from 
Rizal’s poem, “Song of the Wanderer,” which serves as a framing device for 
Viajero and which I will discuss below in 5.2 B) during Salvador’s travels 
through Germany and a copy of whose poem, “To the Flowers of Heidelberg,” 
the mayor of Wilhelmsfeld, where a monument of Rizal stands, gives to 
Salvador.15   
 4.  Maisog, a Cebuano seaman aboard one of the ships of the Spanish 
galleon captained by Ferdinand Magellan, whose accounts Salvador finds in 
Seville’s Archivo General de Indios depict, through Maisog’s eyes, the killing of 
Magellan and his soldiers and sailors by Maktan (an island in the Cebu province) 
warriors under the command of the chieftain Lapu-Lapu in 1521.16   
 5.  Geronimo Piedad and her father, both of whom reside in Seville, the 
former a scholar of the galleons from the University of Mexico and resident of the 
same house in which Salvador stays during his visit to the city, and the latter a 
former commander of a galleon ship and who grants Salvador access to his 
office’s many archives.17 
 6.  Francisco Leandro de Viana, a sailor aboard the Santa Teresita, a ship 
on the Spanish galleon, who recounts the story of the death of all but seven 
passengers (five Spaniards, seven Indios, i.e. the indigenous residents of the 
Philippines, cf. 1.2 on the history of the status of the category “Filipino”) from an 
                                                
15 ibid, 64 – 6.  
16 ibid, 79 – 87.  
17 ibid, 96 – 9.   
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attack of small pox while at sea, a story meant, like Maisog’s, to attest to the 
Indios’ strength, courage, and perseverance through colonization and 
exploitation.18 
 7.  Father Jack Macher, a Jesuit scholar researching the Propaganda 
movement in the Archivo, where he and Salvador meet.  Through Father Jack, 
Salvador begins to ruminate on one of the ilustrados exiled in Spain, Marcelo del 
Pilar, editor of the Spain-based ilustrado organ La Solidaridad and one-time 
friend of Rizal.19 
 8.  Del Pilar himself, whose story Salvador fictionalizes in hopes of being 
confirmed “in the future” by historians.20  The story focuses on del Pilar’s 
personal and economic struggles while in exile, on the efficacy of his anti-
colonial publishing activities when Filipinos (now referring to the erstwhile 
“Indios”) at “home” were “always living in danger.”21  We will see that this query 
is actually more of a reflection of Salvador’s own feelings about his sense of 
privilege vis-à-vis the Philippines and Filipinos. 
 9.  Old Tele, an Ilocano and former worker in the canefields of Hawaii, 
the salmon canneries of Alaska, and orange orchards of California and whom 
Salvador meets earlier in the narrative after being reminded, in uncanny fashion, 
of Apo Tale.  Old Tele, before dying, leaves Salvador a chest full of old clothes, 
notes, and letters; Salvador, knowing that “there was no justice for people like 
Old Tele,” decides that he “should make use of them now,”22 thus providing the 
reader with Old Tele’s story (told through his own voice), from the time he leaves 
the Philippines for America to work in Hawaii to his days in California, to his 
                                                
18 ibid, 100 – 09.  
19 ibid, 110 – 14.  
20 ibid, 114.  
21 ibid, 115 – 21.  
22 ibid, 129.  
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decision, after a visit to the Philippines, to return to California to help the Filipino 
field workers there, where he begins to record, in essay form, and with the help 
and encouragement of an American female companion, Laura (who echoes the 
white female figures in Carlos Bulosan’s America is in the Heart––Marian, 
Eileen, Teresa), his struggles as a laborer.23 
 10.  Artemio Ricarte, the erstwhile Chief of Operations of the Filipino 
forces during the Philippine-American war who was deported to Hong Kong by 
the Americans after refusing to swear allegiance after the Philippines’ defeat.  
During World War II, he supported the Japanese and celebrated them as the 
islands’ Asian “liberators” from American imperialism, and whose opinions and 
justification for his support of the Japanese Salvador transcribes (in first person) 
after he reads a master’s thesis and dissertation on Ricarte from Tokyo University 
while visiting the city.24 
 11.  Vladmir Ilych Acosta, a Filipino who has worked as a cook on a 
Philippine-owned and Panama registered ship; at an American owned oil 
refinement and pipe laying company in Saudi Arabia; at a hotel in Dhubai; on a 
Norwegian freighter; on a Japanese ship that carries containers from North 
America to Japan; and finally as an illegal worker in Tokyo, where he is hired as 
a cook for the house in which Salvador is staying.  While there, Salvador hears 
Acosta’s stories of his many jobs, which, as presented to both Salvador and the 
reader, contours the geopolitical situation of the Filipino diaspora from the 
laborer’s perspective.25   
 12.  Chika, the proprietress of the house in Tokyo, who ends up telling 
Salvador about her father, a head officer in the Philippines’ Fort Santiago (used as 
                                                
23 ibid, 130 – 37.  
24 ibid, 156 – 63.  
25 ibid, 178 – 90.   
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a prison during the Japanese Occupation), and his brutal stories (recounted to 
Chika through letters) about torturing Filipino prisoners.  During Chika’s story, 
she offers clues to what turns out to be a stunning twist of the plot: namely, that 
Salvador’s orphaning and her father’s death are indirectly related.  While at a bar 
with a junior officer, her father is shot by a Filipino guerilla, the Japanese reaction 
to which was to seal off the area, in addition to arresting random men and 
blanketing the streets with gunfire, the very same rampage in which Salvador’s 
parents were caught.26 
 13.  Benigno Aquino, Ferdinand Marcos’ political opponent and husband 
to Marcos’ successor, Corazon Aquino, who is assassinated by a Marcos 
supporter on the tarmac of the Manila International airport in 1983.  Salvador 
meets Aquino while both are in Honolulu, Salvador introducing himself to the 
latter after a speech he gives at the University of Hawaii on the death of the 
American dream of democracy.  Salvador learns that Aquino knows of Salvador 
through his essay, “Exile and Revolution,” a revised segment of his dissertation 
published in Asian Journal, in addition to one of his books on revolutionary 
nationalism.  Salvador is advised by Aquino, in another meeting later that year, to 
return to the Philippines because he “can do so much to help.”  “We need you,” 
Aquino tells Salvador, “America does not.”27 
 14.  Three contacts in the Philippines whose names and addresses Aquino 
had given to Salvador at their last meeting: Father Jess, a priest in Manila’s 
Tondo slum, who, for the first time, confronts Salvador with the idea of 
“becoming” Filipino and leaving his “academic dilettantism behind,” “to be a part 
of this brutalized nation;”28 Professor Hortenso, who was “disappeared” by the 
                                                
26 ibid, 192 – 5; see also 224 for the complete disclosure of this connection.   
27 ibid, 198 – 205.  
28 ibid, 215.  
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Marcos regime for his activism and thus never appears in the narrative;29 and 
finally Leo Mercado, a former Huk guerilla and father of Namnama (Ilocano for 
“hope”), with whom Salvador eventually falls in love. 
 15.  And finally Pepe Samson, protagonist of the last installment of José’s 
five-novel Rosales Saga, Mass, who, at the end of the novel, flees to the 
mountains to join the guerillas.  Pepe leads him through the streets of Manila 
during EDSA, those four days of relatively peaceful revolution that hastened 
Marcos’ downfall, and poses him the following question: “So we will get rid of 
Marcos, but will we also get rid of all the powerful Filipinos who have enslaved 
us?”30  He also takes Salvador to the mountains to show him the conditions of the 
rural areas, where his constant interrogations challenge Salvador to radically 
question, in ways the he had never done before, both his search for an identity and 
the problems his wealth and privilege pose to that quest.31    
 If this catalogue of events and people has been laborious in its 
presentation, its purpose has been to give an indication of the novel’s episodic 
structure and its ideological function: the novel reads as a compendium of these 
events and experiences, through which Salvador, the balikbayan, finally attains 
his identity.  In particular, the last three figures––Leo, Namnama, and Pepe––
form a kind of triumvirate that initiates Salvador’s genuine “homecoming.”  The 
reader is brought along this journey from the pre-Spanish days to the present (in 
this case, the year or so after Marcos’ ouster).  Over half a millennium is given as 
evidence of a number of the following: the Filipino’s resilience against 
oppression and exploitation, as well as the Filipino’s defining role in the political 
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economies of its imperial rulers, from Spain and its galleons to the U.S. and the 
global capital of which it maintains hegemony.   
 
B.  THE RETURN “HOME” 
 These episodes, however, function in two critical and interrelated ways.  
The first is to educate both Salvador and the reader: the lesson is that the Filipino 
is resilient, the lesson is that the Filipino is “the proletariat of the world,” the 
message that Salvador wants to convey in recounting Acosta’s story.32  Gradually, 
Salvador begins to feel that these stories are “needed.”   
 Before discussing this need, however, I should introduce a feature of 
Viajero whose discussion I have thus far been deferring: namely, that the novel 
begins, even before the narrative of Salvador’s orphaning, with an account of 
Salvador’s murder by Simplicio Verdad, the colonel of the AFP death squad 
responsible for his death.  Functioning as a prologue, Verdad tells of his 
admiration for Salvador’s immense intellect, comparing the latter’s book on 
revolutionary nationalism to Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.  After 
recounting the AFP’s surveillance methods and the events leading to the fire that 
kills Salvador (caused by two low-flying flares meant to illuminate the village), 
Verdad tells of how he finds a fire-proof box, the contents of which consist of 
Salvador’s memoirs, entitled, as can be guessed, Viajero.   
 Viajero is Salvador’s narrative of a) his “becoming-Filipino” and 
“becoming-revolutionary,” and b) the means by which he achieves this becoming, 
which he wants to then impart to the reader as such: the episodes are presented in 
such a way as to be chronologically descriptive of Salvador’s growth while also 
instructive for the reader, who shares in the intellectual and (hopefully) political 
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growth that Salvador himself has undergone.  This is the focalizing power of 
Viajero.  But because this pedagogical function is initiated by Verdad’s prologue, 
the novel’s ultimate meaning, in the sense given by Moretti, is predetermined: we 
know from Verdad that Salvador will eventually become a guerilla leader, that 
indeed his search for an identity becomes a success in the end.  Moreover, the fact 
that Verdad is an AFP colonel is significant: the predetermination of meaning is 
successful in this case only because of an essential contingency––Salvador’s 
death.  That Verdad says that he and his men had never meant to kill Salvador is 
only incidental; what is significant is that Salvador’s death makes Viajero’s 
existence possible.  Salvador’s becoming, and the narrative that both describes it 
and pedagogically communicates its messages to the reader, is thus a becoming 
framed by the disappearance of the protagonist, a becoming that, once the ideal 
Filipino nationalist has been born, destroys him; Salvador, from the start of the 
novel, is already dead, a death, however, that in itself would have been impossible 
were it not for his becoming.   
 We should recall at this point Moretti’s classification of the 
bildungsroman as a narrative form that prescribes, in its symptomatic 
ideologizing against the French Revolution, a necessary end to youth, to growth: 
only in this way can the novel curb the sense of limitlessness the Revolution 
engendered.  The end in Viajero, however, has another function altogether: what 
the reader encounters is not a definitive end, but, in reading the novel, the 
continuation of Salvador’s life––in narrative form––in spite of his death.  Viajero 
reverses the classical bildungsroman’s injunction against infinitude by positing 
the recurrence of life every time the novel is read.  The prologue, then, seems to 
function only as the enabler of what might be called Viajero’s recurrent structure 
and form, its folding back on itself in the continual regeneration of a life that 
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persists, as all revolutions must.  Indeed, this is the meaning behind Salvador’s 
contemplation of Samson’s question about resistance: once Marcos is gone, what 
next?  Filipinos will still have to continue their struggle and combat the next 
despot, the next exploiter, the next imperial puppet.   
 This brings us to the second function of Viajero’s episodic character: they 
introduce the idea that the Filipino persists in spite of a history of betrayals and 
attempts at crushing his or her pride and honor.  This is why the novel is initiated 
and made possible by a colonel of the AFP and not, for instance, a guerilla to 
whom Salvador entrusts his documents.  The spite that runs throughout Viajero 
and forms a large part of its politics is introduced from the very beginning: even a 
colonel of a death squad cannot help but admire this revolutionary; even a 
betrayer of the genuine nationalism that Viajero proposes is not immune to the 
power of revolutionary sentiment––both in content and form, as discussed above.    
 We can now return to Salvador’s need to tell stories, his imperative, in 
short.  This need not only anchors the pedagogical impetus of Viajero; it also 
gives this pedagogy its ideological weight.  Salvador feels it necessary to recount 
the stories he encounters because they indicate a consistent political vision of 
national liberation that persists alongside the oppression of foreigners as well as 
the betrayals of Filipinos, from the ilustrados, to Artemio Ricarte (who is 
nonetheless, because of his vehemence towards American imperialism, treated 
with sympathy), the wartime collaborators, the landowners and the rich, 
bureaucrats and politicians like Marcos and Aquino, and Verdad himself––
examples that are too numerous to cite, scattered as they are throughout the entire 
narrative.  The important point is that this need arises out of an essential 
teleological vision, without which the idea of betrayal would be objectless and 
thus impossible.  The destiny here, of course, is the destiny to which Salvador 
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ends up devoting his life: a Philippines liberated from all colonialisms, both 
external and internal, whose actualization is attainable through the form of 
nationalism embodied by Salvador himself.   
 Let us pause here and recall the two most significant aspects of Viajero’s 
recurrent structure and form, that is, the manner in which the narrative’s 
temporality manifests itself: 
 1.  that its predetermined meaning, Salvador’s destiny as genuine Filipino 
      revolutionary, overturns the temporality constitutive of the classical 
      bildungsroman by positing the limitlessness of the protagonist’s 
      becoming and by extension revolutionary struggle; and  
 2.  that this predetermined meaning also posits as a precondition for its 
      pedagogical and ideological core Salvador’s imperative, which  
      introduces in its turn a narrative telos, at the end of which is  
      Salvador’s “becoming-Filipino” and his recognition and acceptance of 
      the meaning of true revolutionary struggle. 
These two aspects express a fundamental contradiction in Viajero’s temporal 
“order,” an order that is the result of the unity of two different domains altogether 
(though these are not necessarily respective to the temporalities given above):  
 1.  that of the political and historical, in which the idea that the  
      Philippines’ liberation has been constantly thwarted by a sequence of 
      events (the Philippine-American War, the Japanese Occupation and the 
      U.S. return, the more than century-long capitulation of Filipino  
      politicians to foreign, mainly U.S., interests) has been accompanied by 
      an equally astounding history of resistance; and  
 2.  the novelistic and generic, in which the bildungsroman, the only form 
      proper to both José’s politics and the pedagogical function of Viajero, 
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      requires that the novel “end” in the way it does, that its telos be  
      predetermined throughout.   
Salvador’s death thus contains both of these domains and the temporalities 
specific to each: it produces both the impossibility of conceiving of time as a 
linear process with an end, since reading the novel implicates the reader in what is 
an essential resurrection, and the predeterminations to which narrative meaning is 
secured.   
 In Viajero, then, time is both infinite and apodictic.  Moreover, both 
domains are symptomatic of much larger political and conceptual impasses.  The 
classical bildungsroman, as we saw, in its English and German forms, wanted to 
quell the dangerous energies of the French Revolution, opting to represent gradual 
growth instead of rupture, the full intelligibility of time over its opaque infinitude, 
and the attainment of full meaning rather than the plunge into a revolutionary 
void.  The concept of what may be called a “Philippine revolutionary time,” 
however, is much more complex, since it contains both temporalities within itself.  
That Philippine liberation has been betrayed is a notion conducive to both the idea 
of a “permanent revolution” and an apodictic time: on the one hand, the 
continuity of revolt seems never-ending, expressive as it is of the transformations 
that political struggle must always affect in the face of the new forms of 
oppression and exploitation; on the other hand, the politics that imagines this 
liberation, as depicted by Viajero, is always a politics based on what I referred to 
in Chapter 1 as the national-popular/popular-democratic struggle, the hegemonic 
form of politics that prescribes the reordering of the status quo instead of positing 
a revolutionary void, an absolute negativity, from which militancy can begin.   
 But there is something else here: this politics requires that the Philippines 
be maintained as an identificatory axis and positivity: the question of diasporic 
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resistance in Viajero disappears altogether; Salvador’s homecoming is nothing if 
not a repudiation of the possibility of becoming-Filipino since, for José, a genuine 
political ontology requires first that one “become” Filipino in the most literal of 
senses––that is, by being in the Philippines, thus guaranteeing one’s ethno-
political identity.   
 What I described earlier as the self-policing mechanism of the form of the 
classical bildungsroman thus holds true for Viajero: in this case, however, what is 
policed and ultimately jettisoned from thought is the possibility of absolute 
negativity qua Filipino diasporic militancy; and although I will devote more time 
to this self-policing function qua the reader-subject in the following subsection, I 
will mention for the moment that the national-popular/popular-democratic ethos, 
when serving as the ideological and political bulwark to a narrative, produces the 
following result: a politics based upon the inability to imagine anything beyond 
the protagonist’s final enthrallment to the Philippines, a protagonist who is 
ultimately still embedded in that cult of individuality that the classical 
bildungsroman so successfully deployed in order to crush the idea of a militant 
negativity.  In a word, the self-policing function manages to find its way back into 
José’s novel, presented this time as that positivity called the Philippines, a politics 
that is a politics of the State, which, in a narrative focalized around the kind of 
revolutionary nationalist represented by Salvador, interpellates the reader and 
turns him or her into the perfect subordinate, the reader enthralled to the call of 
the State and the police.    
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C.  POSITING TIME 
 This is not to say, however, that Viajero does not modify this particular 
aspect of the classical bildungsroman.  Let us see just how far the novel departs 
from the genre. 
 The most important modification occurs at the level, no less, than the 
function of the protagonist’s individuality, of his relation to his socio-political 
environment.  This modification has to do with the complex dynamic between the 
individual and the common.   
 During one of Salvador’s and Samson’s meetings, on their first excursion 
together in the mountains, Salvador, discerning Samson’s intelligence, wonders 
whether or not he was being “haunted by the same thoughts that had badgered 
him.”  Salvador then asks Samson the following question, which, though he 
thinks it is a cliché, is nonetheless an important one “if only so that the path ahead 
for him would be more clear:” “Have you ever thought about who you are, where 
you are going––you know, that question about identity which so many are 
asking?  I ask because, if you must know, this is one reason why I have returned . 
. .”  Here is the exchange that subsequently takes place between Salvador and 
Samson: 
     Pepe Samson was silent for a while, then he laughed silently, the 
  laughter turning into a patronizing cackle which Buddy resented. 
     “You academics, you Americans––you are no different from out 
  middle-class Filipinos wondering about who they are.  Did it ever 
  occur to you that this is a kind of luxury you are indulging in?” 
     Buddy resented being made fun of.  “It is a real problem, not a 
  luxury,” he said hotly.  “It gnaws at the spirit, diminishes a man’s 
  worth if he does not know who he is . . .” 
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     “That’s a lot of crap, Professor,” Pepe Samson said, then  
  immediately apologized.  “I am sorry, but look at me, I have no 
  time to ask such questions.  None of us bother with that.  We all 
  know who we are, what we are trying to do, where we are headed.  
  I think it is those who have all the leisure, who are not concerned 
  with society or people––they are the ones who have that problem.” 
     Buddy let the words sink in.  They were a challenge,  description 
  of what he was and even now, what he had always been, a voyeur, 
  a spectator. 
     “I am Jose Samson, I come from a small village in Pangasinan.  I 
  am Ilokano but, above all else, I am Filipino.  I am also certain it is 
  here, in my suffering country, where I will die.  It really is as 
  simple as that.”33 
Up until this point, Salvador’s quasi-existentialist pretensions and musings have 
remained unchallenged; up until this point, the path towards individual growth 
and enlightenment followed the course and logic of the classical bildungsroman.  
What, then, happens here, a crucial turning point in the novel’s elaboration of a 
political ontology?   
 The answer is this: an overturning of the very meaning of the individual 
itself, of the terms by which it is defined, contoured, and produced within the 
narrative’s internal logic, the narrative’s presentation of the individual’s 
“becoming” along the axis of meaning, which predetermines and ensures the 
“eventfulness” (the protagonist’s investment of the episode with personal 
significance) of the sequences that comprise the narrative. Here, Verdad’s 
prologue becomes important again.  If indeed it is the first indicator of what I 
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called Viajero’s recurrent structure and form, positing as it does the permanence 
of revolutionary struggle, it is also, because it predetermines the novel’s ultimate 
meaning (Salvador’s “becoming-Filipino”), the indicator of what is an essentially 
transformed concept of the individual qua the common: it delimits in advance 
who counts as “the people” and who counts as the betrayers––respectively, the 
revolutionary and the poor and the State and those who serve its interests––thus 
introducing into the social an essential rift, on each side of which is an ontology 
that Salvador must choose, a choice that, however, has already been made.   
 As Moretti says, the classical bildungsroman was concerned with “the 
conflict between the ideal of self-determination and the equally imperious 
demands of socialization,”34 and that this conflict was resolved by uniting the 
individual with the socio-political reaction against the French Revolution and 
turning him or her into the perfect citizen who polices him or herself, the 
individual who has internalized State control.  The protagonist’s logic, his or her 
choices and thus the meanings that he or she introduces into the narrative, thus 
aligns itself with this imperative, the “ideal paradigm of modern socialization,” as 
Moretti calls it: “I desire to do what I in any case should have done.”35  Of course, 
Salvador is not made to obey the social, if we think of the social as that domain 
where the State guards itself against any potential revolution.  As we saw, 
however, Viajero is focalized around Salvador’s arrival at the conclusion that the 
events he depicts and the stories he tells are necessary; he too is operating 
according to some imperative.   
 But what exactly is this imperative?  If we take into consideration 
Viajero’s contradictory temporality, then it becomes clear that Salvador’s choices 
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are not only made in advance for him, hence time’s apodicticity; they are also 
more importantly an index to the much larger question of what kind of a 
socialization produces this imperative that preempts choice in the first place.  If 
the social space that the narrative posits from the start is already split between the 
revolutionaries and the betrayers, then the social space of Viajero is the social 
space of a revolutionary community.  The individual imperative is thus the 
imperative of what, for now, I will simply call the common, though this by no 
means equates the common of Viajero to the common I discussed in Chapter 1.  
Indeed, my objective in this subsection is to determine whether or not these two 
versions of the common are compatible.  Viajero’s common is one that is opposed 
to the civil society of the State, whose ideal individual is Verdad, the ultimate 
counterpart to Salvador.   
 We thus have a binary: the State and the betrayer versus the revolutionary 
common, or the tao (the “people”), and the revolutionary nationalist.  And it is 
through this binary that the reader becomes interpellated into the narrative and 
its pedagogical function.  But this is not an interpellation that happens without 
acknowledging, despite the imperative that animates it, the ideal of self-creation, 
that other node on Moretti’s bipolar concept of modern socialization.  The 
individual, and by extension the reader, is presented with the idea that the 
common, the tao, contains within itself the potential for revolutionary action.  As 
Georg Lukács has said, one important feature in the classical bildungsroman’s 
structural peculiarity is that the protagonist be “chosen” “accidentally:” “the hero 
is picked out of an unlimited number of men who share his aspirations, and is 
places at the centre of the narrative only because his seeking and finding reveal 
the world’s totality most clearly.”36  This is the situation in which Salvador finds 
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himself.  His journey is made possible only because of a sequence of 
uncontrollable events: it could have been any child, it could have been anyone 
caught in the gunfire that took the lives of his parents.  And yet, this is not an 
entirely contingent sequence: because the circumstances surrounding that day 
during the procession of the Black Nazarene were revealed gradually, they 
partially lose their contingent character by being included in every other event to 
which Salvador gives meaning.   
 A series of interrelated contradictions and apparently incompatible axes is 
starting to reveal itself: 
 1.  that of time, i.e. the apodictic and the infinite;  
 2.  that of the relation between individual self-determination and the 
      pressures or demands of the social, or the common; and 
 3.  that of the relation between Salvador’s imperative and the  
      contingencies of his being “chosen.” 
They all coincide in a remarkable way, and for the following reason: they produce 
the idea of a never-ending process of Filipino resistance whose intelligibility 
arises from the concept of betrayal, a betrayal that, once recognized, posits an 
inherent split within the social as a whole and thus creates two distinct political 
and ontological camps––that of the State and that of the common, the tao.   
 This is where the mechanism that interpellates the reader becomes 
obvious: by focalizing the narrative through the revolutionary nationalist, a 
viewpoint and a perspective are created, one that produces the division within the 
social, the idea of an inherent rift whose recognition in its turn makes it possible 
to think of revolution.  The reader is invited to make choices, which are focalized 
through those that Salvador himself must make as he encounters the same 
material, stories, and people that the reader encounters along with him.  The 
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reader is thus interpellated into this process of discernment, which is nothing less 
than the production of the meaning of revolution, the decision-making process 
concerning what realizing the Philippines’ national liberation entails.  The reader, 
in this way, is interpellated as yet another potentiality, a potentiality that arises 
by being focalized through the potentiality that is Salvador and his 
“accidentality.”  The tension between contingency and the narrative imperative 
dissolve here when the pedagogical function is taken into account: he or she, like 
Salvador, is provided with the chance to recognize his or her own potential 
contribution to revolutionary nationalism. 
 This revolutionary nationalism, however, is a highly specific kind, 
because the reader that is marked as a potentiality is the reader from the diaspora, 
the reader who finds him or herself outside of the Philippines and who is 
delimited in his or her own right according to the logic of the ultimate ontological 
horizon prescribed by the narrative: that of the balikbayan as revolutionary 
nationalist, that of the diasporic revolutionary nationalist as balikbayan, that of 
the diasporic Filipino who returns home in order to fully “become” Filipino.  
Every potentiality is a potentiality of the “return,” of the choice to go back to the 
Philippines in order to fight there.  Every choice, then, is preempted by a principal 
nationalism; the apparent freedom that arises from the narrative’s flow of events 
is only an effect of what is a basic, fundamental, and immutable sequence meant 
to ensure the interpellation of the reader as a potentiality of the kind of delimited 
political ontology embodied by Salvador.    
 To recall: the militant univocal, a new horizon of non-being and non-
knowledge, the horizon of self-constitutive power that Negri finds in Spinoza, is a 
One subordinate to a primary Two.  This radical split within the political and 
ontological status quo that conditions the emergence of a possible militancy 
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constructed as a univocal immanence is a militant immanence that arises from 
positing in thought an unbridgeable gulf between what is and what is-not: 
absolute negativity, the thought of which is capable of inducing the thought on the 
potentiality of revolution within and as the common, the thought of which is a 
subject’s becoming-Filipino and praxis qua literature-as-thought.   
 On the surface, this formulation shares many similarities with Viajero’s 
politics: the radical split in the social, the idea of an immanent revolutionary 
potentiality, the production of this potentiality qua literature.  These similarities, 
however, are of course merely superficial.  The key is the differences in the way 
that the One is brought in relation to the Two.   
   In Viajero, the One, the common or the tao to which Salvador in the end 
comes “home,” is united to the Two, signaled by the radical split in the social 
space announced in Verdad’s prologue.  They are inseparable because the politics 
of the return, of the balikbayan posited as the only genuine political ontology, 
requires, for its pedagogical function, that the common be delimitable as such: it 
is a wholly apodictic ontological horizon that surrounds the subject (both 
Salvador and the reader) who, presented with the split, with the Two, has to 
choose between either side, a choice that, because every story, every figure, and 
every occurrence is preempted by the meaning of Salvador’s becoming (as well as 
that of the reader-subject’s), will always arrive at the One, the One that is also the 
point of departure.  Viajero, in other words, begins by uniting the One and the 
Two, and proceeds from there to focalize the reader through Salvador’s 
actualization of this unity’s political consequences: his accession to the political 
ontology of the revolutionary nationalist.   
 This initial unity between the One and the Two thus affects the narrative 
in such a way that the time of Viajero aligns itself with the production of 
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knowledge; the stories I enumerated above are nothing if not a sequence of things 
to be learned by the reader.  Although these stories are not presented in 
historically chronological order (Chika’s World War II story comes after Acosta’s 
contemporary one, for instance), they do create a kind of matrix through which 
history––or rather, Philippine History and its teleological thrust––is defined by 
the individual’s personal history, i.e. Salvador’s––the focalizing power of the 
protagonist swallows the history of the common and turns the bildungsroman as 
the vehicle for the destiny of both nation and individual.  
 If we can say, moreover, that a prerequisite for a militant reader-subject, is 
the breakdown of communication, the incommunicability of the common as a non-
delimitable thing, then Viajero does just the opposite: its pedagogy necessitates 
that the common and the individual unite under the terms of revolutionary 
nationalism, and that it be communicable and thus intelligible to the reader.  This 
is what is at stake in the narrative’s focalization through Salvador, in addition to 
the reader’s identification with him qua the significance he gives to each story 
and figure, to the decisions he makes concerning the meaning of “being Filipino” 
and the proper course of a revolution.  Focalization does not operate by way of 
the production of the concept of the non-delimitable common; what is produced is 
the idea incarnate in the message of the narrative.  In Chapter 4, I said that the 
novel’s abolition of communication operates through its indifference, that is, 
through the absence of a clear-cut message, the communication of which is 
constitutive of the narrative’s structure.  This is what happens in Viajero; José 
resorts to the bildungsroman because he wants to impart to the reader his idea of a 
true revolutionary ontology––and nothing more. 
 This has significant consequences for the production of the reader’s 
subjectivity and becoming.  It concerns the role of praxis as the production of the 
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common as concrete-in-thought.  Praxis involves the alignment of the common’s 
non-delimitability––which is the common expressed through every subjectivity’s 
equal capacity to introduce into it this impossibility––and this common’s 
production in thought, praxis being nothing less than the thought on the 
common’s non-delimitability and thus on every subject’s militant capacity.  This 
is how a linear, apodictic time is abolished: the future, this non-empirical and 
non-realized idea of the constellational diaspora, enters thought as the present’s 
absolute negativity.  Viajero, and its message, posits time itself.  The flow of 
stories and the presentation of figures obeys the sequential order of a learning 
process, a gradual growth with a definite end; the future, Salvador’s destiny, does 
indeed fold back upon the entirety of Viajero, but instead of producing 
negativities, saturates each occurrence with the fullness of meaning.   
 More importantly, however, this destroys the function of praxis altogether.  
As Rancière says, art anticipates work because it transforms sensible matter into 
the community’s self-presentation.  The reader-subject, in producing the non-
delimitable common in thought, thus includes him or herself in the common, a 
production-inclusion dynamic that is the very meaning and basis of attribution: 
the inclusion of the self within a common cut through by this inclusion.  And 
inasmuch as this reader-subject’s inclusion is also the thought on the non-
delimitable common, this inclusion produces the thought on the self-presentation 
and self-constitution of the community in which the reader-subject, by thinking it, 
is included, a thought on the self-constitution of the common that includes the 
thinker as the producer of the selfsame community.  Because in Viajero the reader 
is interpellated into the narrative by first of all abolishing the possibility of 
repudiating the common’s delimitability, praxis does not take hold.  The non-
delimitable common, in other words, is not given the chance to constitute itself.  
                                                                                                                                 
 181 
And is it any surprise?  This self-constitution requires the immanence of the 
Filipino diaspora, its constellationality; by positing the balikbayan as the only 
genuine revolutionary, José forecloses on this immanence by recapitulating the 
idea that the Philippines holds an ontological priority because it is implicitly 
accepted as a political economic positivity.  The revolutionary must fight “at 
home;” therefore, the Philippines’ political economic freedom takes primacy over 
every other freedom of every other Filipino, including, and especially, those in 
the diaspora.  The national-popular/popular-democratic will finds its literary 
correlate here: praxis is destroyed, and what has replaced it is the self-policing 
mechanism of the reader’s putative “becoming” Filipino, his or her assumption of 
a pre-ordained identity.   
 Clearly, then, this forced identification is merely heeding the call of that 
ideal that, as Viajero shows, echoes throughout time: democracy.   
 
D.  REVOLUTIONARY MORALITY 
 There a number of passages that reveal Salvador’s democratic sympathies, 
but the following are the most illustrative.   
 During a conversation about race, Wack describes to Salvador (Buddy), 
then still in college, the persistent segregation witnessed in the South and his own 
“pain of being black.”   He concludes his remarks with a glimpse of hope: 
“‘Times are, of course, slowly changing.  When we found you, Buddy, we were 
all blacks in that unit.  We weren’t trusted enough to fight, like the Hispanics and 
the Indians.  Can you imagine?  A hundred years after the Civil War when there 
were Negro officers in the Union Army?  Lincoln went to war, Buddy, on a moral 
principle––that this nation cannot be half slave, that a black man  cannot be 
excluded because of his color.  That is America’s strength, Buddy––the moral 
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principle!”37  In another passage, during the lecture given by Aquino after which 
Salvador introduces himself, the former says something that “fascinates” him: 
“Aquino mourned the death of the American dream, the beliefs of the American 
founding fathers which have lost their meaning, not because the American people 
no longer had vision, but because they had become too comfortable with their 
status and with the dictators with whom they forged pragmatic, opportunistic 
alliances.”38  And finally, in a passage that recapitulates the first one I quoted, 
Salvador offers up his reflections on James Wack’s “discovery” of him.  This 
passage comprises the narrative’s closing paragraphs: 
     Here I am, a waif in tatters, barefoot, hungry and sick, and this 
  gentleman with curly hair, this tall American officer in khaki, two 
  silver bars on his collar, picks me up.  Oh, my father, look at your 
  wandering son returned to his first memory at last. . . . 
     I strut around the [army] camp [where Wack brings him] in 
  khaki and olive green, my feet encased in some boy’s black leather 
  shoes.  In the afternoon, I take them off, wiggle my toes which 
  have lost their freedom, and try to endure the barbed sting of 
  blisters, knowing I have to wear the shoes again for that is what 
  Captain James Wack wants. 
     When I limp the following morning, he asks to see my feet and I 
  show him the raw blisters which, he says, will heal.  His eyes are 
  merry, he tousles my hair. 
                                                
37 Viajero, 61.   
38 ibid, 199 – 200.  
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     “This is the price you have to pay for civilization,” he tells me, 
  then hoists me on his shoulders.  I am very glad for up there, I can 
  see much more.39 
 In these passages, we have a sequence that establishes a definitive 
equivalence between America and some latent, liberatory moral principle, the 
supreme embodiment of whom is James Wack.   The banality of the scene is 
apparent: Wack’s hoisting of Salvador on his shoulders is nothing more than the 
fulfillment of the latter’s identity: his first memory, to which he returns after, he 
recognizes the need to fight in the Philippines, marks out the fulfillment of his 
identity, which is not the identity for which Samson chides him, but an identity 
that is simultaneously individual and common, the personal attainment of 
individual significance that is also the joy of “becoming” Filipino and thus 
revolutionary nationalist.  But because this joy is told through the first memory, 
this is a joy focalized through the following: Salvador’s simultaneous 
estrangement and his adoption, the originary moment of which is World War II.  
He is the adopted son: the American return is the place from which Salvador’s 
narrative and his “becoming” spring.  Focalized through him, Viajero is, then, a 
narrative about the potentiality of revolutionary nationalism, the beginnings of 
which can be found in the American return, that moment that, alongside the 
Philippine-American war, marked the greatest possibility for the Philippines’ 
liberation from colonialisms and imperialisms of every kind, but which was 
betrayed.  The subtext of estrangement and adoption that runs throughout the last 
passage above communicates the ambiguities in what I described as the logical 
and political impasses posed to the Philippine Left by the U.S.’ return: the 
                                                
39 ibid, 304.  
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Philippines was both betrayed by the U.S. as an imperial conqueror, but also 
saved from the Japanese Occupation.   
 This is why Ricarte’s example is important, the pedagogical function of 
which is to expresses the tensions of democracy: it reveals, in his absolute hatred 
for American imperialism, what is nonetheless a warning of also admiring its 
democratic aura.  His alliance with Japan was fueled by this hatred, thus making it 
possible to excuse him from the narrative’s many excoriating remarks on the 
collaborationists; but neither is he completely excusable, because in this hatred he 
ended up siding against the democracy and swore allegiance to Japanese 
brutality (as the example of Chika’s father most clearly illustrates for both 
Salvador and the reader).  He is an ambiguous nationalist, simultaneously 
vehement in his defense of the Philippines against American imperialism and yet 
misguided in the political logic through which this vehemence was channeled.  
 This is also the explains Leo Mercado’s and Namnama’s functions as 
Salvador’s initiators of his final salvation: Leo guides Salvador to Father Carlos, 
who finally reveals to him the circumstances surrounding his parents’ death and 
which fills in the gaps in Chika’s story.  They guide him, along with Samson, 
through two significant events in Philippine history: World War II and the EDSA 
revolution.  Samson challenges his comfortable pretensions concerning identity, 
and the events become the signposts towards the completion of his personal 
history and his “becoming:” this personal history, moreover, that has its official 
beginnings in World War II.  The novel’s focalization, then, also begins with the 
second world war, which initiates the narration of a six hundred year history that 
channels the fullness of the World War II narrative and becomes the synecdoche 
for Philippine History itself, the ultimate meaning and destiny of which a 
democratic morality is at once the basis and destiny.     
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 The problem of America’s return is therefore rekindled, but in such a way 
that it constitutes yet another betrayal of an essential freedom: America has not 
only betrayed the Philippines by acting the imperial conqueror yet again; it has 
also betrayed itself and the moral principle upon which it was established and 
which can still be glimpsed in many of its facets.  There is no better indication of 
what Delmendo describes as the “entanglement” the Philippines’ political ethos 
with that of the U.S.: “Democracy, political equality, and equal opportunity were 
neither precolonial nor colonial Filipino concepts.  The Philippines absorbed 
democratic concepts as the result of American colonial rule . . . Thus, Salvador de 
la Raza’s emergence as a successful Filipino nationalist is predicated on his 
commitment to traditionally American tenets of democracy and equality.  
Ironically, de la Raza becomes an ideal Filipino when he operates as an ideal 
American.”40  This ambivalence is the moral-political foundation without which 
Viajero’s narrative structure, as well as its pedagogical function, would cease to 
exist; it would crumble if it did not reproducing this impasse, the impasse of the 
idea of a revolutionary nationalist democracy itself.  There is no clearer way to 
see how axiomatization functions than through Salvador’s “becoming” Filipino, 
which is also a becoming American.  The ideal Filipino revolutionary is the one 
who upholds the ideals through which Empire axiomatizes the Filipino; 
Salvador’s revolution abides completely by the axiomatic’s logic––the logic of 
the State, of Empire, of capital, of the police. Democratic right, as I showed in 
Chapter 3, becomes an imperative, the securing and proliferation of which is the 
basis for imperial violence and capital accumulation, whose foundations become 
immutable once democracy ceases to be a particular instance of political 
organization and becomes, as Harvey says, an ethics capable of “substituting 
                                                
40 The Star-Entangled Banner, 159.  
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[itself] for all previously held ethical beliefs.”  Whence democratic morality’s 
inescapability, which Salvador’s imperative typifies; in his “becoming,” in 
Viajero’s interpellation of the reader and in its focalizing power, democracy is the 
moral ground upon which it exerts itself and sustains both the politics of the 
narrative and the structure and form that it allow it to function.  
 At this point, we can make the following conclusion: that Viajero, in its 
repudiation of absolute negativity, in its logical positivization of the Philippines, 
and in its positing of time, in its interpellation of the reader qua the focalization’s 
production of a self-policing function, in its pedagogy––in short, in those 
ideological and structural elements constitutive of the novel itself––it expresses 
that logic that makes democracy such a dangerously universal category of right: 
democracy’s manifestation as a valuation-as-process, the political, economic, 
social, and cultural ideal that is also a process consisting of advancing humanity’s 
ability to pursue, participate in, and enjoy these ideals.  The universality imputed 
to democracy displaces its relation to Empire and capital accumulation; in the 
case of Viajero, America’s role as the proponent, or rather, the principal spiritual 
host, of democratic right is acknowledged as a liberatory force that has been 
buried by its imperial designs.  Nonetheless, that Salvador chooses to make 
democracy and morality equivalent legitimizes this universality, and his 
acceptance of its limitless scope is recapitulates the force it takes to make this 
universality a matter of consensus.   
 Viajero’s time, the narrative trajectory that is compelled by the destiny 
posited from the start anyway, is therefore nothing if not the literary expression of 
democracy’s valuation-as-process: the sequence of events to which Salvador 
gives meaning and significance are moments of the elaboration of the perfect 
democratic subject, the gradualism of his growth extending past its individual 
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function and reaching out towards the universality of the process by which his 
political ontology is formed.  Salvador’s life, as well as his destination, are the 
allegorization of democracy’s self-actualization, the series of rights and ethical 
beliefs that ground its ideals as well as the means by which these rights and 
ethical beliefs are carried out and enforced.  Salvador’s interpellation of the 
reader, the production of the Filipino reader-subject as balikbayan and thus as 
democratic revolutionary nationalist, is the literary equivalent of this 
enforcement––thus is the classical bildungsroman’s self-policing pedagogical 
function brought to Filipino literature and to the Filipino reader.  If, then, the 
notion of a national-popular/popular-democratic politics proposed in Viajero 
eschews the immanence of a constellational diaspora in favor of a hegemonic 
version of rebellion, it only because the democratic ideal that lies at its heart 
cannot withstand the idea of the absolute negativity introduced by the former, 
those becoming-Filipinos and becoming-militants that repudiate being and 
knowledge.  Unify through the Philippines, that politics says, which ultimately 
means assuming the form of State politics: control, self-policing, only one true 
and delimitable ontology.  
 If Viajero presents a politics that repudiates the basic coordinates of a 
becoming-Filipino and becoming-militant; if this repudiation is accompanied by 
reproducing of the logical and political impasses of imagining national liberation 
and diasporic politics represented by World War II; and if this repudiation serves 
as the portico towards the very structure and form of the novel as bildungsroman 
as well, and thus becomes an imperative without which the novel would fall apart, 
it is now time to see how the presentation of an explicitly anti-revolutionary 
protagonist can ironically produce the opposite result: the notion that there is no 
logical and political impasse when World War II is concerned, because, quite 
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simply, democracy is always an axiomatic power.  For this, we will have to turn 
to Carlos Bulosan’s detective novel, All the Conspirators.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ON THE WAY TO AUTONOMY: CREATING THE READER’S FREEDOM 
 
 
                           “Nobody seemed to fit into the roles I had assigned them.” 
                –––Carlos Bulosan, All the Conspirators 
 
            “. . . it is false to say that the author acts upon his readers; he merely makes an appeal to their          
    freedom, and in order for his works to have any effects, it is necessary for the public to adopt them   
                       on their own account by an unconditioned decision.” 
                                      –––Jean-Paul Sartre, “What is Literature?” 
 
 
 
 
 There is perhaps no other literary genre that exploits focalization as well as 
the detective or hard-boiled novel: oftentimes told in the first person, the reader is 
made to share in the very same confusion, mystery, and violence that besieges the 
protagonist as he (since it is usually male) tries to make sense of the environment 
into which he has been plunged.  Structurally, the detective novel shares some 
similarities with the classical bildungsroman, the most important of which is their 
mutual positing of a meaning, revealed and acquired by the protagonist at the end, 
that determines the sequence of events comprising the plot and story, which, in the 
case of the detective novel, manifests itself as a collection of clues that will 
eventually form an intelligible whole.   
 In the previous chapter, we discussed one kind of focalization: that of the 
classical bildungsroman, in service to a revolutionary nationalist politics.  This 
narrative form interpellates the reader into the position of the protagonist’s 
transformation into the properly politicized Filipino, i.e. the radical balikbayan who 
decides that there is no place for a genuine Filipino politics but the Philippines.  The 
distinguishing characteristic between Viajero and the novel that is the subject of this 
chapter, Carlos Bulosan’s All the Conspirators, lies in the way that Bulosan’s 
precipitation of generic mutations in the detective novel emphasize what is already 
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a chief element of the genre: that of irony.  I will elaborate on my use of the 
category of irony in the following pages, which I draw mainly from Northrop 
Frye’s typology.  For now, however, it can be said that the irony emphasized in All 
the Conspirators creates, a posteriori, the possibility of reconsidering Viajero’s 
politics in light of what irony implies: namely, the freedom of the reader to produce 
meanings other than the ones immediately given by the narrative.  This involves the 
reader’s recognition of the tremendous gap between the meaning internal to the 
narrative––that is, the significance provided to the events of the plot by the 
protagonist––and the meaning external to it––that is, the concepts and categories 
producible by the reader.  These in their turn can be shaped by his or her response 
to the narrative qua his or her lived, extra-textual experience, whether this entails 
prior knowledge of the writer’s body of work or his or her political and ideological 
predilections.   
 This is not to say that this chapter will engage in a reconsideration of 
Viajero.  For better or worse, I think that our discussion of that novel has been 
exhausted, at least for the purposes of this dissertation’s concerns.  Let it be said 
that what Viajero lacks, and what All the Conspirators abounds in, is an openness to 
the reader’s decisions.  The latter does not advance, a priori, political and 
ideological judgment; this forecloses on the possibility that the reader could derive 
anything from the narrative other than complete agreement, in which case 
interpellation has succeeded, or complete disagreement, in which the reader has 
refused interpellation outright and thus repudiated the narrative’s ultimate meaning.  
This is where irony comes in and turns All the Conspirators into what I will call an 
insecure text, a narrative in which any definite meaning cannot be assigned directly 
to the sequence of events and which, as a function of the reading process itself, is 
the very index of the reader’s freedom to produce meaning––to create, in other 
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words, the very condition by which the categories and concepts through which 
politics can be thinkable are indeed thinkable at all.   
 
 
6.1  STYLIZING AUTONOMY 
 
A.  THE INACTIVE PROTAGONIST 
 Before proceeding to the literary analysis, I will give a brief outline of the 
plot.  The protagonist, Gar Stanley, is a white man born in the Philippines sometime 
during the first decade of American rule to a mother and father whose wealth came 
from a gold mine operated in Baguio (a mountainous city located roughly 153 miles 
north of Manila), and who eventually moves from the country to American to go to 
college.  After fighting in the European theater during the second world war, he 
returns to the U.S. to work as a shipping broker in San Francisco.  One day, he 
receives a letter from Candy, his childhood sweetheart from the Philippines (also 
white, but whose personal history is never explained), informing him that her 
husband, another childhood friend, Clem Mayo (another white man in the 
Philippines), who had joined the guerillas during the war and had purportedly been 
killed by the Japanese, may actually still be alive.  
 Gar returns to the Philippines.  He discovers that the evidence Candy 
possesses as proof that Clem is still alive is a ring he always wore, a brass ring that 
could not have been taken off his finger (he had gained too much weight for it to be 
pulled off the last time Candy saw him), thus giving her the idea that only he could 
have taken it off himself after having lost weight in the mountains (there were no 
markings on the ring indicating that it had been filed off).  Clem then attempts to 
trace the ring back through the many channels in which it has traveled, in the 
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process encountering a rich mestizo, Pepe Gonzalez, who is also Candy’s suitor, a 
number of Igorot, and nightclub owners and gangsters.  He eventually receives 
word that the ring, during the war, was used as a signal by the guerillas to inform 
their compatriots in the cities that they needed assistance, and that Clem’s 
disappearance is somehow linked to a botched meeting with a Filipino commando 
from the U.S. military who was carrying a money belt meant for Clem and the 
guerillas but which has turned up missing.  He is beaten up, escapes his captors, and 
creates alliances (many of them the Igorot).  
 But as Gar uncovers the mystery of the ring and slowly begins to find his 
way towards the truth of Clem’s disappearance, he also winds his way through a 
conspiracy, realizing that he is caught between two rival factions: the wartime 
collaborators, who are trying to escape arrest and prosecution, and whose identities 
are never, until the end, fully defined, and those who are working with the police 
and the State to capture them.   
 It is this uncertainty of identities that imparts to the novel its air of menace, 
a social, political, economic, and legal struggle mobilizing itself around Gar and 
bearing him along the way.  And indeed, unlike other detective novels, like The Big 
Sleep or The Maltese Falcon (to name only two of the most popular), Gar is 
relatively inactive: things reveal themselves to him as they unravel, rather than 
through the force of his physical or intellectual prowess.  As we will see, this 
generic reversal has a lot to do with the novel’s production, through its ironic 
focalization of Gar’s perspective, of the reader’s freedom. 
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B.  REFRACTING THE POLICE STATE 
 Northrop Frye has suggested that there is a direct link between detective 
fiction and irony.  In his classic study, Anatomy of Criticism, Frye defines irony as a 
literary modality that does two things.  Firstly, it offers up a mimetic representation 
by having characters and situations that reflect more directly the capacities of the 
reader and the characteristics of his or her world, which is in contrast to both the 
mythic and its representation of the “superhuman,” and the romantic and its 
presentation of an idealized or idyllic world.1  Secondly, and in contrast largely 
with the romantic tradition, the ironic novel contains an element of social criticism, 
one that, however, arises from the reader’s own judgment on the text: the ironic 
mode deploys a certain level of moralistic objectivity on the part of the writer who, 
in keeping with the conventions of mimesis, “merely states” things as they are, 
giving details that “[say] as little and [mean] as much as possible.”2  Critical to the 
ironic mode is the presence of a pharmakon, the “scapegoat” that acts, by being 
sacrificed or punished, as the central point by which the reader’s identification, 
because of the apparent arbitrariness of the pharmakon’s victimization, of the fact 
that the punishment or sacrifice has happened only because the pharmakon “is a 
member of a guilty society,” that he is “living in a world where such injustices are 
an inescapable part of existence.”3  The implication is that the reader’s 
identification of an unjust world qua the pharmakon’s suffering will be somehow 
refracted back into his or her own life, allowing him or her to see the injustices in 
his or her own world through those of the fictionalized one encountered in the 
novel.  Whence the social criticism endemic to irony and its mimetic qualities.   
                                                
1 Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (10th ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 366 – 
7. 
2 ibid, 40 – 1.   
3 ibid, 41. 
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 It seems, then, that such a formula should find it way directly into the 
detective novel, with the victim assuming the role of the pharmakon whose 
vindication arrives at the moment of his or her killer’s identification, punishment, 
and, sometimes, death.  This, however, is not the case; instead, Frye ascribes the 
position of the pharmakon to the criminal, through whom the idea that society is 
corrupt and dangerous arises, but only because the criminal is merely one of the lot.  
For Frye, the “case against the criminal is only plausibly manipulated,” an almost 
arbitrary choice that does not describe the inevitability of his crime, the criminal 
oftentimes quite characterless and almost a caricature; rather, the choice of the 
criminal is what Frye calls a “settling,” as if the choice were either poor or made 
simply out of the necessity created by the lack of extraordinary options.4  The 
criminal, the pharmakon of the detective genre, is what is common in the world of 
its novels.   
 The trope, then, by which the reader is made to identify, is that of 
punishment, he or she being placed in the role of the punisher while the pharmakon 
becomes condemned as the justifiably punished individual.  This is why Frye 
describes the detective novel as a melodrama in which “we come as close as it is 
normally possible for art to come to the pure self-righteousness of the lynching 
mob,” transforming the novel into “advance propaganda for the police state, in so 
far as that represents the regularizing of mob violence.”5  This is a curious assertion, 
one that Frye, except to say that were it not for the manifest literariness of the 
detective novel itself (a point I will return to soon enough), does not explain further.  
Frye posits a split, within the detective novel, between the police state and the mob 
violence with which the reader identifies; the reason why the detective novel is 
                                                
4 ibid, 46 – 7. 
5 ibid, 47. 
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advance propaganda for the police state is because it serves as a potential warning 
for the consequences of mob violence.  For Frye, the propagandistic quality of the 
detective novel is that it refracts the police state somehow by serving as the law, so 
to speak, that keeps the reader’s all-too-ready identification with the mob in its 
proper place; the morality of the detective is thus the morality of the police state’s 
mandate against the autonomous judgment of the collectivity.   
 The question is what kind of a relationship inheres between the pharmakon, 
the synecdoche of society’s general corruption, and this autonomous mob––
autonomous, that is, from the State and the police.  If it is the case that the reader is 
placed in the position of the punisher––and at this point, we should say that the 
reader is focalized through the autonomous collectivity––the pharmakon then 
becomes the figuration of the police state’s necessity.  But this is possible inasmuch 
as the reader accepts the laws that govern the status quo’s legitimation of the State 
and the police––in other words, of the hierarchized production of the concept of 
legality and illegality and their proper enforcement and punishment.  What Frye is 
suggesting, then, is that the detective novel is propagandistic only when the reader 
capitulates to the status quo and disavows what is basically an automatic reaction to 
the focalizations internal to the novel, where the plot and character development 
would lead the reader to identify against the pharmakon and thus desire his 
punishment or death.  The police state’s propaganda is effective only if the reader 
reacts against the novel’s powers of focalization. 
 But Frye disputes the effectiveness of propaganda, and for the following 
reason: “The protecting wall of play is still there.”  For Frye, “the more serious [the 
melodrama] is, the more likely it is to be looked at ironically by the reader, its pity 
and fear seen as sentimental drivel and owlish solemnity, respectively.” On the 
other hand, the more comedic a melodrama becomes, the more satire intrudes, 
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“which defines the enemy of society as a spirit within that society.”6  Why?  
Because detective fiction in particular, and ironic literature in general, “tends 
toward myth, its mythical patterns being as a rule more suggestive of the demonic 
than of the apocalyptic, though sometimes it simply continues the romantic tradition 
of stylization.”7  What both myth and romance have in common are their emphases 
on form, and it is this formal quality that lends to the propagandistic tendencies of 
the detective novel its lack of credibility: on either side of the melodramatic pole, as 
Frye calls it, are the all-too-serious and all-too-comic, both of which cause the 
reader to adversely react against the novel because it is either too emotionally false 
or too outrageous as to be satirical.  The very fact that the novel is a work of fiction 
reveals itself; the stylizations characteristic of the detective novel especially––the 
emphasis on a vernacular type of voice that is often forced to mime the 
stereotypical sound of hard-boiled dialogue is one example––disclose the generic 
codes too forcefully for the mimetic bases of the genre to fully take hold.   
 This is crucial: Frye places a barrier on the police state’s entry into the novel 
because of its form, which acts as a buffer against the former’s force and power.  
Moreover, what is left over in our analysis, by default, is the idea of autonomous 
judgment.  It is the product of the reader-novel relation, and it allows the reader to 
think his or her separation from the State, creating the idea of a form of justice that 
escapes its judicial, political, and ideological grasp.   
 
C.  CRIMINAL ROMANCE 
 But we should not be so quick to accept such a potentially radical critique as 
a main feature of the detective genre: its ideological sources are rife with 
                                                
6 ibid, 47.  
7 ibid, 140, emphasis added.  
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contradictions that both criticize and recapitulate forms of power and rule, 
especially American capitalism and imperialism.  Critic Jopi Nyman offers up a 
brief genealogy of the genre that gives us a view of inherent contradictions and 
provides a series of counterpoints to Frye’s conclusions.  For Nyman, detective 
fiction, and especially its darker, more violent hard-boiled variant, derives its main 
characteristics from two key sources: 1) American naturalism and 2) the adventure 
novel, in particular the Western.8  The common element between them and which 
finds it way into the hard-boiled novel is the protagonist’s individualism, usually 
manifesting itself in his lone confrontation with a corrupt and greedy capitalist 
society (as in Frank Norris’ naturalist novels), or with an unruly but tameable nature 
populated by the harsh wind of the prairie, the insurmountable mountain range, and 
the hostile hatchet-wielding Indian or the drunk and rebellious Mexican.  Nyman, 
moreover, suggests that the rhetoric of individualism has much to do with the 
rhetoric of the frontier, that is, with Teddy Roosevelt’s rugged individualism.  
Already, we see two strains of thought that converge upon the individual––always 
gendered male––as the privileged site for subject-hood: as the “trustbuster” fighting 
against big corporations, as the conservationist who established national parks and 
reserves, and as the proponent of the civilizing function of America’s westward 
expansion and propagation of its military and economic power in the Western 
hemisphere (the construction of the Panama Canal and the wars with Spain over the 
destinies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines).   
 Nyman summarizes the contradictions belonging to the detective and hard-
boiled novel as follows: “[the protagonist of detective and hard-boiled fiction] is a 
populist hero who shows the impossibility of order in the corrupt world of crooks, 
                                                
8 Jopi Nyman, Men Alone: Masculinity, Individualism, and Hard-Boiled Fiction. Atlanta: Rodopi, 
1997), 16 – 7.  
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corrupt politicians, and women of loose morals.  If we develop the idea of 
adventure fiction as an interplay between self and other, the idea of fixed 
boundaries as protecting stable identity points to the significance of masculinity.”9  
The novel, in other words, resolves these contradictions when it fixes the social 
code through the focalized identity of the protagonist’s masculinity, which 
becomes, let us propose, the de facto principle by which the boundaries necessary 
to the functioning of focalization are established. 
 Besides naturalism and the adventure novel, we have to look to yet another, 
more broadly conceived and deeply-rooted “movement:” namely, Romanticism.  
This, more than either previous genre and category, has a much more direct 
connection to the socio-political milieux in which the detective novel’s ideological 
roots are ensconced, and for the following reasons: 
 1.  The Romantic notion of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, thought 
      to have descended from the noble lineage of peoples of the Asian  
      steppes who made their way into Western Europe, a racial category that 
      was distinguished from others in that it carried with it the very seeds of       
      human civilization itself, expanding from Asia to Europe in a natural  
      and pre-destined trajectory that left its civilizing mark along its vast  
      wake.10   
 2.  American scientific racists adopted this notion of Anglo-Saxon        
      superiority and justified the project of Manifest Destiny by deploying the 
      racial markers of what Reginald Horsman calls a “Romantic racial  
      nationalism,” which, following the German Romantics, conceived of  
      nation and race as being inextricably linked through the philological  
                                                
9 ibid, 61.  
10 Reginald Horsman, Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), 33 – 6.  
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      lineage of “the people,” that is, through a particularized national  
      language.11   
 3.  The nineteenth century American authors’ proposal to develop a  
      specifically American literary language that, though being influenced by 
      English Romantic models, radically separated itself from thus and thus  
      actualized the nation-language-race trinity produced from out of the  
      Romantic imagination, emphasizing in the process a shared Anglo-Saxon 
      past with their European Romantic brethren (which established the  
      continuity essential to Manifest Destiny), “the virtues of the English  
      language,” and finally “pride in a race which appeared to be winning  
      control of much of the world.”12 
This genealogy explodes in the hard-boiled novel as the focalized protagonist’s 
peculiarity: as Nyman says, the hard-boiled novel is characterized by its use of a 
highly stylized and vernacular language––the “indigenous” language of the strong 
white, American male.13   
 If indeed the hard-boiled novel’s methods of focalization attempt to fix the 
erosion of stable boundaries, such a linguistic, racial, and nationalistic particularism 
becomes a critical point of identification by which the legacies of Romanticism and 
the ideologies and practices of Manifest Destiny as an American imperial project 
are intelligible: if anything, the latter encountered the problem of a national racial 
superiority and integrity as the following political and economic problems arose: 
 –––the fears and anxieties that emerged over the inclusion of non-whites  
       into the nation as ever-more territories once belonging to Native  
       Americans and Mexico were occupied and incorporated;  
                                                
11 ibid, 158 – 60.   
12 ibid, 160.   
13 Nyman, 33.  
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 –––the question of what to do about the newly freed slaves and their socio-
       political and economic status as a massive surplus labor force; 
 –––and, eventually, the question of the Philippines itself, which became an 
       issue of the proper management of an “assimilated” nation whose status 
       became that of a “ward” to the U.S.  
The problem that the idealized Anglo-Saxon American faced was the problem of 
economic, political, and even military control of the territories it occupied as it 
indeed expanded westward and fulfilled its destiny.  This is the imperial history, a 
history of control and the attempt to grapple with an impossible racial, national, and 
linguistic ideal, that lies at the heart of the hard-boiled novel’s methods of 
focalization.   
 We thus have, at this point, two starting points by which All the 
Conspirators can be analyzed: 1) the notion that the detective novel, in its form and 
style, is able to refract the police state’s propagandistic forces and to thus focalize 
the narrative, by default, qua the idea of the reader’s autonomous judgment, i.e. the 
detective novel’s ironic mode; and 2) the notion that the detective novel, and hard-
boiled fiction especially, is genealogically inseparable from those very self-same 
forces that ideologically sustained American imperial State-building, i.e. the 
production and regulation of notions of a proper male Anglo-Saxon subject-hood 
immersed in the expansion of the Empire westward towards what would eventually 
become California and into the Pacific towards the Philippines.  My thesis is this: 
that All the Conspirators elaborates both coordinates without attempting to resolve 
their essential contradiction, resulting in a text that ends up ironizing the very 
ideologico-genealogical sources of its genre and thus of its methods of narration, in 
addition to the means by which it focalizes the reader through its protagonist, Gar 
Stanley. 
                                                                                                                                 
 201 
6.2  SECURING THE FREEDOM OF THE READER 
 
A.  AN ANTI-IMPERIALIST ALLEGORY? 
  As I mentioned above, Gar is distinguished from most, if not all, hard-
boiled protagonists by being completely in the mercy of his environment.  If indeed 
one of the ideological functions of the genre has been to secure the concept of a 
stable white American male identity amid the inherent differentiations of imperial 
expansion’s political, economic, and cultural integration of lands and people, what 
happens when this formula is transplanted into post-war Philippines, a period when 
State-restructuring and rebuilding meant the hunting and prosecution of the 
collaborators?   
 The process of determining the identity of the collaborators proved to be a 
difficult task, one that proved almost futile once those who were caught were 
actually never punished, as in the case of Manuel Roxas, the top rice collector for 
the Japanese army (who was never tried because he was defended by his friend 
General McArthur) and was eventually elected president of the newly-
“independent” Philippine Republic (declared on July 4, 1946).  As Gar himself 
states: “Nobody seemed to fit into the roles I had assigned them.”14  This revelation 
comes almost at the end of the novel, when Gar realizes that the key conspirator 
was always Candy who, having learned that Clem was still alive in the mountains 
and still possessed the money belt, worked with Montalvo, a prominent Manileño 
and bank owner, to kill Clem to steal the money belt as well as silence him: he had 
information regarding Candy’s own collaboration with the Japanese.  Gar, 
moreover, realizes that has actually been used: the only reason Candy was able to 
track down Clem was because Gar had done all the work himself.   
                                                
14 Carlos Bulosan, All the Conspirators (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 129.  
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 At this point it might be useful to recall the narrative trajectory of the 
bildungsroman, in which the meaning that emerges at the end comes to determine 
the course of the novel, every detail becoming imbued with a significance the full 
extent of which is intelligible only at the end: “the triumph,” as Moretti calls it, “of 
meaning over time.”  What, then, is the meaning that triumphs at the end of All the 
Conspirators?  Nothing but the idea that, all along, Gar was unable to control his 
environment, that every code that presented itself before him was indecipherable 
without the help of those who were already “on the inside,” those who were either 
collaborators themselves and were thus “in” on Candy’s scheme, or those who were 
in possession of that knowledge all along (such as Pepe Gonzalez, who turns out to 
be a police inspector searching for the collaborators) or have a special “insider’s” 
knowledge of Philippine society and politics (such as the Igorots who help Gar 
along the way).  The meaning, the significance of the ring and Clem’s apparent 
disappearance, delimits Gar’s perspective, his search charting out a course in which 
his immense “distance” from the Philippines, created by the length of his absence, 
makes it impossible for him to understand the conditions in which the Philippines 
has been plunged in the post-war period.  In terms of the focalization that the novel 
produces, the time of the novel is one in which the conventional coordinates by 
which mystery in the detective or hard-boiled novel is created (the absence of “the 
full picture”) are aligned directly with the problem of determining the Philippines’ 
wartime political alliances ex post facto.  The search for meaning that pushes the 
trajectory of All the Conspirators is thus the problem of the deferral of a meaning 
that does nothing more, once this meaning emerges, than underscore the problem of 
finding the meaning of Philippine politics itself––of, what is more, the meaning of 
Philippine nationalism and, perhaps, of a revolutionary anti-imperialism.   
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 In this way, it can be said that All the Conspirators allegorizes the reading 
process and its focalizing mechanism as containing within themselves the inherent 
problem of producing meaning, which is the question that is at the heart of this 
dissertation: what does it mean to return to the Philippines (whether literally or 
figuratively) in the name of some kind of anti-imperial politics?  This, however, 
would be too easy a conclusion, for what such a proposition ignores is the fact that 
Gar is a white male returning to the Philippines.  This returns us to the question of 
the balikbayan discussed in the previous chapter.  The following sections will lead 
up to and finally discuss this question. 
 
B. ABOLISHING COMMUNICATION, CONTINUED 
 If what this dissertation is concerned with is the potential production of a 
militant diasporic subject qua literature-as-thought, what kind of a subject is 
producible in All the Conspirators’ focalizing mechanisms?   
 Like Frye, Georg Lukács attributes to modern literature the quality of irony, 
except to him it is an outcome of modern capitalism’s creation of a split between 
subject and object, the former being alienated from the objective world that 
surrounds him or her.  This is the Lukács who famously used the Marxian concept 
of alienation to describe the reifying forces of a commodity culture.15  For Lukács, 
irony qua modern capitalism makes it way into literature as the protagonist’s 
continually failed attempts at establishing a connection with “reality,” at positing a 
meaning to his or her environment as a means to negotiate its challenges.  Such an 
endeavor, however, is futile: the idea of an organic totality that is delimitable by a 
subject is completely illusory.  The only actual “reality” is contingency, modern 
                                                
15 See Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness (Tr. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1971), esp. 83 – 222 
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civilization being incapable of rationalization.16  As a result, literary meaning takes 
on an entirely different quality: the “outside world” is given a heterogeneity, each 
level penetrated by meaning and thus ordered and made controllable by a signifying 
subject.17  What is ironic is the expression of in the novel “of the self-correction of 
the world’s fragility:” it is the resolutely fictional ordering of the world into a 
knowable object, the clearly manufactured and produced quality of the novel’s 
representation of an organic totality.18   
 All the Conspirators, however, takes this ironic quality and amplifies it: the 
idea of a representable organic totality is abolished completely.  Gar’s realization in 
the end that nobody fit into the roles he had assigned them makes him less of a 
subject, in the sense given above, i.e. as a receptive, signifying individual who 
“reads” the outside world, and more of a medium for the expression of what is an 
essential unknowability and contingency: that of the political situation of a 
Philippines undergoing reconstruction and attempting to consolidate itself as a 
proper nation-state just granted (nominal) independence.   
 In this sense, the overcoming of literary time by meaning happens in such a 
way that time becomes abolished as a well-ordered sequence within which some 
final meaning is elaborated: it is not that time is subordinate to meaning, but rather 
that time, conceived as the means by which meaning unfolds itself, ceases to exist.  
What replaces it, concomitant with the final revelation that the only meaning 
conceivable in All the Conspirators is that of contingency, is a series of events that 
have meaning only by their completely loose and forced relation to each other.  If 
indeed a function of irony, as Lukács suggests, is to create a world that is inherently 
                                                
16 Georg Lukács, The Theory of the Novel (Tr. Anna Bostock. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), 76 – 7, 
138.   
17 ibid, 137 – 8.  
18 ibid, 75.  
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impossible, then the abolished time of All the Conspirators produces a vacuum that 
becomes occupied by the fabrications whose meanings possess no readily available 
organicity, but are rather disjointed and heterogeneous.  Time becomes impossible 
because the notion of a telos is abandoned in favor of the ironic mode’s production 
of a multiplicity of meanings, the apparent center (Gar) that orders and fixes them 
being removed of his privileged position and instead acting as the filter through 
which this multiplicity becomes intelligible. 
 This is where focalization becomes crucial: the reader, through Gar, sees 
this multiplicity.  The reading process becomes a sequence of attempts at 
establishing an organic totality that, in the end, encounters its ultimate frustration: 
that fact that, although Clem’s disappearance has been solved, although Candy is 
revealed to be the true criminal, what remains is the overwhelming feeling that, 
because the protagonist was used, because he was unable to conform to the typical 
image of the detective or hard-boiled protagonist, there is still much that remains 
beyond the purview of the narrative focalizing mechanism.  All the Conspirators 
ends by creating the idea that it itself has been unable to adequately represent the 
political situation of post-war Philippines.   
 If organic meaning is thus impossible, what takes its place is the absolute 
indifference of the novel’s communicative apparatus: as Rancière says, the 
indifference characteristic of modern literature abolishes communication by 
destroying any single perspective by which judgment (moral, political, or 
otherwise) can be passed.  This is what Rancière called “the equality of 
indifference,” the leveling of subject matter and the introduction of all possible 
meanings into every level of the narrative.  Formally speaking, All the 
Conspirators, in its irony, produces this equality by removing the protagonist as 
judge: what is equal is the unknowability of the socio-political environment into 
                                                                                                                                 
 206 
which Gar has been plunged, the levelness of its mystery, menace, and foreignness.  
This is what leads Caroline Hau and Benedict Anderson, in their introduction to All 
the Conspirators, to say that the time of the novel is imbued with a concept of 
history as “happenstance and coincidence without the redeeming promise of 
coherent meaning.”19  History, in All the Conspirators, becomes incoherent because 
the subject has been removed; history becomes unintelligible because, in short, 
communication has been destroyed, because the medium through which 
communication and judgment can be passed has been transformed into a medium 
for their elimination.   
 
B.  THE INSECURE TEXT 
 Let us posit the following thesis: that All the Conspirators, in its abolition of 
both time and meaning, in addition to the product of their correlation, i.e. 
communication, leaves the reader absolutely free to decide on what categories and 
concepts are producible qua the text.  This is what makes All the Conspirators what 
I termed in the introduction to this chapter an insecure text, a narrative that has 
abandoned the goal of producing any definite political message in favor of calling 
attention to the reader’s capacities to think and decide on its political significance.   
 Again, Carline Hau and Benedict Anderson are helpful on this point.  They 
ask, regarding All the Conspirator’s place in Carlos Bulosan’s oeuvre: “How did 
Bulosan go from writing the paradigmatic Filipino American Bildungsroman 
[America is in the Heart] and, better yet, classic Filipino litterature engagée [The 
Cry and the Dedication] to a ‘commercial’ novel about an American tracking down 
a missing fellow-American in the Philippines?”20  They see All the Conspirators as 
                                                
19 Caroline S, Hau and Benedict Anderson, “Introduction,” All the Conspirators, xix – xx.   
20 ibid, xiv – xv.  
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a counterpart to The Cry and the Dedication, a novel whose main characters are 
Filipino guerillas, based loosely on the Huks, attempting to rendezvous with a 
Filipino balikbayan from America with money to fund the anti-imperialist 
resistance movement in post-war Philippines.  The similarities it shares with All the 
Conspirators are evident, even at a cursory glance.  At the end of The Cry, Hau and 
Anderson point out, Bulosan gestures towards a future in which history will reveal 
itself as the fulfillment of a revolutionary promise: the liberation of the Philippines 
from Empire and capital.  All the Conspirators does just the opposite, however: in 
its abolition of time and communication, it reveals the contingencies of history and 
exposes in its turn the undecidability of the future, or rather, the threat that nothing 
will come of resistance and hope, that, like Gar, the socio-political and economic 
field that surrounds us is much too great to understand, and that in this 
overwhelming ignorance we will simply succumb to whatever decides our fate.   
 This, as I mentioned, is the novel’s internal meaning, that is, the meaning 
that is locatable within the narrative itself.  In this case, this meaning is the idea that 
meaning is impossible, and that any a posteriori signification of past events is not 
enough to save us from the mysteries with which Empire and capital harass us.  All 
the Conspirator’s internal significance thus posits a tremendous amount of 
emphasis on the objective world.  But what significance arises from the reading 
process itself?  What categories and concepts are producible by the reader qua the 
immense objectivity of the novel’s world?   
 If this objectivity amplifies what Lukács called the heterogeneity of its 
significance, it is still impossible to read the novel without in some ways forcing a 
comparative perspective between it and Bulosan’s other novels.  Let us assume for 
the moment that one comes across All the Conspirators with some prior knowledge 
of Bulosan’s work (which is a safe assumption at that).  The generic and formal 
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difference between All the Conspirators and The Cry and the Dedication and 
America is in the Heart becomes the guiding principle of the reading process.  It is 
the difference, in other words, of which Hau and Anderson have written: the 
detective novel as against the litterature engagée.  As we shall see, however, the 
generic differences (which are only apparently inescapable), because they operate 
the thought on All the Conspirators and of the political categories and concepts 
producible through it, actually create a kind of a force field in which the barriers 
that separate the qualities of either genre begins to crumble. 
 Sartre has defined litterature engagée as a literature that, as the “committed 
writer” knows, manifests words as “action,” a literature that engages the reader as 
the “free” producer of ideas and concepts, and who in so doing enters into a 
relationship with the writer such that he or she “collaborate[s] in the production [of 
the latter’s] work:” “the book does not serve my [the reader’s] freedom; it requires 
it.”21  Sartre continues: the author “makes an appeal [to the readers’] freedom, and 
in order for his words to have any effect, it is necessary for the public to adopt them 
on their own account by an unconditioned decision.  But in a collectively which 
constantly corrects, judges, and metamorphoses itself, the written work can be an 
essential condition of action, that is, the moment of reflective consciousness.”22  We 
have thus returned to the notion of the totalization, that non-delimitable common 
that is continuously undergoing a modification and is itself a product of the 
subject’s thought––in other words, the common produced in and as the attributive 
becoming of the militant subject.  It is in this way that the notion of the reader’s 
freedom can be aligned with both focalization and attribution qua literature-as-
thought.  With respect to All the Conspirators, attribution, the reader’s thought on 
                                                
21 Jean-Paul Sartre, “What is Literature?” and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1988), 37, 54 – 5.  
22 ibid, 140. 
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him or herself qua the non-delimitable common, happens through its dissolution of 
the barriers between its putative genre (the detective novel) and the reader’s prior 
knowledge of Bulosan’s body of work, of his litteratures engagée. 
 
C.  THE WHITE BALIKBAYAN 
 Before proceeding, I should advance the following clarification: that the 
objective situation referred to above as the internal world of the novel does not in 
any way correspond to the external world of the reader’s thought.  Objectivity, in 
other words, refers to the fictional representation and not to the objective conditions 
that make the reader’s freedom, in Sartre’s sense, a prerequisite for the writer-reader 
“pact.”  That said, it is now time to describe in what way the reader’s freedom––or 
perhaps we should say, in keeping with the conceptual framework of this 
dissertation, the reader’s thought on his or her freedom as a reader––can be 
conceptualized.   
 For Sartre, the totalization that surrounds the reader and which acts as the 
precondition for reading’s manifest praxis must undergo a “permanent 
revolution.”23  It seems, then, that our analysis has run into an impasse: how do we 
conceive of the non-delimitable common as the source and result of the reader’s 
thought on his or her becoming––as the preconditions for what may be called 
readerly freedom––if this permanent revolution, this totalization, is the sine qua non 
of this freedom itself?  The problem is how to think the relation between the 
subject-hood of the reader (as a becoming) and the objective conditions that, if we 
take Sartre at face value, precede this becoming.   
 We can avoid this problem if we recall what I suggested is the constitutive 
feature of the subject in its becoming: the thinking of the present’s void, i.e. 
                                                
23 ibid, 139.  
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introducing––thinking––into the contemporary situation that which negates it.  In 
this sense, the divide between the objective and the subjective domains is removed; 
the binary is thinkable only if a strict division between present and future are 
posited as well––that is, if time, conceived as a linear trajectory, is maintained as 
the principle for a militant subject.  To think the abolition of time is to 
simultaneously think the dissolution of the difference between the objective and 
subjective domains––this is the formula for the self-constitution of a militant 
subject that thinks futurality.  And it is through this formula, qua All the 
Conspirators, that we can now think the emergence of the reader-subject as free. 
 As we have seen, All the Conspirators fulfills one of the basic coordinates 
of this formula: it abolishes time.  A result of this abolition is that the novel’s 
communicational mechanisms have also been eliminated.  This freedom, in the 
novel’s formal and stylistic characteristics, can thus be aligned with Frye’s thesis 
that the detective novel refracts the police state’s propaganda by focalizing the 
narrative through the novel’s ironic mode, and that this irony signals the emergence 
of the reader’s autonomous judgment, freed from the trappings of the State.  
Genealogically, however, we have also seen that the detective novel, and hard-
boiled fiction specifically, is inseparable from the ideological regulation of 
American imperialism’s State-building projects, centered upon the production and 
regulation of notions of a proper male Anglo-Saxon subject-hood against the 
“threats” posed by the heterogeneity of cultures and races being enclosed within the 
ever-expanding reach of the U.S.   
 We are now, however, ready to approach that thesis I advanced earlier: 
namely, that All the Conspirators elaborates both formal and genealogical elements 
without attempting to resolve their essential contradiction, and that this results in a 
text that ends up ironizing the very ideologico-genealogical sources of its genre and 
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thus of its methods of narration, in addition to the means by which it focalizes the 
reader through Gar.  Because the reader, as I have hypothesized, is going to be 
familiar with Bulosan’s previous work, there is already built into the reading 
process an element of irony: in keeping with Frye’s definition, we can say that the 
reader is always aware of Gar’s whiteness, and that his strangeness vis-à-vis 
Bulosan’s other protagonists makes him a complete work of artifice.  His whiteness, 
in other words, makes clear the stylization that All the Conspirators, as a detective 
novel, must necessarily exhibit.  And it is a function of the ironic mode to give free 
reign to the reader to judge.  In the case of Gar, the genealogical element arises 
quite explicitly and immediately: he is a balikbayan only because his mother and 
father owned a gold mine, themselves implicated in the imperial plunder that 
America’s “incorporation” of the country enabled.  Gar thus represents the ironic 
mode’s “appeal” (in Sartre’s words) to the reader’s freedom to judge, in addition to 
the explication of All the Conspirators’ ideological inseparability from American 
imperialism and capitalism.  Moreover, we can say that through Gar the reader 
judges the genre itself, and through this judgment judges Empire.   
 Unlike Viajero, All the Conspirators, by focalizing its narrative through the 
balikbayan, allows the following to be thought: the very problem of a post-war 
return to the Philippines in order to, in the terms of the expectations generated by 
the detective novel’s “normal” course of events, fix things, as it were.  The 
stabilizing effects of the genre are thus precluded.  Even Gar’s sexuality is 
destabilized: although his remarks about Candy and, when he meets her, Tampa, 
Clem’s daughter from a previous marriage, display the same kind of sexualized 
masculinity as the stereotypical hard-boiled detective, its alignment with the other 
traits that support this sexuality––violence, aggressivity, control––because they are 
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absent, does not take place.  In All the Conspirators, there is no novelistic subject 
properly speaking, only a medium through which this judgment on Empire happens.   
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CHAPTER 7 
“THE ONLY ANSWER WAS A COLLECTIVE RAGE” 
 
 
           “I long for your treason. . . .” 
                                           –––Wilfrido Nolledo, But for the Lovers 
 
 
 
 
 We have now reached our final chapter.  At this point, let us provide a 
summary of what we have learned from Viajero and All the Conspirators.  In 
Viajero, we saw that José’s use of the bildungsroman to tell the story of a political 
“becoming” qua the balikbayan ended up foreclosing upon the reader’s ability to 
think, except, we may say, in spite of the novel, his or her becoming-Filipino.  
Viajero’s insistence on the irrefutability of the Filipino’s return to the Philippines as 
the prerequisite for any radical politics displaced what is the basis for becoming-
Filipino: the non-delimitable common, the constellational diaspora without an 
political ontological center.  In All the Conspirators, on the other hand, we saw that 
Bulosan’s exploitation of the detective novel’s ironic mode leads to a situation in 
which the balikbayan figure ironizes the very notion of a return itself––critiquing 
both the U.S.’ “salvation” of the Philippines from the Japanese and, more indirectly, 
the ideological trap created by this return, a trap into which Viajero has fallen: 
namely, the recapitulation of the problem faced by those who wish to separate 
radical democracy from imperial democracy, a task that must face the problem of 
the American return itself.  This was the problem of revolutionary morality, as I 
called it in my reading of Viajero.   
 With regard to All the Conspirators, however, we must add the following 
caveat: that although it does abolish the forms of focalization that Viajero uses to 
delimit the political possibilities of the diasporic Filipino, it does not necessarily 
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offer up an alternative.  The ironic mode’s characteristic freedom-granting 
capabilities allows for a critique of Empire and its ideological snares, but if it can 
critique, by ironizing, what Viajero proposes, it can do so only, it seems, by default.  
All the Conspirators does not present the reader with a positive image of a 
becoming-Filipino––that is, where the internal and external meanings, as I termed 
them, producible qua the reader-novel relation correspond by doing more than 
simply exposing the liberty entailed in the latter.  The reader, in the language used 
in the previous chapter, is too autonomous.   
 There must be some way that attribution be secured, but without sacrificing 
the reader’s freedom to think.  This means that there must be some way that 
communication be rendered, but without delimiting the reader’s thought, the very 
consequence that abolishing communication sets out to avoid.  We can call this a 
communication-without-communication, a sort of expressibility of an idea that 
initiates a true symbiosis between reader and novel, one that enables the reader to 
think his or her becoming-Filipino, one that induces the production of attribution 
under the terms of the concept of a non-delimitable common, and vice versa.  This 
is where we encounter literature-as-thought.  In this dissertation, I have used one 
novel as an exemplary instance of this symbiosis: Wilfrido Nolledo’s But for the 
Lovers.  In contrast to the ironic mode, it deploys what I will term the baroque 
mode. 
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7.1  INFINITE WORLDS 
 
A.  NARRATIVE DENSITY 
 Written in the late 1960s and published in 1970 while Nolledo was living in 
Iowa City and working as Editor of the Iowa Review, But for the Lovers covers 
much of the terrain familiar to us by now: the Occupation, the American return, the 
problem of finding allegiances in a Philippines torn apart by war, near famine, and 
economic disarray.  Like the other two novels, however, But for the Lovers can be 
noted for the distinguished way in which it deploys form and style to accomplish its 
political edge.   
 The story revolves around an orphan, Alma, found in the streets after being 
raped by a Japanese soldier and unofficially adopted by Hidalgo, a former clown 
who used to entertain children in the countryside and who is nostalgic of the glories 
of the Philippines’ Spanish past.  Through him she befriends Amoran, a young 
guitar-playing boy.  The novel, however, has numerous other characters, all of 
whom play an equally important role in the narrative.  There is Major Shigura, a 
Japanese soldier who dreams of a pan-Asian unity freed from the West and led by 
the Japanese empire; Lieutenant Deogracias, the leader of a group of Filipino 
guerillas who plans to use the rumors of an American return as the impetus to start a 
total revolution against all imperialisms; and Captain Johnny Winter, an American 
pilot of a P-38 bomber who embarks upon a number of missions to Manila and is 
the subject of both Alma’s dreams and Deogracias’ revolutionary plans.  But for the 
Lovers is distinguished from both Viajero and All the Conspirators in that it has no 
sustained point of focalization: the narrative enters and exits the paths of both its 
more central and marginal characters, eventually producing a narrative 
characterized more by the multiplicity of its perspectives than by any “hard” form 
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of focalization, the only apparent organizing “principle” being Alma, who begins 
the novel and ends it and who, along the way, becomes something of a medium 
through which the novel’s thematics become expressible.  This multiplicity of 
perspectives, of course, is not unique to this novel, especially if one wishes to place 
it within the category “postmodern” fiction in general, or more, specifically, in 
postmodern Filipino fiction.  Jessica Hagedorn’s oeuvre is only the most prominent 
example of this literary “type.”  What does make But for the Lovers unique is its 
linguistic density, the ornateness and complexity of its language; when combined 
with the oftentimes fantastical and hallucinatory quality of the novel’s many stories, 
it emerges to create a narrative that is undoubtedly difficult––but one that has a 
purpose: to obstruct communication itself, such that what arises in place of a 
definite object is an elaborate web of descriptors that create the object’s idea rather 
than providing it with its direct representation.   
 
B. THE MONAD  
  Let us begin our analysis by defining what I mean by the baroque mode.  I 
take as my primary source for the concept of the baroque Gilles Deleuze’s The 
Fold, his book on Leibniz.  Although I do not by any means intend to foreclose 
upon any other theoretical, political, or even aesthetico-historical conceptualization 
of the baroque by identifying Deleuze’s book as the definitive statement on the 
category, I do want to make a note of the fact that his notion seems to theorize what 
the baroque has, in common parlance, become––not only is it a particular period of 
European artistic production, it is also a much more general descriptor of any style 
or modality characterized by what is usually an inordinate amount of ornateness, 
decorativeness, complexity, and density.  Deleuze, indeed, says this much in the 
first sentence: “The Baroque refers not so much to an essence but rather to an 
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operative function, to a trait.”1  It is this trait, which, by implication, any modality 
(the full significance of which I will discuss), that I will now elaborate upon.  The 
remainder of this section will be devoted to an extended rereading of Deleuze’s 
book––a lengthy detour, but a necessary one.   
 The baroque, for Deleuze, is a way of theorizing the constitution of subjects 
by way of their interaction with both organic and inorganic matter.  It is an 
aesthetic, properly speaking.  Deleuze’s objective is to think a single, great Unity 
comprised of individual “souls.”  The book, then, is merely one of Deleuze’s many 
attempts to theorize difference and unity––or rather, their relation, one in which 
unity does not sacrifice difference by subordinating it to a higher logic, a taxonomic 
rigidity.  Deleuze’s ontology aims at creating a being that, in his and Felix 
Guattari’s famous terminology, is not a being at all but a “becoming,” a subject 
undergoing ceaseless transformations, one that cannot be tied down by a single 
determinative law.  In more politically oriented terms, his project could be said to 
have been concerned with one thing: a politics that, while capable of organizing a 
unified field of action, did not also degenerate into a hierarchy, a topology of the 
common in which there are no leaders.   
 Accordingly, Deleuze begins his analysis with the individual subject’s 
constitution, with the relation, more specifically, between the body and the soul.  
Each of these, he says, is comprised of “folds.”  Deleuze divides “folding” into two 
interrelated but entirely separate categories: elastic and plastic.  Elastic forces 
define the force of cohesion, the infinite division into “small and smaller folds”2 of 
a particular body (by “body,” Deleuze is referring both to organic and inorganic 
bodies, i.e. matter).  Plastic forces define the force of folding that “organize[s] 
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masses,” those that “transform raw matter into organic matter” by “preparing” the 
latter by way of a “motivating drive.”3  Once masses are organized, a higher form 
of constitution is needed: elastic and plastic forces only comprise what Deleuze 
calls “the lower level” of the baroque, the plane in which the body––and not the 
soul––resides.   
 This higher form of constitution is where an unfolding happens, where the 
forces in the lower level begin to construct organisms by inducing yet another kind 
of fold: the “cerebral fold.”  This is where the mind becomes active, where 
organisms are born: the mind is the site of organization, where the “soul” “becomes 
reasonable” by the apprehension of that which has and is taking place in the lower 
level.  Deleuze calls this unfolding-folding process an “elevation, an exaltation,” 
where “the theater of matter gives way to that of spirits or of God,” the “animal or 
sensitive soul” born from its “[opening] onto an entire theater in which it perceives 
or feels according to its unity, independently of its organism [i.e. its body, the body 
is perceives as being its ‘own’], yet inseparable from it.”  An immense unity is thus 
created where the soul and the cerebral folds become “entangled” with the body, 
with living matter, a perceptual and physical system in which the body’s 
constitution of what is essentially thought is itself conditioned by the thought that 
thinks the unity of the thinking subject as both mind and body, soul and animal––a 
“vertiginous animality,” as Deleuze calls it.4   
 Thought itself thus becomes the primary object of analysis, of how the 
subject not only arises from its encounter with the world, as Deleuze himself calls 
it, as it exerts its forces upon the subject, but also with how the subject as subject 
thinks this encounter––thinks itself and the world as organic unities.  This thought 
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is capable of being conceptualized, then, inasmuch as the vertiginous animality of 
which it is a constitutive element is considered––that is, only if unity is established 
from the start as both a result and prerequisite for the constitution of the subject and 
the world.  The perceiving thing, or the subject, and the thing perceived, or the 
object, thus unite in an entirely new relation.   
 At this point, we must pause and ask: what exactly is the object in this case?  
If the thinking subject thinks its encounter with the world as an organic unity and 
thinks itself qua the world as an organic unity as well, then the object is doubled––it 
is both the subject and the world, both organic unities combined as a single, 
differentiated and organic manifold perceived by the subject.  Let us keep this in 
mind. 
 For Deleuze, the object is no longer simply an observed thing, static and 
immobile.  It is an “objectile;” it fluctuates, and it “no longer refers its condition to 
a spatial mold––in other words, to a relation of form-matter––but to a temporal 
modulation that implies as much the beginnings of a continuous variation of matter 
as a continuous development of form.”5  This is another way of saying that the 
object perceived––both world and subject––are temporal because they are in the 
process of continually becoming, folding and unfolding themselves, entering into 
new relations and unities and engendering ever newer unities and thus new folds 
and unfoldings, organisms arising out of the recombinant structures of previous 
unities, ad infinitum.  Spatially, these unities and organicities are imperceptible; to 
think them as a relation of form-matter abolishes their temporality by keeping in 
abeyance the transformations constitutive of this immense unity––it is to fix them in 
a given mold, to delimit them according to a hierarchy of forms rather than to 
liberate them by thinking the variations that constitute them.   
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 The subject, accordingly, is transformed into what Deleuze, qua Whitehead, 
calls a “superject”––that is, the subject that undergoes a profound transformation in 
its becoming alongside the objectile it perceives.  The superject “will be what come 
to the point of view, or rather what remains in the point of view” of the perception 
of the objectile.6  The subject does not precede the object; rather it is what arises in 
the place where the perception of the object has taken place.  It is important to 
emphasize this point: where perception has taken place, i.e. what remains in the 
point of view.  The subject, instead of being the determining agent of the encounter 
with the object, is an effect, an outcome––but not of an object that precedes it either; 
rather, the subject is an effect inasmuch as it is what arises from its encounter with 
the object, the remainder of the encounter that has produced a new unity and 
organism.  The subject is not the point of view; it is the place in the point of view 
that thinks its encounter with the world.   
 If in this thought the object is both the subject and the world, this means that 
not only is the object doubled, as mentioned before; this means that the subject is 
doubled as well: it is both objectile and superject.  The subject is the superject 
inasmuch as it is the differentiation that allows the thought on the encounter to 
occur.  This is what Deleuze means when he says that it is what remains in the point 
of view: it is the remainder because it is the place of thinking marked by the 
difference immanent to the subject that allows it to think itself as part of the greater 
unity with the world that it thinks.  In Deleuze’s language, we can say that the 
thought constitutive of the subject differentiates the subject as thinking superject 
and as organic objectile unified (enfolded) with the world and its infinite folds: “It 
is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the 
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truth of a variation appears to the subject.”7  Thought is equated with a constitutive 
differentiation; and it is this constitutive differentiation that allows organisms and 
unities to be thought in their continual variation, in their ceaseless becoming.  
 What are these organisms and unities?  They are the famous Leibnizian 
monads.  Before discussing the monad proper, however, let us clarify for a moment 
one key term that has thus far remained somewhat undefined: the fold.  The fold 
can be best conceptualized as a potentiality, a single potentiality of a given thing 
that persists together with other potentialities, and whose unfolding is this 
potentiality’s actualization in a given organism.  Elastic forces maintain the 
cohesiveness of a given thing (whether organic or inorganic) as a manifold 
potentiality: the properties of that thing comprise its folds, each property 
manifesting a particular potentiality that could be actualized by combining with 
other properties to actualize a given mass.  Plastic forces prepare these forces for 
organization: the elastic forces that constitute a manifold of potentialities give way 
to the plastic forces’ actualization of a given set of these potentialities into a new 
organism and a new unity.  The folds of a match are the roughness of the match 
head and the chemical composition that makes it flammable, which, when 
combined with the folds of the surface struck and the folds of the environment (its 
dryness, the amount of oxygen available, etc.), create fire, whose folds eat up the 
folds of oxygen and the folds of the head of the match, during which folds combine 
and unfold to actualize new things, from a burnt match head, to ash, etc.  This is a 
sequence in which elastic forces (the composition of the match, for instance) give 
way to plastic forces (the igniting of fire), which, in the folds contained therein, also 
comprise elastic forces (those chemical  properties that maintain a fire for a given 
amount of time, for instance), and so on.  It is a sequence of variations, but elastic 
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forces do not pass into plastic forces.  Rather, due to the composition of unties 
characteristic of a given point in the sequence, a “higher order” is actualized.  This 
order contains elastic forces that maintain its unity and which, because it enters into 
relation with another manifold of potentialities, are potentialities of another sort; 
these then become actualized in another order.   
 Cerebral folds, then, are what allow the striking of the match, its ignition, its 
burning, and its dying out to be perceived: the process becomes process by the 
subject who thinks the unity of this process through the infinite variation of forces 
that comprise it, a subject that, by thinking the match, the fire, and the ash, thinks 
itself as the observer qua match, fire, and ash and as the thinker who thinks this 
observation qua the world.  All of these becomings comprise an infinite and 
manifold variability.   
 
C.  THE RATIONAL DOUBLE 
 This is why Deleuze calls the world an “infinite series,” which “cannot be 
separated from an infinity of variations that make it up.”8  What is the monad’s 
place in this infinite series?  “As an individual unit each monad includes the whole 
series; hence it conveys the entire world, but does not express it without expressing 
more clearly a small region of the world, a ‘subdivision,’ a borough of the city, a 
finite sequence.  Two souls do not have the same order, but neither do they have the 
same sequence or the same clear or enlightened region.”9  We are clearly in familiar 
territory.  This recalls what we have been saying about the common: a subject’s 
capacity to destroy the common’s delimitability is predicated upon the thought of 
every other subject’s equal ability to do so in their own region, site, and location as 
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well.  The monad expresses clearly the region it inhabits; the form of thought that it 
exhibits when thinking the unity and organicity of the world in the clarity of its 
region is what Leibniz called “sufficient reason,” which names the concept of the 
world and its infinite variations.  The result is a “compossible” world, a world that 
is “[reconstituted] over and again one and the same, infinitely infinite, converging 
series.”  The differences represented by each monad in the clear region specific to it 
thus “expresses the analytical extension of one series into another . . . Just as each 
monad conveys the entire world, so then a single notion can no longer pertain for 
one subject, and subject-monads will now be distinguished only by their inner 
manner of expressing the world.”10  The compossible world, then, is the concept 
given by the monad through sufficient reason to a world that is thought as an 
organic totality, an infinite series of foldings and unfoldings, of varying 
potentialities and their equally varying actualization.   
 This compossible world, however, is comprised, in its concept, of both clear 
and obscure regions, their intensities contingent upon the place that the monad 
inhabits: “At the limit . . . all monads possess an infinity of compossible minute 
perceptions, but have differential relations that will select certain ones in order to 
yield clear perceptions proper to each.  In this way every monad, as we have seen, 
expresses the same world as the others, but nonetheless owns an exclusive zone of 
clear expression that is distinguishable from every other monad: its subdivision.”11  
This gives us a clearer idea of the subject’s relation to the world.  If indeed the 
subject is differentiated from itself in its thought as both subject and object, as both 
the observer (superject) and object-in-the-world (objectile), then the world acquires 
a different meaning: it is the site of what might be called the subject-precipitate, the 
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leftover or remainder of the differential that induces the thinking being that thinks 
the variations from which it has momentarily fallen.  As objectile, the subject as 
concrete existence must necessarily remove itself from the world of infinite 
variations if it can become the superject and think the world in its unity; but once 
this removal has taken place, the world ceases to be the series of infinite variations 
that the subject once occupied as objectile and instead becomes what I will term a 
rational double of itself––rational insofar as it belongs within the domain of 
sufficient reason, and double insofar as it becomes the concept of the world, which 
is not the world that the subject inhabits, but the world that it thinks while 
inhabiting it.  This rational double of the world, in other words, is the concept of the 
concrete, infinite variations that allows the subject to think unity while also 
contemplating itself in it.  The world as rational double of itself is thus inextricable 
from the subject’s differentiation.   
 Moreover, because this thought implies the thought of other monads––i.e. 
other subject-precipitates who themselves think the world and its rational double––
the world is not just rationally doubled, it is rationally “infinitized,” so to speak, 
extended to an infinite number of potential worlds that nonetheless belong to one 
single organic unity.  We can say, following Deleuze’s terminology, that within the 
world there are an infinity of compossible worlds.   
 Does this mean that these worlds radically diverge from the one that is 
thought as a totality?  Deleuze calls one type of divergence “incompossibility;” it 
serves as the concept for what is excluded from the compossible series.12  Are these 
rational infinitudes analogous to incompossibilities?  In a way, they are.  They 
point us towards a direction that Deleuze merely hinted at towards the end of his 
book: that we can be said to live in a Leibnizian age only insofar as there are an 
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infinite number of foldings, unfoldings, and refoldings.  And then he qualifies this 
statement by suggesting that, on the contrary, “the world is now made up of 
divergent [i.e. incompossible] series . . . the world is unable to contain the entire 
world as if in a closed circle.”  The monad, Deleuze says, “astraddle over several 
worlds, is kept half open as if by a pair of pliers.”13  The entire book has been up 
until this point dedicated to elaborating the foundations of a monadology; this 
apparently self-subverting conclusion, then, can be read as an indication of what 
Deleuze was preparing all along but never (for whatever reason) properly 
discussed: what it means to think an incompossibility as both a divergence from and 
a part of, inasmuch as it is thought through, the monad’s organic, totalized world.  
One way to think this thought on incompossibility has just been provided: the world 
as rational infinitude.  Why is this important?  Because incompossibility is absolute 
negativity, the precondition for a thought on the militant subject.  But there is a 
second way to think incompossibility, and it belongs more properly to the domain 
of language itself––in the concept of predication.   
 
D.  AGAINST REPRESENTATION I: “PREDICATION” 
 Deleuze, qua Leibniz, posits predication against attribution: the former, for 
him, expresses “above all a relation and an event,” whereas the latter marks a 
defined linguistic territory in which the subject is stabilized by an attribute, obeying 
a type of hierarchical logic in which the copula assumes the role of the verb that the 
subject, in becoming stabilized by the attribute, takes on––the subject is walking, is 
moving, is this or that.  Predication, on the contrary, is “an act, a movement, a 
change, and not the state of travel.”14  The state of the subject attributed as 
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something, as doing something––this is what Deleuze says Leibniz removes by 
providing a “Baroque grammar.”  The “predicate is a verb;” more properly, it “is 
the proposition itself.”  Deleuze says that the Stoics made a significant 
“accomplishment” in this area: they made “the event neither an attribute nor a 
quality, but the incorporal predicate of a subject of the proposition (not ‘the tree is 
green,’ but ‘the tree greens . . .’).”15  What is important to remember is that Deleuze 
defines predication as the proposition: predication is not a form of being, but rather 
a form of thought on being as event, as process, as movement and becoming.  
Predication is inseparable from the thought and language that expresses this 
eventality.   
 This is why “perception has no object,” why “[c]conscious perception has 
no object and does not even refer to a physical mechanism of excitation that could 
explain it from without: it refers only to the exclusively physical mechanism of 
differential relations among unconscious perceptions that are comprising it within 
the monad.”16  What perception is is a thought on the manifold variations that 
comprise the thing perceived, those differential relations created by elastic and 
plastic forces and which create organisms.  The relation between thinking subject 
and thought object is submitted to the infinitude of differences that render 
attribution impossible: neither subject nor object are stable entities, so to speak, 
because both are constituted by the idea of the world’s variational flux that defines 
the baroque mode of thought, or in other words, the world’s rational infinitude. 
 Before defining how exactly the baroque mode offers up a thought against 
representation (the concern of this section, after all), we have to discuss the relation 
between predication and attribution, since, obviously, and upon a cursory glance, I 
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have deployed both apparently incompatible concepts in order to advance my 
claims. 
 
E.  AGAINST REPRESENTATION II: THE ATTRIBUTE 
 The first question that comes to mind is: is the attribution that Deleuze 
speaks of the same kind of attribution that we have thus far been describing qua 
becoming-subject and becoming-militant?  Recall that I derived the concept of 
attribution from Negri’s reading of Spinoza.  While I do not think that, for the 
present purposes, a long disquisition on the relation between Spinozian and 
Leibnizian thought is particularly helpful, I do think it useful to note that, as is well 
known, Deleuze was himself heavily indebted to Spinoza as a philosophical 
“teacher.”  With this in mind, let us restrict ourselves to quoting a single passage 
from Deleuze book on Spinoza, called Expressionism in Philosophy: “Attributes are 
infinite forms of being, unlimited, ultimate, irreducible formal reasons; these forms 
are common to God whose essence they constitute, and to modes which in their 
own essence imply them.  Attributes are Words expressing unlimited qualities; 
these qualities are as it were involved in the limits of the finite.  Attributes are 
expressions of God; these expressions of God are univocal, constituting the very 
nature of God as natura naturans, and involved in the nature of things of natura 
naturata which, in a certain way, re-expresses them in its turn.”17  This analysis is 
very similar to the one Negri provides; what distinguishes Deleuze’s, however, and 
which is why it is important to us, is his emphasis on the relation between the 
attribute and expression, or what he calls the Spinozian Word.  As we saw, 
predication is a form of thought that allows the world to be thought as a rational 
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infinitude.  Deleuze, in this passage, also describes the attribute as a form––a 
common form.  It too serves to designate a thought on unity, one that, moreover, is a 
thought on this form as expression, as the mutual expressiveness of the divine 
substance and the earthly modes.   
 Representation implies a hierarchy that Deleuze wishes to abolish; it 
presupposes an a priori subject’s incarnation in language, through which access to 
this subject then becomes possible.  Expressionism removes the relation between 
represented thing (subject), representer (language), and representee (the “consumer” 
of the representation who “reads” the subject’s existence through language) by 
positing a unified field of immanent “expressibilities.”  What the attribute enables is 
a form of thought on the common itself, on what places the modes within a 
community of modes while allowing their differences to be simultaneously 
thought––the relation, in other words, between difference and unity.  Spinozism, for 
Deleuze, is “the assertion of a community of form and the positing of a distinction of 
essences,” that “creatures differ from God in essence and existence” while “God 
has something in common with creatures formally.”18  Form is thus one, while 
essence is multiple.  This is the basic formula for a Spinozist attribution that 
demolishes the authority of a single essence transmitting itself across and through 
all signs; attribution is a thought on formal commonality and essential infinitude.   
 The attribution that Deleuze speaks of in The Fold, then, is a much more 
deficient concept: as the stabilizer and qualifier of the copula, it posits a subject that 
preexists the attribute, the relation between them created only by also introducing 
the copula as a logical unifier of the subject and its predicate.  In this sense, being 
can be said to be nothing more than the legitimator of the hierarchy of 
representation: something is inasmuch as the subject does not become, but persists, 
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its attributes mere qualifiers of an unchanging essence, the ever-represented thing 
of representation.   
 An immanent plane, then, is an attribution-predication: the community of 
formal differences expressing an essential infinitude, the thought of which is 
possible only by thinking the rational infinitude of the world, the world devoid of a 
single determinative essence.   
 
F.  AGAINST REPRESENTATION III: INCOMPOSSIBILITY 
 This brings us to a final way of thinking against representation, and which 
will concretize the political implications of the form of thought I have described as 
attribution-predication: that of the incompossible.   
 Thus far, we have seen that, in the baroque mode: 
 a.  the subject is differentiated from itself and is the precipitate of   
      perception, both perceiving subject and perceived object; 
 b.  the object, or objectile, is unstable, subordinate to the temporality that  
      marks the infinite variations of which it consists; 
 c.  representation is annulled, attribution-predication being the form of  
      thought that places the subject-object relation on an immanent plane,  
      expression taking its place and producing the idea of the formal  
      commonality of the world of irreducible differences; and 
 d.  the world is rationally infinitized, the world that the subject inhabits as  
      concrete thing (object) and perceiver (subject), the thought on which  
      initiates an infinitization by way of, first, its existence as concrete unity 
      (the world of the subject-as-object) and, as such, as concept of itself (the 
      world of the subject-as-subject); and second, the idea of other perceiving 
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      subjects, i.e. the monads, who themselves rationally double the world, an 
      infinite variability of concrete concepts that create the world anew. 
If perception indeed has no object, and there is no such thing as representation 
(unless we want to resurrect hierarchical thought), what then happens to the world 
as concrete concept?   
 I suggested earlier that what Deleuze aimed to do in The Fold was to 
suggest ways of thinking an incompossibility as both a divergence from and a part 
of the monad’s organic, totalized world.  Formally speaking, Deleuze has described 
the general schematics for thinking incompossibilities; this is what he means when 
he says that, though we are now at an age in which the monad straddles multiple 
worlds and leaves itself vulnerable to being pried open (as if by pliers), a 
conclusion that he refuted throughout the rest of the book, the world is still, because 
of the infinity of foldings, unfoldings, and refoldings that constitute it, Leibnizian.  
The world as rational infinitude opens up this form into the concept of which, 
admittedly, this dissertation has been absent in the last two chapters: absolute 
negativity. 
 What kind of perception takes place, as it were, qua the world as rational 
infinitude?  The world is made up of infinite concrete subdivisions, in Deleuze’s 
terms, in addition to infinite concrete concepts.  The material world and its concrete 
concepts are extended to infinity.  Perception without an object, because it is 
thought as attribution-predication, entails the disappearance of both the world and 
subject as objects; what takes their place is the idea of the infinite variations that 
comprise the world and the subject-as-object united as common forms, an immanent 
plane of differences in which expression has taken hold precisely because there is 
no single determinative “instance” governing the forms themselves.  The subject’s 
place in this immanence is that of the perceiver who thinks the unity-difference 
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relation as a concept that is entirely contingent upon the subject’s “subdivision,” 
on his or her place in the world as both perceived thing and perceiver.  If the 
subject is indeed the precipitate of perception, then the subject “takes hold” only 
insofar as the perception specific to the baroque mode happens––that is, when the 
thought on the common infinitely divided by its infinite essences induces this 
precipitation.  But what is the nature of this precipitation?  As the site of thought, 
the subject arises as the partial fixing of the world, as the removal of thought from 
the world in order to properly think it.   
 This distanciation, however, does not clarify the world; rather, it multiplies 
it, infinitizes it.  And it does so according to the idea of other multiplications and 
infinitizations, or in other words, other subject who themselves have removed 
themselves from the world.  But these subjects themselves are objects––they 
therefore remain subject to attribution-predication.  They cannot, we must say, be 
represented––they can only be thought in their immanent equality to the world and 
to other subject-objects in their inherent and essential difference.  The thinking 
subject’s relation to the world and to the common is thus to de-represent them; it is 
to force them into a relation of expressibility.   
 Incompossibility, absolute negativity, emerges, then, as a constitutive 
element of thought, because of the following prerequisite: that the thinking subject 
is essentially apart from other subjects, which exist, when thought happens, as 
objects, as concrete concepts.  It is not just a matter of there being obscure regions 
of perception, as Deleuze calls it; it is more a matter of these obscure regions’ 
expression of the most common “thing” of all: the form of the world as infinitude, 
the substances of which remain in their essentially discreet regionalities.  And this 
form is thinkable only from the position of that which is not of the world: the 
subject.  The startling conclusion we must reach is that the most radical negativity 
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of the world––that which does not belong to it––is nothing less than the thinking 
subject itself, the one who thinks the common as world, who thinks the world as 
rational infinitude, who thinks rational infinitude as the form of thought.  The 
subject’s separation from the world negates it; it is a distanciation that is 
tantamount to a renunciation of the world as is; it is a renunciation of hierarchies 
and representations, the thought against which initiates the becoming of a subject 
that is absolute negativity manifest.  This subject is incompossibility itself.     
 
 
7.2  LITERATURE-AS-THOUGHT: ABSOLUTE NEGATIVITY ACTUALIZED 
  
A.  LITERARY PRAXIS, REVISITED 
 Conceptualizing the reader-subject, as we saw in Chapter 4, is contingent 
upon conceiving of literature as a form of thought.  This in its turn is dependant 
upon conceiving of such a thought as the reader-subject’s capacity to think of him 
or herself as being included in the field of relations that the literary work presents.  
This is the thought on literature as a function of praxis. 
 And what is praxis, or work, qua literature-as-thought?  It is the negativity 
that literature introduces into thought as the expression of a new community, of its 
self-presentation beyond the delimitations imposed by capital––namely, those of 
communication, in which addressor and addressee occupy fixed positions in a 
spatio-temporal grid that marks out the territories of production and consumption.  
Futurality sends into this grid absolute negativity, the extra-temporal dimension that 
produces the idea of a new organization of space that exceeds both knowledge and 
being––a non-knowledge (insofar as knowledge describes the consensus’ limitation 
of thought) and non-being (insofar as being designates the ontological sphere of 
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what is, as opposed to what cannot be) that sends the entire apparatus of 
communication into disarray and brings about––actually summons––a new 
community, a new common, in thought.   
 
B.  “A HEMORRHAGE OF HISTORY:” A FUTURE PEACE 
 How, then, does But for the Lovers accomplish this multifaceted production 
of the reader-subject?  Through the novel’s typology, which posits relations 
between temporality, political subjects, and language.   
 Four characters express the typological axis around which the novel is 
organized: history’s, and, in another vein, time’s capacity to structure the meaning 
of events, which in the novel’s case is the struggle to make sense of the Philippines 
during the closing months of the second world war.  These four characters are: 
Hidalgo, Major Shigura, Lieutenant Deogracias, and Alma.  Let us distinguish the 
first three characters’ typological function first.   
 1.  Hidalgo.  The temporality he expresses is one of a pure pastness, the 
historicality he represents being filtered through his nostalgia for the Philippines’ 
Spanish past.  And not only that––this nostalgia is a history marked by its length 
and breadth, its supposed rootedness in the Philippines, as though an unchanging 
earth that defines and contours the country and its people.  When he finds Alma, he 
anoints her with a “benediction:” he calls her “hija.”  Here is how Nolledo 
describes the moment: “Four hundred years of Spanish romance caressed the 
word.”19  His favorite spot is Intramuros, the old walled city, the first Spanish 
capital of old Manila, established by Legazpi, the same conquistador mentioned in 
José’s Viajero.  He thinks of his wanderings towards Intramuros as being driven by 
his “querencia,” his homesickness or longing.  He thus bypasses Intramuros’ 
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contemporary function: the Japanese used the walled city as their headquarters in 
Manila, in addition to housing prisoners of war and any Philippine dissenters.  This 
also means that Hidalgo remains obstinate to the ideas of an American liberation:  
  The American Air Force had sought out the particular landmark to  
  bomb, lingeringly, almost religiously, with precision and contempt.  
  Filipinos would cheer every air raid siren; they celebrated each  
  bombing as they did the feast days of their saints; not Hidalgo.  If  
  this was his last season on the stage [recall that he is a vaudevillian 
  performer], Intramuros was his last sanctuary in this city, perhaps in 
  the whole country.  Even this ridiculous war could not take that  
  away from him.  Haber, why should he choose between the Gringo 
  Roosevelt and the Celestial Hirohito?  Both were moths flickering  
  over the Castilian candle. . . .  History only breathed in the Walled  
  City, and despite its historical brutalization, Intramuros still  
  belonged to the Spain of El Cid.20 
Whereas Filipinos long for an American-led liberation of the country, Hidalgo still 
longs for the color and beauty of a “Hispanic Asia.”21  The status of the Filipino, 
then, is remarkably complex here: Hidalgo is nostalgic for that period in history 
when he, a (self-described?) “Spaniard” (whether he is actually from Spain or is a 
mestizo is never disclosed), was the only legitimate Filipino, i.e. those with pure 
Spanish blood either from Spain or born in the Philippines from Spanish parents.  
And yet, the passage I have quoted differentiates Hidalgo from the “Filipinos” who 
celebrate the Americans’ bombings of Intramuros.  They are not described as other 
Filipinos; they are simply Filipinos, a (racial, national, patriotic, historical) category 
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to which Hidalgo does not belong, or does not see himself belonging to––his 
allegiance to Spain describes another Philippines altogether, one that is not 
beholden to the modern Empires but is instead historicized by its Spanish past.    
 Hidalgo equates true history with Spain, and posits this truth against what 
are essentially fleeting historical events, ones that are, however, capable of 
destroying everything he cares about.  He thus splits time into two.  On the one 
hand, there is the time of Spanish Philippines, a genuine historical time that is 
intelligible in the environment, in the buildings and colors (he often describes his 
surroundings in terms of their chromatic significance) infused with meaning and 
historicized memory.  On the other, there is the time of the present, of the post-
Spanish period that began with America’s conquest and reached a new stage with 
the Japanese Occupation, and whose meaning is entirely different: as against the 
Spanish period’s resplendence and richness, there is the drabness (the “red and 
brown” of the Japanese uniforms against the “polychromatic” brilliance of 
Intramuros’ walls22) of the modern Empire, the scramble for riches and military and 
political strength a weak flame to Spain’s established and affective hold over the 
country.  This historical weakness, this bankruptcy of meaning and significance, 
however, is able to reduce everything that gives historical meaning to the 
Philippines to dust.   
 Hidalgo’s nostalgia posits time against non-time, history against a-history, 
meaning against meaninglessness.  His pre-modern romance, in short, is the only 
way he can create for himself the idea of a stable socio-political entity: the 
Philippines as non-State, as imperial appendage and outpost to a once-thriving 
Spanish empire.  Hidalgo seeks to align history, temporality, and meaning, their 
harmony securing for him a social environment in which significance is still 
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thoroughly intelligible in the world.  It is a world, oddly enough, without Filipinos.  
If indeed he cannot describe himself as a Filipino, which only serves to delimit 
those who remain tied to the imperial present, then he acquiesces, nonetheless, to 
the idea that time cannot be reversed, that he cannot return to that era when his 
ethno-racial class was the only true Filipino one: there is no indication that Hidalgo 
considers himself to be any more legitimately Filipino than anyone else.  He is 
simply Spanish.  When focalized through Hidalgo, the novel implies a time in 
which Filipinos do not exist: they are simply sublimated into a hierarchy in which 
Spanish-ness becomes the attribute by which significance, and, by extension, 
history and time, are possible.   
 2.  Major Shigura.  He presents the novel’s most extreme case of 
temporality; his is diametrically opposed to Hidalgo’s vision of a history and time 
replete with meaning: his dream of a pan-Asian collectivity heralded by the 
Japanese rising sun is thoroughly anarchic at its heart.  Here is a remarkable 
passage: 
     You have not seen Manchuria.  You have not seen China––the  
  butchery, the beheadings.  Our war goes on like the growing of rice.  
  Rice is at the bottom of everything, from the day we exhale to the  
  night we fail. . . .  Once, in our fetishistic heyday, a student of  
  Buddha burned down one of Gautama’s [founder of Buddhism]  
  temples.  I think it was a deliberate act of absolution through  
  violence.  But such an extroverted truth can only be called madness.  
  Yet that curtailer of a cult spoke for us all.  Part of every soldier is an 
  assassin.  Let me remind you that the world has been like colossi  
  with arms of purification.  I, too, am an assassin, ne?  I would like to 
  purge the army.  If only there were a million like myself who could 
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  disband that collective strength by sheer ineptness, by absolute  
  abandonment, perhaps contumely of scapegoats in uniform will lose 
  the war and win dignity.  If some vast protest exist in the navy, in the 
  air force, and in the secret police, perhaps Japan will revivify–– 
  glory?  But these infiltrations are hornets without sting and the army 
  will never realize until very late that I was its greatest enemy.  I, and 
  this monumental disenchantment with that we are fighting for.   
  Therefore it remains your task, you out there in the honeycombed  
  bunkers: to muffle the artillery, outflank the infantry, sink the  
  battleships, shoot down the bombers.  I wish all the armies of the  
  world would collide for the last time and quash the dogs of war.   
  After such a tournament, it may be that the citizen long hobbling on 
  the front (and what is this front but only the backdoor of man’s  
  intentions?) may come back to a society without government, to a  
  state without statesmen, to a republic without democracy, to a house 
  without lords.  Meanwhile, the stupidity does on that we lovingly  
  call free spirit.  Ah, to be free of the human spirit!23 
This tirade, a sort of prolepsis/fantasy on the apocalypse of all States and 
governments, comes at a significant moment: Shigura has already realized that, in 
these final months of the war, an American return is inevitable.  The destruction of 
the Philippines’ social, economic, and political foundations, the burning of Tondo 
(which happens at the end of the novel), the atrocities, the death toll across the 
Pacific, even the atomic destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima––all of these are 
figured and prefigured in Shigura’s soliloquy.  It is an immense annihilation 
through which the world must pass in order to reach some final, lasting peace.  
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Shigura accepts Japan’s imminent defeat, but exempts himself from all culpability, 
distances himself from Japan.  He is the novel’s traitor-figure.   
 This is how he sees himself: 
  Between transmission and execution, between order and obedience, 
  Major Shigura was confident he was beyond guilt or glory.  In the  
  event of an Allied victory––and the handwriting had dripped down  
  on the other side of the wall––the war trials would, with evangelical 
  wrath, pursue the taint of culpability to their visible roots: Tojo,  
  Yamashita, along with all those warlords that had presumed too  
  much in their ‘war of expansion.’  As a coup de grace, the Emperor 
  himself would be stripped of his celestial robes.  In Nazi Germany, 
  the identifiable beast was Hitler, whose certified infamy would soon 
  keep historians busy.  Der Führer would join all the infamous  
  exterminators of czarist and Stalinist Russia; and Sieg Heil! he  
  would go down in the final accounting with Nero, Caligula, Attila  
  and Genghis Khan.  But Japan’s own Sphinx, enlisting, then  
  exhuming its aliases and despoilers, would survive Allied   
  technology, would subvert man’s very theology––to reassess,  
  reconstruct, regroup tomorrow’s traumas, the future’s feudal fangs  
  for a neo-Nipponese rising sun, for a more beautiful harvest moon,  
  and . . . 
     This very minute, the Sphinx (or the Manila moon?) was   
  transfusing: through an alias––Major Shigura.24 
Unlike Hidalgo, what is most significant to Shigura is what is most unintelligible 
and indiscernible, those nameless masses who bombed Pearl Harbor, those 
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indecipherable Sphinxes of the apocalypse who stand mute and perplexing, 
confounding all aspects of human understanding.  Those who are most significant 
are the most a-historical, those who remain intractable to history’s recorders––to 
language itself.  They survive every judgment against the State.  Shigura, at this 
moment, is the alias of this silent and faceless apocalypse.  Shigura’s distanciation 
from Japan happens as a separation from every significance given to war by the 
State and, by extension, any international law that might prosecute him in the 
aftermath: his mission is to accelerate violence beyond every conceivable value.  
He sees himself as the bringer of destruction; it is a form of attribution when he 
defines himself as an alias of the Sphinx.  And only he possesses the answer to the 
following riddle: how, despite the State’s destruction, is it still possible to posit a 
non-Western order headed by Japan?  Japan can only name an ethnicity, the bearer 
of the most non-Western tradition, due to centuries of isolation, and as such is 
capable of leading every other category of Asian to its ultimate destiny: a pan-Asian 
collectivity freed from the conquest of the West. 
 But this destiny is a-historical; it can be meaningful only as a time, perhaps 
paradoxically, that bears marks of a determinism.  Although he repudiates the 
efficacy of Imperial Japan’s war of expansion, itself described as a form of pan-
Asianism by Japan’s top military designers and propagandists, the second world 
war remains an essential step: it is the apocalypse that will bring about, in its 
rubble, the conditions that make it possible to realize the new pan-Asian order.  
Shigura will take advantage of this destruction and hasten its effects.   
 If the novel’s focalization of Shigura has brought us closer to absolute 
negativity than any other figure thus far, it has also revealed an error similar to the 
identitarianism of José’s Viajero: that racial belongingness still needs to establish a 
hierarchy.  In Viajero, this hierarchy was constructed along a ethno-political and 
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spatial axis, the diaspora having to return “home” in order to actualize its potential 
radicalism; here, a hierarchy is created along a purely ethnic one that attempts to 
repudiate history and find significance in its intractability towards judgment and 
language.  Shigura fails, however; if Japan names an ethnicity, a name that is the 
result of a self-designation in what is otherwise a cipher of meanings, and inasmuch 
as this naming takes place along a quasi-deterministic concept of time, then 
Shigura’s invocation of an ethnic purity is possible only by abstracting it from the 
very concrete history to which it belongs, attempting, without consequences, to 
extract from Japan’s imperial mission the ethnic and racial dimensions that are in 
fact inseperable from its political, economic, and military designs, those very things 
that Shigura deplores.  He abstracts, in other words, ethnicity, as though it were 
thinkable, in his pan-Asianism, apart from Empire and the State.  Shigura’s 
attribution, then, bears within itself, despite all of its anarchic rage, the problems of 
hierarchization: it returns in the form of a temporality that sees the present as 
absolutely indispensable to realizing his dream.   
 The trick is to posit the abolition of all values without recuperating the 
continuity of time, and to think the contradiction of eroding the foundations of an 
ethno-political name while maintaining its importance as an organizer of anti-
imperial and anti-Statist subjects.   
 3.  Lieutenant Deogracias.  The leader of a Marxist guerilla unit, he is 
ordered by the rebel high command to escort Captain Jonas Winters (Captain 
Johnny), shot down by Japanese guns during a bombing mission in the P-38 he 
pilots, from Baguio (where his plane wrecked) to Manila.  This would lead to a 
second phase of his mission, which the “Manila high command” describes as “the 
exploitation of a metaphor,”25 i.e. the exploitation of the idea of an American-led 
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Philippine liberation as promised by MacArthur.  Captain Johnny, then, is the figure 
and name of an imminent Philippine freedom from the Occupation, paraded around 
the towns along the way as the sign of this inevitability.  Along the way, Deogracias 
takes Winters along a virtual tour of the Philippines, commenting thusly:  
  the static quality of mountain culture is emphasized in both rice  
  terraces and design of the Igorot dress.  Jonas, bear with me; study  
  the intervals in evidence.  Neither terrace nor cloth of the Ifugao has 
  changed in aeons.  Philippine life––as the Ifugao designs would have 
  us believe––has but one movement and that is round and round a  
  vicious circle, even as the Ifugao [the people of the Ifugao region in 
  Northern Luzon] dance.  Terrace and cloth dance, my friend, yet do 
  not move.  But that is a myth begun by Spaniards, encouraged by  
  Americans; and the Filipino is past Ifugao, beyond Torquemada,  
  Tojo––even MacArthur.  The tabernacle is Filipino . . . tomorrow!26 
This last exclamation is significant: coming at the end of a disquisition against the 
myth of circularity––that Filipinos have no history––Deogracias invokes the Judeo-
Christian concept of the soul and/or holiness.  The tabernacle, as the host of the 
Covenant or of the human soul, is invoked as the being of the Filipino; the Filipino 
is thus, somehow, the shell of a much greater purity and sanctity, but only in the 
future, i.e. “tomorrow!”   
 What is this purity?  Deogracias elaborates it in his notion of taoism, tao 
being the tagalog word for “people.”  It is essentially a populist theory that 
describes the true Filipino as “the legitimate heir of the indio commonality,” that 
“only those executed in the past and suffering today could be deemed Filipino.”  
This excludes “any bureaucrat,” “even the most insignificant clerk.”  The Filipino is 
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“he who starved, he who smiled for centavos, he whose children were born 
deformed and nurtured in discontent.  In short, taoism was next to Filipinism, and 
this nepotism, if one were to extend credibility a gap farther, led to godliness.”27  
Deogracias’ time is a messianic one (he calls the return of the Americans the 
“Second Coming”): replete with meaning, it is significant only insofar as the notion 
of progress is allowed to imbue every event with purpose, which allows Deogracias 
to delimit the concept of the Filipino and the tao, in addition to positing their 
correlation.  The tabernacle, as Filipino, is tomorrow because Deogracias has 
produced an alternative history marked by the forward thrust of a teleology defined 
by the tao’s  vindication: a free Philippines populated by next-to-godly people, a 
collectivity without, apparently, hierarchies.   
 The path towards reaching this heavenly state is, however, based upon a 
dissimulation: Captain Johnny will be presented as the sign of liberation, one that 
will be based not upon what he actually represents––the American return––but by 
the activation of the tao’s desires, fantasies, and anticipations––that of liberation, 
pure and simple.  Deogracias’ mission is to fill the messianic time of the tao with 
the metaphor of liberation––and what it metaphorizes is the revolution of the tao, 
mobilized and organized.  The hope is that this metaphorization will happen; there 
is nothing to guarantee that the idea of liberation is capable of igniting a purely 
autonomous and self-sufficient Filipino revolution against all Empires.  Deogracias’ 
messianic time is thus filled with contingencies, which is why Hidalgo disagrees 
with him.   
 It is worth noting that the passage I quoted above is focalized through 
Hidalgo’s criticism; though it maintains its ideological edge, it is still nonetheless 
framed as a critical evaluation of Deogracias’ version of populism.  Hidalgo’s 
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charge is that the latter knows nothing of the people, that he is thoroughly idealistic.  
Hidalgo is right, of course.  But his charge is based upon, as we saw, his 
Eurocentric vision of history: progress, he claims, is impossible in Deogracias’ 
notion of the tao, whose immanent autonomy Hidalgo contests: for him, the tao can 
never be capable of instituting change; it will always sit on the head, as if a “topee” 
[sic], of a country’s ruler.28   
 At this point, it should be clear that the two differing notions of Filipino-
ness are stake in this disagreement: Hidalgo’s Filipino, sublimated into a Spanish-
centered historicality, against Deogracias’ self-actualizing, autonomous and 
suffering Filipino.  What they share is that the meaning of the Filipino is submitted 
to a timeline in which significance comes, more or less, from elsewhere: Spain in 
Hidalgo’s version, and America in Deogracias’.  For the latter, however, Filipino-
ness comes as the self-recognition of the tao as the tabernacle of freedom and 
godliness (and thus of history’s vindication of their suffering); the metaphor is 
exploitable precisely because it serves as nothing but the chance that this 
recognition can be activated.  The American return is thus delegitimized in favor of 
a “revolution from below.”   
 Why, then, does the novel discredit Deogracias by killing him off (he is 
crushed in a falling building towards the end)?  Because his notion of Filipino-ness 
is delimited, because he posits an apodictic identity of the autonomous, 
revolutionary collectivity.  Not only that––he does so by passing through the 
meaning that the American return carries with it.  Though he delegitimizes it, he 
still relies on its ability to invoke freedom and liberty; the hope is that these ideas 
are seen not only as a fraud when incarnate in the metaphor of the American 
solider, but that they are somehow universally intelligible signs that can be 
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appropriated as the foundation for revolution.  We are thus left with the same 
problem as that of Viajero: freedom American-style, even when it is recognized as 
an imperial project, carries with it a pure and essential spirit that functions as the 
democratic principle by which true liberation can be achieved.  The Filipino, in 
Deogracias’ vision of history, is significant only when the messianic time of 
progress is given ideological weight by this quandary.   
 What these three characters express is the novel’s development of a 
typology of the future, which is marked by a peace that is, a) historically replete 
with significance, b) marked by its absolute negation of every value cherished in the 
present, and c) initiated by a revolution of the people.  We have seen how these 
different concepts of time and history relate to language; the primary means by 
which Hidalgo, Shigura, and Deogracias define this typology is by evacuating 
meaning from a given set of signs: the Filipino for Hidalgo; national and military 
allegiance for Shigura; and freedom and democracy for Deogracias.   
 The problem is how they fill the void they have created; the problem is how 
they posit meaning and significance again, how they delimit the politics they have 
elaborated, each one providing us with a coordinate by which absolute negativity 
and, along with it, a militant diasporic reader-subject can be thought: the abolition 
of the Filipino and its return as organizer of political ontologies, and the 
introduction of the present’s absolute negativity as the excess of all meaning, of the 
creation of a new language (as Shigura desires).  The problem is a problem of 
hierarchical time; each one of these characters end up positing some sort of 
determinism from above.  Moreover, in each of their own ways, these characters, by 
positing this determinism, reinforce the notion I have repeatedly rejected 
throughout this dissertation: that, in the last analysis, the second world war, the 
American “liberation” of the Philippines, and, in a more general sense, the triumph 
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of democracy against a defeated global fascism, was a step in the right direction 
toward actualizing democracy’s radical potential, despite the fact that, as these 
characters’ typological functions reveal (and especially Shigura’s and Deogracias’), 
everything the war stood for among those with power would be wiped out by this 
radical politics.  What we need to do is figure out how this evacuation of meaning, 
this creation of a new and negating language, can refuse being refilled by such a 
hierarchization of time qua meaning, of meaning qua time.   
 
C.  A CONSTELLATION OF TRAITORS: BAROQUE IRONY 
 Alma is our fourth main character, and she is the cipher of any delimitable 
meaning.  She is also the novel’s primary site of focalization.  She affects every 
character, including the three I have just described.  And as we will see, she is the 
actualization of the baroque mode and is the instigator of the reader-subject’s 
praxis.   
 Alma begins the novel: its prologue is an hallucination of hers, which takes 
place before she is found by Amoran and Hidalgo, and it depicts the following 
event: the death of a Filipino boy with whom she had been infatuated.  The 
hallucination transforms, in advance, four of the novel’s characters and combines 
them, turning them into figures whom Alma imagines as co-participants in some 
small adventure: to travel, on a boat, beyond Asia and into the seas of the world.  
First, there is a “boy,” first shown eating flowers, and who recalls Alma’s erstwhile 
crush, who sold flowers before being shot by a Japanese soldier, but who in the 
hallucination is a blue-eyed American, much like Captain Jonas Winters.  Second, 
there is “Quasimoto,” a Japanese soldier on the run whom Alma and the boy 
encounter and who eventually joins them in their travels, who recalls both Major 
Shigura (for reasons I will shortly describe) and Amoran (the latter described later 
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on in the novel as having a hunchback).  Moreover, the hallucination is punctuated 
with the distant sounds of a guitar; throughout the novel, Amoran himself is 
oftentimes introduced, his presence in the scene evoked, by the sound of a guitar 
(which he keeps strapped to his body).   
 That the novel should begin in such a way, with characters of different 
national and political allegiances cooperating to sail the seas and, as the reader 
eventually realizes, are the result of a merger between four characters that play a 
large part in the kind of typology that Alma embodies, blurs the line, as the 
narrative says, between “reality” and “dream:” “They navigated from day to 
daydream, unwilling to linger in one place.”29  Such an unwillingness to adhere to 
the either side of the boundary between clarity and hallucination, however, does not 
exempt this navigation from having any concrete correlate: as the novel shows, 
each hallucinatory figure has as its counterpart a figure.  But these figures arise 
post-hallucination: the figures the reader eventually encounters are actually pre-
figurations of the hallucination that begins the narrative proper.  Why is this 
significant?  Because, by being framed by Alma’s thought, her dreams, her 
imagination, the novel becomes imbued with a futurality, in the sense that I gave to 
it in Chapter 3: as the absolute temporal negativity of the present.  The narrative, by 
being pre-figured by a hallucination that takes place before every event, because 
Alma thinks characters who (with the exception of the murdered boy with whom 
Alma was in love) have yet to exist, becomes saturated with her thought.  The 
hallucinatory prologue is as much a delirious fabrication as it is a mangled form of 
foresight.  The thought that contours the narrative is Alma’s through and through.  
What the reader does when he or she reads is plunge into a world she has already 
imagined.   
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 What kind of a world is this?  It is a world marked by flight, by treason.  
This is how treason is defined in the prologue, revealed in a dialogue between Alma 
and Quasimoto: 
     “I have committed treason,” he sighed, never neglecting to cast a 
  troubled glance at the clouds whenever he resorted to this throat- 
  catching word that weighed most on his mind. 
     “What is treason?” asked the girl. 
     “Nothing but the width of the universe,” groaned Quasimoto.   
  “Nothing but the wrath of man.” 
     “How lovely it is,” Alma raved, swaying to Quasimoto’s litany. 
     “Hai,” agreed Quasimoto, “indeed . . .” 
     “How lonely it is.” 
     “It is . . .”30 
Recall Shigura’s traitorous dreams of a world beyond nations, States, democracies, 
and law, of a world that has superceded every present value, of a world in which a 
new language that is the absolute negativity of the present is born.  That the 
prologue unites three figures from countries at war with each other is enough to 
signal a certain amount of treason.  What is more important, however, is the desire 
that Alma has for it; it is both lovely and lonely to her, the object of desire that also 
abolishes any notion of togetherness and community.  Treason is lonely because to 
be a traitor––not a traitor to a country, to a cause, to anything in particular, but a 
traitor pure and simple, which is what Quasimoto is––is to stand against every 
conceivable value that upholds allegiances and established ideas.   
 And alone is what Alma becomes by the end of the prologue: after being 
captured by a group of six unnamed men (one of whom, however, can be seen as a 
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pre-figuration of Hidalgo), the boy and Quasimoto are killed.  Alma takes her 
revenge by grabbing a rifle, killing all but one.  She is shown floating on a raft, 
having dined on bananas, with the body of Quasimoto in her lap: “now the infanta 
of the forest has eaten and there nothing left to guard and no history on earth could 
write the memory nor light this night without gods.  Down the river the man (the 
lone brave lover) [the only survivor of Alma’s revenge, who chases after her along 
the banks of the river upon which she floats, enamored by her] saw her floating on 
a piece of house in a dream of life, her hair as long as sunrise.  And she also wept, 
she also sang ‘O Quasimoto-San, I long for your treason. . . .”31  Thus begins the 
narrative.   
 Throughout, Alma, for the most part, stands alone.  What effect does this 
prologue have on the narrative?  As we saw in my description of Hidalgo’s, 
Shigura’s, and Deogracias’ typologies, the novel is replete with attempts at 
evacuating meaning from concepts in the name of actualizing some future peace, 
failed attempts that result in nothing more than a reintroduction of meanings that 
recapitulate those hierarchies that each character is attempting to rebel against by 
positing a deterministic model of time and history.  These hierarchies delimit a 
particular identity to which this future peace belongs: for Hidalgo, it was an identity 
sublimated to a condition of Spanish-ness; for Shigura, it was a pan-Asianism at the 
helm of which is a pure Japanese (and thus Asian) ethnicity; for Deogracias, it was 
a notion of Filipino-ness linked to the tao.  The latter two, especially, posit the 
second world war as a necessary step towards actualizing their respective utopias, 
as the event that would accelerate the violence between, for Shigura, nations, and, 
for Deogracias, the Philippines’ classes.  These delimitations, however, are belied 
by what the prologue provides: irony.  The novel, by starting out with Alma’s desire 
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for treason, by pre-figuring the majority of the main characters in an hallucinatory 
version of unity, posits the existence of another idea that lies beside and against the 
delimitations presented in the narrative proper: the idea of the traitorous assembly 
of figures in the name of rebelling against history, memory, language, and gods.  
Alma’s longing for treason drifts, like her raft, throughout the entire narrative as the 
principle that stands against the war, against nations and States, against every 
principle fought for––fascism, Empire, democracy. 
 The irony makes its way into every novelistic event as the alternative 
meaning that is not represented: it is what is presented by the prologue and what 
insinuates itself throughout.  The result is that Hidalgo Hispanophilia, Shigura’s 
“neo-Nipponese rising sun,” and Deogracias’ “exploitation of the metaphor” in the 
name of the tabernacle of the Filipino are all ironized: they are the objects 
refracted, emanating the idea of their delimitations’ abolition through treason, 
through the destruction of hierarchies, laws, rules, and values.  The object 
represented, in other words, disappears; what takes its place is the object-less idea 
of treason.  Recall, in my discussion of Deleuze, that the baroque mode posits not 
the object, but the objectile, the thing perceived from the standpoint of an 
hallucination.  The irony involved in disappearing the objects of the narrative is 
thus a baroque irony, resulting from both a preliminary hallucination and the 
precipitation of a non-represented idea: non-hierarchical unity, the traitorous 
adventure of the boy, Alma, and Quasimoto.  
 What the reader perceives are not the divisions between nations, identities, 
flags, and ideas, but potential unities, the traitorous unities for which Alma longs.  
As the non-represented object, or objectile, this treason plunges the reader into the 
condition of the superject––that is, the effect of the perception (as Deleuze called 
it), which, in this case, is nothing less than the effect of the reader’s encounter with 
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the literary work, or, what amounts to the same thing, the reading process itself.   
What happens is that the reader’s thought on the narrative objectiles is a thought on 
the objectile as product of the reading process, such that the reader begins to think 
his or her own effectedness by (as being the effect of) the encounter with the literary 
work.   
 We have thus reached the incompossible dimensions of the novel.  The 
traitorous world is a world against the world represented in the novel.  Inasmuch as 
this incompossibility is a function of thought, the question of the reader’s 
inseparability from incompossibility, or the subject as incompossibility, is 
actualized.  The reader’s encounter with the novel produces the reader-subject when 
he or she thinks the novel qua the baroque mode and sees beyond the representation 
of the war and grasps the idea of a radical treason.  This thought places the reader in 
touch with the idea of the reading process as the process by which absolute 
negativity––that treason of Shigura’s––becomes thinkable.  This absolute negativity 
is the incompossible world that the reader-subject thinks, or in other words, is the 
reader-subject’s thought qua the work of literature.  And inasmuch as this reader 
thinks incompossibility, he or she also becomes a subject––by thinking the 
separation from the world from itself and, in the process, thinking on the side of the 
world that cannot be tolerated and represented by the world given by the novel.   
 
D.  “A HUNDRED SEPARATE PLACES:” THE WORLD OF TREASON 
 But why exactly is this reader a subject, i.e. militant?  Because he or she 
initiates the praxis enabled by the thought on this incompossibility.  Praxis, to 
recall our discussion of Rancière and Jauss, is the reader’s ability to think the 
reconstitution of the world according to the principle of equality, of literature’s 
redistribution of the sensible beyond the delimitations imposed upon the social 
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order by capitalism.  The primary means for literary praxis, as we saw, is its 
abolition of communication, and that this abolition initiates in its turn the 
“disincorporation” of both knowledge and being.  This has the effect of making 
visible––but without representing––a new mode of life, a new kind of community 
that, by destroying the composition of capital’s social order, is inefficient and non-
productive, thus calling to mind the idea of a new mode of production altogether.  
This links literary praxis with the thought on concrete work.   
 But for the Lovers expresses, through baroque irony, this incompossible 
world as the world that did not fall into the trap of positing the binary between 
fascism and democracy, a binary that, as we have been discussing throughout this 
dissertation, makes it possible to salvage democracy’s liberatory potential, one that 
has, because of Empire’s hegemonic power, been corrupted.  Alma’s prologue, by 
introducing what can be called the baroque ironic mode, repudiates democracy 
itself: treason names the rebellion against those sacred values that maintain 
democracy’s hold on radical politics.  There is nothing more treasonous than 
expressing the idea, especially in a Filipino novel, that a Japanese fascist is 
redeemable, much less an essential element to the cause of freedom, even an 
hallucinatory one.  This is a community of traitors.  This is a community that does 
not only not believe that the American return could have ever named a true 
liberation; it also believes that democracy, the legacy it has left and the violent 
capitalist path it has traced throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, itself 
can do nothing but name Empire itself.   
 What kind of a community is nameable, then?  The incompossible world is 
named by the force of attribution.  Since it designates absolute negativity, the 
incompossible world, produced by literary praxis, is drawn from out of its abyss by 
the reader-subject’s emergence, i.e. by attribution.  The common named is still 
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Filipino: the reader-subject as Filipino becomes Filipino by virtue of his or her 
recognition of the significance of thinking, qua the Philippines, past the 
identitarianism that could potentially plague the thought on a diasporic political 
subject.  Like Alma’s raft, this subject drifts throughout the world seeking freedom; 
but it is still Filipino inasmuch as this subject takes upon itself the project of 
eroding the foundations of its very being.  This being is the being dominated by the 
axiomatic––the alignment of the Filipino with capital, with Empire, with the State, 
with neoliberal democracy.  But a becoming-Filipino, whose political destiny is that 
of the constellational subject, and vice versa, is the name of an uprising against the 
axiomatization, which, by “using” the primary term of the axiomatic field––the 
Filipino––also discloses the existence of some originary point upon which the 
axiomatic, through a continual negation, is constituted.  The becoming-Filipino, in 
other words, names the incompossible world that militates against neoliberal 
democracy––the “other” Filipino that is banned by the axiomatic Filipino.  This is 
the Filipino that Alma calls to mind, the Filipino producible when the reader thinks 
the baroque irony of the novel.   
 Moreover, because incompossibility requires the subject’s self-
differentiation into subject and object, superject and objectile, the following 
happens: when a becoming-Filipino occurs, this means that what the reader-subject 
encounters is the idea of his or her inclusion in the world of treason, a thought that 
thinks itself in the process of becoming, of engaging the act of treason.  This 
accomplishes what I defined as thought’s doubling: the thought on the thought of 
the function of militancy.  To think this thought is to think one’s subject-hood, and 
since subject-hood is incompossibility, to think this thought is to think one’s 
incompossibility.  The reading process initiated in But for the Lovers is thus the 
initiator of a thought on the subject’s present as being rife with the potential for the 
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incompossible, for the eruption of absolute negativity, of the destruction of 
axiomatization.   
 At the end of the novel, as Tondo burns, torched by the Japanese while 
fleeing from the American invasion, the city is overrun by looting Filipinos: 
“Manila appeared to be invaded by civilians.”32  In the chaos, amid the fire, Alma 
rides on Amoran’s back, both of them looking for shelter.  They are attacked by 
other Filipinos, and retaliate by scratching and biting; they respond by backhanding 
and punching her, choking her from behind.  This is a surprising scene.  Prior to 
that, she has been held, because of her enigmatic beauty, in virtual reverence by 
everyone she meets: when found malnourished after a third suicide attempt (before 
being found by Hidalgo and Amoran), she is used, alternately, by an entire 
community as an example of Japan’s cruelty, as the indication that the government 
should reform its agrarian policies.33  After she kisses Captain Johnny on the cheek 
during one of the guerillas’ propagandistic processions, he becomes obsessed with 
her, falling deathly ill, haunted by her memory.34  And Shigura himself tracks her 
every movement, following her throughout Manila on his white horse.35  She passes 
through the novel generating meaning––or rather, she passes through and everyone 
creates meaning from her, driving everyone, almost literally, crazy.  But in truth, 
she is a cipher, an abyss.  She is the absolute negation, as the desirer of treason, of 
all values and meaning.  It is only in the state of complete panic, when the city 
becomes invaded by its own citizens, when a virtual uprising occurs, that she ceases 
to be the bearer of meaning and simply becomes one of the many Filipinos 
scrambling and fighting for their lives.   
                                                
32 ibid, 306.  
33 ibid, 53. 
34 ibid, 148 – 9. 
35 ibid, passim. 
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 This is a riot, however, and she is mourning it.  After finding shelter in a 
pagoda, she begins to pray, cursing and blaming Hidalgo (the only character who 
sought to force meaning upon her, rather than deriving it from her) “and the 
universe of man with a voice softer than sleep, louder than nightmare before the 
boy [Amoran] who could not lock his ears, only shut his eyes as she mourned to a 
burning city.”36  Is this mourning imbued with the same irony as the rest of the 
novel?  Yes.  If everyone’s attempts at extracting meaning from her are indeed 
ironic, which means that they express, as against treason, the attempt to delimit her 
as an exploitable metaphor (like Winters), then her equalization during the burning 
of Tondo can mean only one thing: that the universe of man that she lashes out 
against is a universe of warfare and States, that she herself has been included in the 
war and given meaning as a Filipino who has been reduced to salvaging the scraps 
of Empire for livelihood––to what the Japanese have left behind, to what the 
Americans are bombarding.  What she mourns is the universe of man itself, of a 
humanity defined by its continual laying of seige in the name of States, in the name 
of putative freedoms, of capital, of expansion, of democracy.  If she does not have 
the capability to confound those who surround her, it is only because the end of the 
second world war signaled not the apocalypse of values, but the saturation of them: 
everything became an object for the Occupation’s cruelty, everything became a 
target for democratic liberation.  This saturation of value is what Alma remains 
treasonous towards: the Filipino she names is beyond the value of this politics.  It 
names the potential for exceeding humanity, one freed from hierarchies and 
representation.  It names a subject whose autonomy arises by thinking the absolute 
negativity of axiomatization.   
                                                
36 ibid, 307.  
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 If there is something to be learned from But for the Lovers, then it is that, 
“[p]erhaps in a hundred separate places . . . revolution––or at the very least, a 
collective rage––was the only answer.”37  This is a rage born not from the seige of 
Empire, when the Filipino is left to fight each other for the spoils of warfare; it is a 
rage that explodes in an expression of autonomy against order, against identity, in 
the name of a multilateral constitution of a diasporic militant subject, one that bursts 
like a constellation, one region after the other or all at once, lighting up the earth in 
one spot and then another, becoming here and there in spite of the State, in spite of 
capital, in spite of democracy, a vast world composed of traitors.   
                                                
37 ibid, 263.   
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CONCLUSION 
IN THE NAME OF SILENCE 
 
 
 
 
 Of course what I have been describing for the last three chapters remains 
open to chance.  The production of a political subject qua literature-as-thought is 
always a potentiality.  The risk taken in literature is precisely what gives it its 
ability to induce a becoming-Filipino: its abolition of communication, the burial, as 
But for the Lovers shows, of the idea of militancy beneath a heap of language, 
under a pile of characters and events given in the novel’s representative apparatus.  
As I mentioned in the Introduction, literature is a variable operator of attribution.  
This, in a way, drives a wedge into this dissertation––the first part, i.e. the first three 
chapters, acting as the preliminary investigations to a further theoretical elaboration 
of the characteristics of a diasporic militant Filipino subject, and the second part, 
i.e. the last three chapters, with the fourth chapter acting as the bridge, the 
description of how one variable operator, literature, is capable of potentially 
inducing attribution.   
 This mode of organization, I hope, has shown, by demonstration, the need to 
disavow ourselves from posing the question of what comes first: the idea of the 
constellational diaspora, or its encounter in literature, or any other variable operator, 
for that matter.  Contrary to such a false dichotomy, my aim has been to 
demonstrate that they are inseperable, that the thought on the constellational 
diaspora is not something that one brings to literature, nor is it something that arises 
from out of literature as a special domain of thought, but rather that literature is 
itself a form of thought equal to any other, that the reading process can function as 
a way of thinking that, in the characteristics and mannerisms, so to speak, specific 
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to this enterprise, can operate the thought on a non-hierarchical diasporic politics.  
This is what I mean when I call literature literature-as-thought.  As against the 
tendencies of Iser, for instance, who, in the phenomenological tradition, submits 
literature to the special conditions of the Husserlian epoché, I think that literature is 
actually one mode of thought into which one passes, yet another moment in many 
others, where a variety of operators exist, in which the thought on attribution and a 
true Filipino militancy occurs.  If anything, what I have been after all along is to 
demonstrate how it is possible to think this militancy, qua the concept of absolute 
negativity, in a variety of reading “situations:” from sets of theoretical works 
(Laclau and Mouffe, Badiou, Althusser, Marx, Negri, Iser, Jauss, Rancière, 
Deleuze), to historical and critical analyses and claims (San Juan, Allen, the CPP-
Maoist), and of course to literature and literary theory (Moretti, José, Lukács, Frye, 
Bulosan, Nolledo).   
 Where does that leave us?  If indeed a concept that makes militancy 
thinkable can be found in that of treason, this means that thinking treason as a 
consistent praxis entails disavowing the claims, in today’s military-politico climate, 
of the war on terror.  If the name Filipino serves to designate the treason against the 
doctrines of the present, then it is a precarious endeavor indeed.  It means 
disavowing every claim and every definition implied in the war on terror, from the 
name “terrorism” itself to that which defends society from it: democracy.  Being a 
traitor means being militant because it names that subject that not only questions, 
but posits true radical alternatives to the concepts of resistance, justice, liberation, 
and, what is more, society, which, increasingly, has come to be identified with 
capitalism and American-enforced democracy.  It means positing a new topology of 
liberatory action, of creating new spaces for revolution and self-constitution.  
Because it has become impossible to think democracy without also recuperating, in 
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some way the axiomatics of Empire and capital, of the police and the State, it has 
come time to replace it with a new idea, perhaps with a new notion of democracy 
not beholden to the consensus’ claims of equality, whether social, political, or 
economic, which involves, then, even rejecting the idea of a radical democracy that 
merely fights for what the present declares possible.   
 And what is this new idea?  For the Filipino diaspora, the question is vexing.  
I chose World War II as my historical point of inquiry strategically: all too often, 
the trap of democracy rears itself when the problem of America’s liberation is 
tackled by the Left.  The binary between fascism and democracy having been 
criticized, it is not difficult to move on to the binary between terrorism and 
democracy: if the former is being used by the defenders of Empire and capital to 
axiomatically generate Filipinos across the world, where OCWs, and especially the 
domestic workers, become the new heroes and heroines of the Philippine State, and 
when this act of support becomes a matter of national pride and an issue of the 
Philippines’ progress towards an economically secure future; when this is 
contingent upon the influx of capital from TNCs, the loans of the IMF, and World 
Bank projects; when the flow of capital ensures the Philippines’ integration into a 
neoliberal global economy; when this economy can survive only when States are 
democratically-secured from the threats against terrorism, anti-democratic 
sentiment, and, what amounts to the same thing, anti-Americanism; when anyone 
who challenges the alignment of freedom, security, justice, progress, democracy, 
Empire, capital, and America are automatically linked to the world of the hijackers 
who were able to transform those jetliners into weapons to smash them into the 
World Trade Center––if indeed this marks the topology of the current world order, 
then those who seek to rescue democracy from its imperial corruptors seem doomed 
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to failure.  They can do nothing but imagine a way to work, as the saying does, 
“within the system,” a system that remains obstinate to the subtleties of language.   
 Absolute negativity, the absolute negativity of the constellational Filipino 
diaspora, is my contribution to thinking “outside” and imagining otherwise.   
 It: 
 a.  introduces the future into the present; 
 b.  remains heretical to the past; 
 c.  aims at thinking non-hierarchically; 
 d.  creates the possibility of thinking of militancy as a discreet procedure  
      that nonetheless has ramifications in the vast field of the diaspora’s  
      reach; and 
 e.  conceptualizes thought as the primary means for praxis, such that  
      thinking absolute negativity in every situation, which demands the  
      recognition of the variable operators of every encounter (with ideas, with 
      concrete events), becomes the instigator of true militant activity. 
Because the topology of the constellational diaspora, as the topology of absolute 
negativity for a militant Filipino diaspora, is based upon thought, it has an 
advantage over the axiomatics of the current order.  If the mainstream Left still 
loves a democracy that cannot escape its capitalist and imperial besiegers, it is 
confined to what is essentially a semantic debate: democracy means this, not that, 
and it involves doing this, not that.  The defenders of the democratic principle, no 
matter how radical they are, are still trapped in the logic of communication.  But we 
have arrived at a point where it is pointless to argue, where we seek to simply 
transform things from the standpoint of the kind of hegemonic disagreement of 
Laclau and Mouffe’s “socialist strategy.”   
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 Absolute negativity demands otherwise.  Its discretion is its strategy, and it 
involves being distant from the current world, it means operating militancy in small 
units of self-constitution.  Instead of passing through Empire, the State, and capital, 
instead of talking to them, it posits silence as its accomplice; because it is non-
delimitable even to itself, because self-constitution is contingent upon the region in 
which the axiomatic produces the Filipino as a friend to power, it posits multiply 
incompossible worlds.  It is the language and praxis that give rise to militancy in 
every situation, a language and praxis, however, that remain, because of their 
discretion, incomprehensible to power.  Absolute negativity always comes as a 
surprise, like an ambush. 
 Admittedly, this is all very poetic; I have not quite provided the concrete 
examples of, for instance, a type of locally-based organization of, say, domestic 
workers, seamen, or service workers in the oil fields of the Middle East.  
Regrettably, I have left that to a future project.  What I have done in this 
dissertation is much more humble and, perhaps ironically, risky: to present the 
theoretical foundations for this future project, to conceptualize what it means to 
posit absolute negativity and a militant Filipino diasporic subject.  I say risky 
because, of course, the demands of theory are high, and quite often its reach barely 
extends beyond the imaginary walls of the academy, and my audience has been 
limited to those who care about Badiou, Althusser and Deleuze, and who can put up 
with the dense abstraction of the language I have been deploying.  But perhaps this 
dissertation has been a practice in thought itself––to think, within a given situation, 
in the language of that situation, absolute negativity.  The task now is to extend this 
thought, to manifest absolute negativity such that its poetry remains, it being a 
function of thought (abstraction is inevitable), but in a way that its confounding 
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silence ring loud as a call to action, a concretization of the militancy of becoming-
Filipino.   
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